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THE CASE OF PAUL WILLIAM HAMPEL (SIRC STUDY 2008-07)

Security Intelligence Review Committee July 6, 2009

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1 INTRODUCTION

In 2006, a CSIS study described Canada as "an appealing target for foreign powers whose goal is to steal secrets in order to advance their interests," and stated that Canada was increasingly subject to economic and foreign espionage operations on Canadian soil.¹ This review examines the case of an "illegal" who used Canada and his Canadian identity to conduct foreign espionage activities. In intelligence vernacular, an "illegal" is an elite intelligence officer who works clandestinely in a foreign country, using a false identity as a private citizen to carry out sensitive operations. A key aspect of an illegal's tradecraft is to create a false identity, referred to as a legend, which is either completely fabricated or is based on the identity of a deceased or living person.

On November 14, 2006, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) arrested and detained on a security certificate a Russian national, using the name Paul William Hampel, just as he was about to board a flight at Montreal's Trudeau International airport. As Canadian law requires, the Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration and of Public Safety signed a security certificate, citing Hampel as a threat to national security. The Federal Court subsequently approved the security certificate (as required by law) and, as a result, on December 25, 2006, Hampel was deported to Russia.

Hampel's detention and deportation received significant attention in the media, which reported that he was a Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) officer, who had been residing in Canada under a false identity since 1995. In his 2006/2007 report to the Minister of Public Safety, the Director of CSIS highlighted the Service's involvement in the case, although few details were provided. The objective of this review is to examine the Service's role in the Hampel case.

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¹ "Espionage in Canada," CSIS Study 2006-7/01(a).

A similar case occurred in 1996, when Ian and Laurie Lambert, who had been living in Canada under the assumed identities of two deceased Canadians, were identified by CSIS as Russian illegals. In May 1996, the Lamberts were detained under a security certificate, and subsequently deported to Russia in June 1996.

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2 OUTLINE AND SCOPE

This first section provides an overview of the Service's role in the Hampel case, including CSIS's investigation of this individual and its role in the security certificate process. The second section examines the effectiveness of the Service's investigation of Hampel's espionage activities. The report concludes by examining the intelligence gains achieved as a result of this investigation.

This study covers the period January 1, 2005 until June 30, 2007 inclusive.

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3 METHODOLOGY

The following documents were examined as part of the review:

a

Security Intelligence Report and other relevant documents (e.g. media lines, internal briefing notes, executive media summaries). Further, one briefing was held with CSIS officials in November 2008,³ providing additional insight into the investigation.

Branch which coordinated the investigation against

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These briefings within the Hampel.

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4 CSIS'S ROLE IN THE HAMPEL CASE

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4.2 CSIS and the Security Certificate

CSIS officials examined different options available,
After carefully weighing its options, CSIS favoured deportation through a security certificate

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ATIP version MAR 2 5 2019 CSIS identified two advantages to proceeding with a security certificate.

Second, a key purpose of a security certificate is to deport illegals. Once a certificate is signed and approved, it becomes an immigration deportation order. Hampel would not be afforded any recourse mechanisms under the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)* and would be permanently removed from Canada. CSIS therefore drafted a Security Intelligence Report (SIR) to be used in support of a security certificate.

CSIS sent the SIR to the Ministers of Public Safety and Citizenship and Immigration for their approval. The SIR contained three arguments that identified Hampel as a member of the SVR and a threat to national security, and therefore was inadmissible to Canada under *IRPA*.

CSIS identified Hampel as a SVR illegal,

posed a danger to national security,

CSIS stated that Hampel's activities

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5 EFFECTIVENESS OF CSIS'S INVESTIGATION

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CSIS was able to collect intelligence information that resulted in the successful arrest and deportation of a SVR illegal.

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6 CONCLUSION: WHAT HAS CSIS LEARNED?

The Hampel investigation afforded CSIS

Overall, the Hampel investigation has This future cases

will assist CSIS in better understanding

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7 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

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