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3. Annual Report 2006-2007 >
4. Section 1.A Review of CSIS security intelligence activities

Annual Report 2006-2007 - An Operational Review of CSIS Activities

Section 1: A year in review 2006–07

A. Review of CSIS security intelligence activities

How SIRC Carries Out its Review Function

The Security Intelligence Review Committee is the only body with the legal mandate and expertise to carry out ongoing, independent review of the activities of CSIS. SIRC was established under the CSIS Act (1984) to provide assurance to the Parliament of Canada and to Canadians that CSIS is acting in accordance with the law, policy and Ministerial Direction in the performance of its duties and functions. In doing so, SIRC seeks to ensure that CSIS respects the fundamental rights and freedoms of Canadians.

To fulfill its mandate, SIRC directs staff to undertake a number of reviews each year. These provide a retrospective examination and assessment of specific CSIS investigations and functions. Under the CSIS Act, SIRC has virtually unlimited power to review CSIS's performance. With the sole exception of Cabinet confidences, SIRC has the absolute authority to examine all information concerning CSIS's activities, no matter how highly classified that information may be.

Each review includes SIRC's findings and recommendations. Upon completion, the report is forwarded to the Director of CSIS and the Inspector General of CSIS.

SIRC is also authorized under Section 54 of the CSIS Act to provide special reports to the Minister of Public Safety on any matter that the Committee identifies as having special importance or that the Minister directs SIRC to undertake.

SIRC's research program is designed to address a broad range of subjects. In deciding what to review, SIRC considers:

• events with the potential to create threats to the security of Canada;
• particular activities that could intrude on individual rights and freedoms;
• the CSIS Director's annual classified report to the Minister;
• the need to assess regularly each of the Service's branches and regional offices;
• SIRC's statutory authorities as detailed in the CSIS Act;
• priorities and concerns identified by Parliament or in the media;
• commitments by SIRC to re-examine specific matters;
• issues identified in the course of SIRC's complaints functions; and
• new policy directions or initiatives announced by CSIS or the Government of Canada.

This approach allows SIRC to manage the inherent risk of being able to review only a small number of CSIS activities in any given year. Each review results in a “snapshot” of the Service's actions in a particular context. Over more than two decades, SIRC's reviews have provided Parliament and Canadians with a comprehensive picture of the Service's operational activities, and assurance that CSIS is acting lawfully.

SIRC is only one of several mechanisms designed to ensure CSIS's accountability. The Service also remains accountable for its operations through the existing apparatus of government, specifically the Minister of Public Safety, the Inspector General of CSIS, the central agencies, the Auditor General, the Information Commissioner and the Privacy Commissioner of Canada.

SIRC Reviews in 2006–07

Review of a security liaison post - Review 2006–01

Background

During the period under review, CSIS maintained a number of Security Liaison Officer (SLO) posts¹ around the world—the number and locations of which are classified, except for those in London, Paris and Washington. These posts work with Citizenship and Immigration Canada to process immigration requests. They also exchange security intelligence information, provide advice to senior staff of the Canadian Mission or Embassy, and liaise with foreign security and intelligence agencies with whom the Service has approved arrangements.

Methodology

SIRC examined how the Service managed its relationships at the post as well as all information exchanges with relevant foreign security and intelligence agencies. SIRC also inquired into the management of CSIS staff at the post, visits to and from the region, and examined the assessments of those agencies with whom the SLO cooperates, a profile of the post itself, and all CSIS studies or reports pertaining to the countries which fall under the post's areas of responsibility. In particular, SIRC evaluated the impact of the immigration security screening workload on other SLO functions.

