Check Against Delivery
Speech for Bill C-59
Presented to the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence (SECD)
Pierre Blais, Chairman of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC)
Chantelle Bowers, Acting Executive Director, SIRC
May 2, 2019
Good afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters. I was last before Parliament to discuss Bill C-59 with your colleagues in the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, in February 2018.
I said then, and will say again, that C-59 is a complex but extremely important bill that will put national security in Canada, and accountability for it, on a new course for the foreseeable future. I am pleased to see the bill moving its way through the parliamentary process.
I would like to begin by describing for you SIRC’s mandate and responsibilities.
SIRC was created in 1984 at the same time and in the same legislation as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). SIRC is an independent, external review body, meaning that it is at arms’ length from the Government. SIRC does not report to any Minister, but rather directly to Parliament. SIRC operates through a Committee of “eminent” Canadians, with diverse political and regional backgrounds. I am the Chair of the Committee.
SIRC helps ensure that CSIS discharges its mandate appropriately, lawfully and effectively, both domestically and abroad. In essence, SIRC’s mandate is to provide assurance to Parliament, and by extension Canadians, that CSIS investigates and reports on threats to national security, and collects foreign intelligence, in a manner that respects the rule of law and the rights of Canadians.
SIRC’s mandate translates into three core responsibilities, the first of which is to carry out in-depth reviews of CSIS’s activities. Secondly, SIRC is called upon to certify the CSIS Director’s annual report to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. Finally, SIRC investigates complaints from the public about the activities of CSIS and denials of security clearances.
The system as a whole functioned quite well, and continues to do so. However, SIRC and others are questioning the effectiveness of the siloed system of accountability as it has existed for over 30 years. This discussion began in earnest in the post 9/11 context with the observation that the national security activities of many federal entities had become intertwined in the aftermath of 9/11, but that the existing review agencies remained siloed.
In our 2010-2011 annual report, SIRC commented that “Canada’s system of checks and balances, designed decades ago to ensure the accountability of individual agencies, has not kept pace with these changes. The existing review mechanisms—including SIRC—are neither configured nor equipped to examine fully Canada’s increasingly integrated national security activities.” This represents an important gap in accountability for these activities.
At a high level, the Bill before you would fix this problem. It would provide NSIRA a mandate to review any activity of CSIS or CSE, any activity carried out in any other department or agency that relates to national security or intelligence, and any other matter related to national security referred to it by a Minister. This will bring dedicated national security review to a large number of other departments and agencies, including CBSA and the RCMP. SIRC is supportive of these proposed changes as they will address gaps in the system of accountability that we, along with many other groups, have pointed to for years.
Canada’s deliberations on accountability are happening at a time when there has been a shift in thinking on accountability for intelligence agencies, translating into expectations of greater transparency among the public. To that end, one of the great strengths of the bill is the provision that allows for the new review agency to issue special reports under section 40 (1) of the Act when it decides that it is in the public interest to do so. The new agency will issue these reports to the appropriate Minister, who must then cause them to be tabled before each House of Parliament.
This mechanism will allow the new review agency to signal a significant issue to Parliamentarians and the public in a timely way. SIRC is not currently able to do this, with its sole vehicle being its annual public report which must be tabled by September 30th of each fiscal year. This has been a limitation for SIRC in its ability to present the results of its work in a timely manner. In light of the government’s stated commitment to transparency, this is an important provision.
During our earlier appearance, SIRC provided SECU a number of specific proposals for amendments that, in our view, would improve and clarify certain aspects of the bill. During my statement, I called attention to the most important one, that relating to the principle that NSIRA should be “the master of its own procedure.” This proposal has been accepted and is included in the draft before you in section 7(1). We are grateful for this change.
Although not all of our other proposed amendments have been included, on the whole, we are satisfied with the bill as it stands. I will take the opportunity, however, to raise the important issue of the title in French of the proposed National Security Intelligence Review Agency. In particular, it seems clear that the intent of Bill C-59 is to distinguish “review” from “oversight”, and that NSIRA’s mandate would be one of review. Thus, the translation “Office de surveillance…” which refers to “oversight” in English, should be changed to “Office d’examen…” which refers more appropriately to “review”. I have indicated this in a letter to the Minister and I leave it to you for your consideration.
I will end simply by restating SIRC’s support for the direction in Bill C 59 with respect to the creation of NSIRA. It represents a significant step forward for review and accountability.
I now would be happy to answer any question you may have.
Thank you.
- Date modified: