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Reflections - A History of SIRC
Commentary
Intelligence review and democratic governance: An overview of Canadian and international perspectives
by Professor Martin Rudner
In response to the global terrorist onslaught that beset the turn of the 21st century, the intelligence services of democracies, including Canada, have been catapulted to the forefront of public attention. In democracies, citizens look to their intelligence agencies to protect national security and public safety. They also look to intelligence review (often confused with “oversight
”) to provide public scrutiny of the activities of those agencies. Intelligence review plays a vital role in making secret intelligence agencies politically accountable and publicly acceptable—it has become a hallmark of good governance in the domain of national security in democratic political systems.
Intelligence review is structured and performed in various ways in different countries. It may be undertaken by an executive, legislative or freestanding body—one that is political-party based, bi-partisan, or non-partisan and independent. Review bodies can have jurisdiction over a single intelligence agency or over a wider intelligence and security sector. The scope of intelligence review or oversight can be retrospective—scrutinizing past practices—or can involve the investigation of current, ongoing operations. Evaluations in the review process may assess organizational efficiency, including resource allocation and questions of value for money, or may examine the compliance of intelligence activities against law, policy and Ministerial direction, or ethical propriety. Outcomes from the review process can take the form of binding directives to remedy deficiencies, or recommendations to government and or to the intelligence service concerned for remedial action. This can be conducted either in public or secretly.
Canada, Belgium and Norway each have a freestanding, non-partisan intelligence review committee operating at arm's-length from Parliament. Other countries chose to base their intelligence review or oversight responsibilities more directly within their respective legislatures. The United States Congress, the German Bundestag, the Israeli Knesset and the parliaments of Australia, Italy, Switzerland and New Zealand (among others) all have specific committees mandated to monitor the conduct of their respective intelligence services. While the intelligence review function in those countries is politically representational, it can also become partisan and politically charged. The United Kingdom, for its part, sought to blend parliamentary representation with non-partisan prescriptions in an Intelligence and Security Committee, which was given a unique statutory status.
Governments may also make use of executive oversight mechanisms, such as Inspectors General (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, U.S.A.), or executive boards (Sweden) or judicial commissions (New Zealand, U.K.) to monitor intelligence service compliance with law and policy. Most countries confine their intelligence scrutiny to the retrospective review of intelligence activities. A few also provide for the external oversight of current operations. American congressional committees and the Norwegian Committee on the Intelligence, Surveillance and Security Services are two examples of external bodies that engage in oversight of current, ongoing intelligence operations.
Both approaches—retrospective review and operational oversight—present important challenges to national security systems of democratic countries. Intelligence review (and especially oversight bodies) risk being co-opted as a result of the close working relationship that must develop for scrutiny to be effective. With oversight in particular, there is a danger that intelligence monitoring can become transformed into an endorsement of ongoing operations, absolving the intelligence service from any subsequent questioning about the propriety of its actions. Retrospective reviews of intelligence activities can also involve ambiguities of time, especially with respect to intelligence operations that last for prolonged periods. This is frequently seen with counter-terrorism cases, where investigations and surveillance of suspected terrorists and their networks can continue for years. In Canada, SIRC can initiate a review of CSIS activities at any time and may scrutinize operations that are still ongoing, but only on a retrospective basis.
During its first two decades, SIRC had to heed the changing thrust of CSIS activities as the focus of security intelligence shifted from the Cold War preoccupation with counter-espionage and counter-subversion, to current priorities: counter-terrorism, transnational organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The expanded role of security intelligence over the past two decades has been accompanied by an unprecedented increase in reliance on inter-agency cooperation and information sharing, both domestically (with law enforcement agencies) and internationally (with allies and partners in the coalition against terrorism). These trends have far-reaching implications for intelligence review and accountability mechanisms. SIRC's mandate is limited by statute to the activities of CSIS and does not cover other organizations involved in security intelligence.
For the accountability process to function effectively, trust is required. The intelligence community and civil society must acknowledge the trustworthiness of the intelligence review system. The intelligence community must trust the intelligence review apparatus to exercise appropriate standards of accountability while respecting the need to protect citizens from harm by improper disclosures, unwarranted interference, or partisan political games. Civil society must trust intelligence review mechanisms to discern whether the intelligence mandate is being fulfilled lawfully and appropriately and that civil liberties are respected.
Trust takes time to build, and can be damaged by a moment of folly. Yet it is precisely trust that empowers the intelligence review and accountability functions, enabling them to enhance the democratic management of, and public confidence in, the national security machinery of government.
Professor Martin Rudner was Associate Director and Director of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, from 1985 to 1999, and is currently Director of the School's Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies. The author of numerous books and articles on international matters, he is Past President of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS), and a frequent commentator on national radio, television and print media. Dr. Rudner is also a member of the Advisory Panel to the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar.