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- Section 1: The Year in Review
Annual Report 2008-2009 - Accountability in a New Era of Security Intelligence
Section 1: The Year in Review
In less than two decades, the global environment in which Canada’s security intelligence operates has undergone a fundamental transformation.
The end of the Cold War appeared to promise a more peaceful world with an expanding number of democracies and more widespread economic prosperity. It soon became clear, however, that the emerging global environment was both more complex and less secure than when there was a clear demarcation of interests between Western and Communist states.
The rise of global terrorism has played a significant role in shaping today’s world, underscored most prominently by the rise of al Qaida as a globally capable terrorist platform. The 9/11 attacks on the United States, along with subsequent attacks in Europe and Asia, have changed how countries around the world perceive, and respond to, terrorism’s destructive potential.
The contemporary threat environment is characterized by a constant danger of meticulously planned terror attacks designed to inflict mass casualties and destroy infrastructure. Canada has been openly threatened with attacks by al Qaida. It has also been subject to domestic and self-radicalizing terrorist cells. The arrest and trial of the Toronto 18 is reflective of this complex and evolving threat environment.
SIRC recognizes that CSIS must respond to these terrorist threats while still pursuing its traditional counter-intelligence priorities. For example, investigating the national security implications of the clandestine activities of foreign governments remains an important issue of concern. Likewise, counter-proliferation continues to be a top CSIS priority as the global community faces a number of unstable regimes with nuclear ambitions.
As the threat environment in which CSIS operates changes, so too does the corresponding legal environment. Recent court proceedings have lifted the veil of secrecy on the inner workings of the intelligence community. As part of this process, judicial rulings have required that the information CSIS brings to the courts meet the highest legal standards.
SIRC believes that the security intelligence environment will continue to be characterized by multiple threats and a high degree of unpredictability. Although global terrorism might shift its focus, it can be expected to continue to breed disorder and instability. Within this context, anticipating and defusing terrorist plans, while at the same time investigating other threats to national security, requires an effective security intelligence service.
When security agencies are faced with a multi-dimensional threat environment—and the need to protect society’s fundamental values must be maintained—the role of a review body is equally complex. SIRC must comment on CSIS’s capacity to carry out its mandate and on the tools that it has to undertake its work. Equally important, SIRC recommendations must be practical and reflect the values of Canadians.
SIRC is the only independent review body with the mandate to comment on all aspects of the Service’s operations. It can respond to complaints or, on its own initiative, review specific aspects of CSIS. It can also respond to requests from the Minister of Public Safety to review the Service’s performance of its duties and functions.
Each year, SIRC reviews a selection of the Service’s operational activities to determine if it acted appropriately, effectively and in accordance with the law. This year’s annual report covers a range of CSIS’s operational activities and deals with some of the complex issues that confront the Service. Section 2 of this report summarizes the Committee’s reviews and complaint decisions.
In SIRC’s view, CSIS has made important progress in developing policies to guide itself on human rights issues when investigating threats to national security. However, as SIRC’s review of the Service’s role in the matter of Omar Khadr reveals, there are additional issues to be addressed. Of particular note, CSIS must consider the principles of national and international law in regards to the treatment of minors when interviewing a Canadian detainee abroad.
Security agencies cannot investigate terrorist activities unless they exchange information efficiently across borders. Some of the countries that may possess vital intelligence on threats to Canada’s security do not respect the human rights valued by Canadians. Canada does not use torture or approve of its use. Less straightforward, however, is whether CSIS should cooperate and interact with countries that may engage in human rights abuses to collect threat-related intelligence. As a result, it is increasingly important for SIRC to review the Service’s interactions with foreign intelligence agencies.
A related issue arises if a CSIS representative interviews a Canadian detained abroad. The priority for CSIS is the collection of security intelligence. At the same time, it must consider suspicions of torture or other human rights abuses—whether a detainee is able to directly confirm them or not.
From SIRC’s perspective, it is important for CSIS to address the many difficult issues that arise in conducting security intelligence work in a contemporary democracy. Most importantly, although intelligence collection is the Service’s raison d’être, the Khadr review underscores how extra-intelligence matters must become an integral part of CSIS’s decision-making processes. As part of this transition, CSIS must draw on the guidance of the Minister in addition to its own experience and resources.
In a separate review, the Committee examined CSIS’s activities at Canadian airports. These locations can be targets for terrorist attacks because they concentrate large numbers of people and are a vital part of Canada’s transportation infrastructure. CSIS activities at Canadian airports support the aviation security framework by providing national security advice and conducting interviews of persons suspected of posing a threat to national security. In reviewing the Service’s activities at these airports, SIRC found that CSIS’s presence enhances the security environment.
SIRC also examined the impact of legislation passed after 9/11 on CSIS’s activities. For instance, one of the goals of the 2001 federal Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA, or the Act) was to address terrorism financing. However, the Act raised some difficult issues for CSIS in terms of managing its human source program. In particular, due to the ATA’s provisions, activities related to CSIS’s human source program that could benefit organizations listed as terrorist entities were, by definition, potentially criminal acts. Although CSIS has taken steps to address these issues, SIRC believes more accountability to the Minister of Public Safety is needed with respect to certain aspects of the Service’s human source program.
SIRC’s review of CSIS’s investigation into domestic extremism found that key elements of the Service’s strategy for dealing with the domestic threat environment needed to be reviewed and reformulated. The Committee believes this is necessary to ensure there is a clear and common understanding of both the threat environment and the terminology used to describe it. This task will become more pressing over the coming months in advance of the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games in Vancouver—an event that will be a major test of Canada’s security infrastructure.
SIRC has the power to comment on the manner in which CSIS has used its authorities, as well as whether those authorities are fair, reasonable and appropriate to the threat. The Committee’s review of CSIS’s Scientific and Technical Services commented on the continuing lack of lawful-access legislation and its impact on Service operations. This legislation is needed. It would require that Internet service providers include intercept capabilities in their networks. SIRC hopes that the government’s latest legislative efforts on this matter are successful in achieving this goal.
The role of SIRC as a review agency would be straightforward if there were public successes and failures that could be analyzed for lessons learned. In the fortunate absence of an actual attack or a major security incident, SIRC examines aspects of CSIS operations, which can serve as valid indicators of the organization’s capability, efficiency and effectiveness.
In the past, SIRC focused much of its review activity on CSIS operations within Canada. As CSIS moves to expand its capacity to operate outside of Canada, SIRC will accordingly allocate more of its resources to review these activities. As well, SIRC will continue to investigate complaints—not only to see if they are justified, but to determine whether they signal more systemic issues for review.
Because of its extensive powers to investigate CSIS, SIRC takes very seriously the duty to understand the complex challenges that CSIS confronts and to thoroughly review its activities.
SIRC’s annual report is a vital component in meeting this expectation—one that has been entrusted to SIRC by Parliament, on behalf of Canadians.