Security Intelligence Review Committee / Comité de surveillance des activités de renseignement de sécurité
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Security Intelligence Review Committee

Annual Report 2006-2007 - An Operational Review of CSIS Activities

Section 2: CSIS accountability mechanisms

A. Reporting requirements

CSIS Director's Annual Report (2005–06)

Each year, the Director of CSIS must submit a classified report to the Minister of Public Safety, detailing the Service's priorities and operational activities. The CSIS Act also requires that the Inspector General of CSIS examine this report and submit a certificate to the Minister, which attests to the extent to which she is satisfied with its contents. Finally, the Minister sends a copy of both documents to SIRC for its review, as required by Section 38(a) of the CSIS Act.

According to the Director's Annual Report, the central priorities of the Service are the assurance of public safety and safeguarding of key critical infrastructure. The Director noted that he supports appropriate lawful access legislation to enhance CSIS's ability to meet these priorities. He believes such legislation would enhance intelligence-gathering capabilities and facilitate CSIS's access to modern telecommunications networks.

The investigation of terrorism and terrorist threats to Canada and Canadian interests abroad remain the Service's highest operational priority, in particular the numerous threats posed by Islamist extremism. The Director emphasized that the threat from al Qaida was most acute overseas, and that many of the Service's targets (including some Canadian citizens) are involved in international terrorist groups whose activities directly threaten Canadian interests internationally.

The Service continued to expand its role in supporting Canadian forces abroad. In 2005–06, this included support for Canadian forces in Afghanistan, involvement in the mission to recover Canadian hostages in Iraq and assistance in the evacuation of Canadian citizens from Lebanon. The Director publicly acknowledged these activities in October 2006.

In addition, the Director reported that CSIS had ongoing investigations into many domestic terrorist-related activities, including the threat of serious violence related to Native extremism, militant Quebec nationalism and white supremacist and environmental movements. For the second year, the Director emphasized the threat posed by al Qaida-inspired, homegrown extremists within Canada such as the ongoing criminal proceedings against fifteen individuals living in Toronto.

The Director's report also noted that the Service continued to investigate attempts by foreign countries to conduct espionage, access proprietary technologies and proliferate weapons of mass destruction. Three countries were considered priorities in 2005–06, but many other countries were engaged in similar activities.

The security screening statistics reported by the Director have already been reported in SIRC's 2005–06 annual report. The Director noted that CSIS expanded its security screening responsibilities by signing agreements with two provinces and assumed new obligations under a 2005 tripartite agreement, the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America.

The Director noted that CSIS expanded its cooperative network with domestic partners by adding two new Memoranda of Understanding in 2005–06. He also reported that CSIS maintains excellent relations with its key foreign partners. Emphasis was also placed on how the Service exercises due diligence concerning the human rights records of partner countries or agencies, and that it continues to provide training to new intelligence services on the principles of intelligence collection in democracies.

Readers should note that CSIS posts public, unclassified reports on its website (www.csis-scrs.gc.ca).

Certificate of the Inspector General of CSIS (2006)

The position of Inspector General (IG) was established in 1984 under the CSIS Act. The IG carries out internal reviews of CSIS on behalf of the Minister of Public Safety, reviewing the Service's operations and providing assurance that CSIS is complying with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policy.

Every year, the IG submits a certificate to the Minister stating the extent to which he or she is satisfied with the CSIS Director's Annual Report. The certificate also informs the Minister of any instances of CSIS failing to comply with either the Act or Ministerial Direction, or an unreasonable or unnecessary exercise of its powers.

The IG reported being satisfied with the 2005–06 CSIS Director's Annual Report, but noted there were some discrepancies between the statistics reported and the facts provided to the IG. The IG found that the Service had not acted beyond its statutory authority and that it exercised its duties and functions effectively and professionally.

The IG reported that for 2005–06, there was an increase in the number of incidents of non-compliance with operational policy. The IG defines non-compliance as any action that is not in adherence with rules, procedures, principles and guidelines set out in operational policy. She does not differentiate the relative importance of any instance of non-compliance.

Among the concerns brought forward by the IG was that CSIS's 2005 annual direction statement was based on national security intelligence requirements issued to CSIS by an ad-hoc Cabinet Committee. According to the IG, the national requirements become a Cabinet Confidence and therefore limit the IG's right of access to all CSIS information.

The IG found several cases where information was mishandled, including cases where her staff found discrepancies and inaccuracies in CSIS files, as well as instances where CSIS was unable to locate or retrieve documentation requested.

The IG identified several gaps in current CSIS policy. She noted that the policy framework did not reflect the current procedures for the approval of information exchanges with partner agencies. The IG observed that there is a growing disconnect between policy and practice with respect to the execution of warrant powers.

Section 16 of the CSIS Act requires the Service to limit the collection of foreign intelligence to within Canada, while security intelligence collected under Section 12 may be obtained within Canada and abroad.11 In her 2006 certificate, the IG noted considerable overlap between the Service's Section 12 and Section 16 investigations, leading her to conclude that in some cases, the effect of the geographical restriction of Section 16 is meaningless.

Finally the IG concluded that she observed a gap in operational policies governing certain CSIS operations overseas.

For more information, please refer to the Inspector General's home page on the Public Safety website (publicsafety.gc.ca).

Unlawful Conduct by CSIS

Under Section 20(2) of the CSIS Act, the Director of CSIS must submit a report to the Minister when, in the Director's opinion, a CSIS employee may have acted unlawfully in performing his or her duties or functions. The Minister, in turn, must send the report with his or her comments to the Attorney General of Canada and to SIRC. In 2006–07, no CSIS employees acted unlawfully, and no such reports were issued.

Disclosures of Information

Section 19 of the CSIS Act prohibits information obtained by the Service in the course of its investigations from being disclosed except in the following specific circumstances:

  1. information that may be used in the investigation or prosecution of an alleged contravention of any federal or provincial law may be disclosed to a law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the matter, the Minister of Public Safety or the Attorney General of the province in question;
  2. information related to the conduct of Canada's external relations may be disclosed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs;
  3. information related to the defence of Canada may be disclosed to the Minister of National Defence; and
  4. information that, in the opinion of the Minister, is essential to the public interest may be disclosed to any Minister of the Crown or employee of the Public Service of Canada.

Of note, Section 19(2)(d) gives the Minister of Public Safety the power to override any invasion-of-privacy concerns, authorizing the Service to disclose information deemed to be in the national or public interest. When such information is released, the Director of CSIS must submit a report to SIRC. This is an exceedingly rare occurrence—there have been only two disclosures under this Section of the Act.

The Service may also disclose information verbally or in writing to any law enforcement body or federal government entity, such as the Department of National Defence and Foreign Affairs Canada. When CSIS permits the use of its information by the RCMP in judicial proceedings, it must do so in writing.

The Service provided over 130 disclosure letters during fiscal year 2006–07.

11 See SIRC review 2006-04 for details on a Section 16 activity.