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4. Looking back: A Maturing Organization (1990-2004)

Reflections - A History of SIRC

Looking back

A maturing organization (1990-2004)

Over the 1990s and into the new millennium, CSIS evolved, becoming noticeably more familiar and comfortable with the accountability expectations placed on it. SIRC was also maturing and saw an influx of new staff as well as new Committee chairs and members. The relationship between CSIS and SIRC benefited from a deepening mutual respect for each other's work and responsibilities—a point that was recognized repeatedly in SIRC's annual reports throughout this decade.

While improved relations throughout the 1990s were a direct result of CSIS's growth and maturity as a civilianized organization, some of the credit also belongs to SIRC's second Chair, John Bassett (1989–1992). His impact on SIRC is acknowledged by Maurice Archdeacon, who recalls Mr. Bassett as “a man of enormous achievement and charisma...he was a great listener and possessed a remarkable memory. Everybody he met respected him—and that served him exceptionally well in his work with CSIS. Even though he was only with SIRC for three years, he managed to accomplish a lot, especially in helping to build a more workable relationship with the Service.”

Mr. Bassett's view of CSIS and of how that organization had become more professional was clearly reflected in the 1991–1992 SIRC annual report. It noted: “Those who have followed the progress of CSIS with interest have seen our annual reports change from being compendiums of direct and implied criticism, in the early years, to being much more supportive accounts of CSIS's activities in recent years. This progressive but clear-cut change in the tone and substance of our annual reports simply reflects the fact that CSIS is now virtually a new organization, hardly recognizable any more as the direct descendant of the Security Service of the RCMP.”

Section 54 reports

It is worth noting two Section 54 reports that were prepared while Bassett was Chair of SIRC: Air India, and the investigation into the attack on the Iranian embassy. These reports are a special kind of review, pursuant to Section 54 of the CSIS Act, in which SIRC can report to the Minister on any matter relating to the Service's performance of its duties and functions. Reports of this nature are rare—as of 2004, only seven had been produced in the last decade.

• Air India—SIRC undertook an extensive review of the 1985 Air India tragedy—an incident in which an Air India flight originating from Vancouver was destroyed by a planted bomb, killing all passengers and crew. SIRC's report—which it had delayed after considering a well-presented case by the Crown about the need to avoid interfering with an ongoing police investigation—served to answer many questions about CSIS's predictive capacity. The Committee's report, published in November 1992, found deficiencies with CSIS's handling of the investigation, but concluded the agency was not in a position to predict the bombing attack.
• Attack on the Iranian embassy—The Committee examined the role of CSIS prior to and during the 1992 attack on the Iranian Embassy in Ottawa by members of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) organization. SIRC identified a flaw in the way the Service handled information before the attack, but concluded that this information—even if it had reached the right person at the right time—would not likely have led a reasonable person to issue a warning to the police.

New leadership and a landmark court ruling

By late 1992, SIRC saw a change in leadership with the appointment of Montreal lawyer Jacques Courtois as the Committee's third Chair (1992–1996). Under Mr. Courtois' leadership, the Committee had to contend with the consequences of the Thomson decision—a landmark Supreme Court of Canada ruling that had been rendered earlier that year. This case was about an individual (Thomson), who had been refused a position with the Department of Agriculture because of an unfavourable security assessment by CSIS. He appealed this decision to SIRC, which conducted a hearing and recommended he be given the necessary clearance. This recommendation was rejected by the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, prompting a series of court decisions that culminated in a final ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada. It held that SIRC's recommendations in security clearance cases were not binding on government—a setback and disappointment for the Committee.

Heritage Front

Mr. Courtois' leadership and the skills of all Committee members were put to the test in 1994, when well-publicized allegations surfaced about a CSIS source, Grant Bristow, who had been operating within the Heritage Front, a North American-based neo-Nazi group. This issue attracted significant media and public attention and prompted many scholars to view the case as “the first serious test” of the Canadian system of public accountability for security intelligence.¹⁵ Maurice Archdeacon described the Heritage Front review as “ one of the most interesting we had ever done.” SIRC's investigation included the review of over 25,000 pages of documents, as well as interviews of over 100 individuals. The result was a 200–plus page report, submitted to the Solicitor General of Canada, in which the Committee extensively documented CSIS's investigation of the Heritage Front. A vetted version of this report was also made public.

SIRC concluded that CSIS was right to investigate the leadership of the extremist organization. Committee members later defended that point of view in their presentations to the House of Commons Subcommittee on National Security, providing more than 16 hours of testimony. While SIRC rebuked Bristow for having tested the limits of what was appropriate behaviour with respect to his involvement in the Heritage Front, it also said that Canadians owed him a debt for doing valuable work. It's worth noting that in August 2004, Walrus Magazine ran a story by Andrew Mitrovica, looking back at Bristow's involvement in the Heritage Front affair. In the article, the author noted that as a result of SIRC's review, “the media hysteria that had enveloped Bristow quickly evaporated as much of the press accepted SIRC's findings and considered the case closed.”¹⁶

Renewed vigour

In 1996, less than four years into his term as Chair, Mr. Courtois passed away after a brief illness. In his place, Madame Paule Gauthier was appointed as the fourth Chair of SIRC. A former president of the Canadian Bar Association (1992–1993) and a member of SIRC from 1984–1991 and from 1995–1996, Mme Gauthier's appointment as Chair was welcomed by many as the start of a new, revitalized era for SIRC. Distinguished York University political scientist Reg Whitaker contended that this new leadership resulted in “a renewed confidence at SIRC.”¹⁷ Mme Gauthier's appointment followed less than two years after the appointment of Ward Elcock as Director of CSIS. Together, these leaders helped spark renewed vigour in their respective organizations.

This revitalized attitude was reflected in the Committee's 1998–1999 annual report, which noted that at the fifteen year mark in the history of the CSIS Act, some “fairly reliable conclusions” could be drawn about the state of security intelligence in Canada. “The plain fact is that some twenty years after Justice McDonald laid out the broad principles for Canada's security intelligence system, there is a growing incongruity between the world for which the existing set of laws and practices were designed almost two decades ago, and the world as it is in 1999.”

As SIRC Chair, Mme Gauthier has taken a keen interest in the Committee's mandate to investigate complaints. She has presided over 22 open and 14 ex parte hearings, involving eight cases since her appointment as Chair, and has authored five written reports to date. In addition, there have been several noteworthy reviews under Mme Gauthier's leadership:

• Ernst Zündel—National media credited SIRC for helping to block a bid by Holocaust denier Ernst Zündel to become a Canadian citizen. He attempted to fight SIRC's authority to investigate his case, which included a review of earlier findings by CSIS that had concluded Zündel was ineligible for Canadian citizenship because he posed a threat to national security. In 1997, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld SIRC's authority. Subsequently, the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of the lower court's decision.
• Sunni Islamic extremism—Following the events of September 11, 2001, SIRC conducted a broad-based study into CSIS's earlier investigation of al-Qaida and Sunni Islamic extremism in general. The Committee identified “ no evidence or information that would indicate that CSIS had in its possession any information that should have alerted it, and through it the Government, to the impending events of September 11^th.”
• Ahmed Ressam—The Committee looked at the activities of CSIS concerning the case of Ahmed Ressam—an Algerian-born al-Qaida operative arrested in 1999 in the U.S. in connection with a bombing plot. In SIRC's report, much of which remains classified to protect ongoing investigations, it contended that Ressam had earlier been able to evade scrutiny while planning his attack because officials in the Canadian Passport Office had mistakenly issued him a Canadian passport under a false name.
• Maher Arar—While the specifics cannot be discussed as they remain the subject of an ongoing public inquiry, this case illustrates the difficult dilemma often faced by the Committee. Because of SIRC's legal obligation to protect both national security and privacy concerns, it is often difficult to convey the thoroughness or complexity of SIRC reviews, or provide the details that might help to substantiate its findings and recommendations. SIRC launched its Section 54 review before the Commission of Inquiry was established, and provided its findings to the Minister in May 2004. Although the classified report was shared with the Commission, SIRC was unfairly criticized when the government released a heavily expurgated version without consulting the Committee. SIRC has stated publicly that it would have “no objection” if a summary of its classified report is released by the Commission, once its own investigation is completed.

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Date Modified:

2010-10-14