Findings

SIRC found that the post was managed effectively and that its operations were in accordance with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction, and operational policy and guidelines. Staff at the post completed and submitted immigration tracking forms on a regular basis, and submitted all required contact and visit forms. The post provided timely and relevant information and advice concerning visits to CSIS Headquarters by foreign representatives. Appropriate approvals were sought and obtained regarding all visits. CSIS's assessments of agencies with which the Service cooperates were, for the most part, completed accurately and submitted in a timely manner, and a new Section 17 arrangement with an organization in the region was established in accordance with Ministerial Direction and operational policy.

All foreign exchanges included the appropriate caveats in accordance with operational policy—specifically, the Service ensured that all information shared with foreign partners was identified as having originated from CSIS, and included restrictions on how it could be used. Finally, SIRC confirmed that the post complied with a CSIS directive not to provide information to or cooperate with a specific foreign intelligence organization during the period under review because of concerns about that agency's reliability.

There were no recommendations arising from this review.

Review of activities and investigations in a CSIS regional office - Review 2006–02

Background

SIRC regularly reviews, on a rotating basis, the activities and investigations of CSIS in each region of Canada. These regional reviews provide insight into how investigations authorized by CSIS Headquarters are implemented in the field. They also help SIRC gain a better understanding of the priorities and challenges of individual regional offices.

This year, SIRC chose to review CSIS's smallest regional office, which, despite its size, has full operational and administrative capabilities.

Methodology

For the period September 1, 2004 to August 31, 2005, SIRC assessed the activities of this regional office with reference to the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policies. SIRC examined the regional office's:

• targeting approval process and investigation of targets;
• acquisition and execution of warrant powers, along with special operations;
• recruitment, development and management of human sources;
• cooperation, liaison and exchanges of information with domestic partners; and
• internal security measures and procedures.

Findings

SIRC found that the operations of the CSIS regional office were in full accord with all applicable laws, directions and policies. CSIS had reasonable grounds to suspect that the targets of authorized investigations in this region posed a threat to the security of Canada, and the intrusiveness of the techniques used was proportionate to the suspected threat. The information collected by CSIS was strictly necessary to fulfill its mandate. SIRC was pleased to observe that regional staff are responding to emerging threats in a timely and professional manner.

The regional office met all requirements of the Federal Court of Canada in applying for and executing warrant powers in specific investigations. Further, the Service acted appropriately and within the law in its management of human sources. There were a few administrative errors noted in certain human source files, but SIRC considered these minor and they did not affect the Service's investigations.

SIRC found no issues of concern regarding the regional office's cooperation and exchange of information with domestic partners, or with the application of security policies, practices and procedures.

There were no recommendations arising from this review.

Review of a counter-terrorism investigation - Review 2006–03

Background

The focus of this review was a nation-wide CSIS investigation of two Middle East-based organizations listed as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code of Canada. The Service's aim was to discover whether there was any formal presence of these terrorist groups in Canada, to identify Canadian-based support networks and to identify persons or groups of persons in Canada who were associated with these Middle Eastern organizations.

Although this was a relatively long-running investigation, there were never more than ten approved targets during the review period of September 1, 2002 to November 30, 2005. By the end of 2005, CSIS had not identified any formal organized presence of these groups in Canada, but the Service had initiated several new investigations of individuals believed to be either linked to, or acting on behalf of the organizations under investigation.

Methodology

This was the first time that SIRC had examined this particular investigation. SIRC analysed documentation pertaining to: the targeting of individuals suspected of engaging in threat-related activities; the management of human sources against authorized targets; and all exchanges of information with domestic and foreign organizations.

Findings

The Service's identification and investigation of targets were found to be in full accord with the CSIS Act as well as applicable Ministerial Direction and operational policies. In each investigation, CSIS had reasonable grounds to suspect a threat, and the targeting authorities were proportionate to the seriousness of the threats. CSIS investigators collected only information that was strictly necessary to the investigation.

SIRC noted that the investigation suffered from a lack of resources throughout the review period, and that administrative responsibility for this file shifted repeatedly among CSIS operational desks. This had adverse consequences on the management of information and, to some degree, on the management of human sources. However, generally speaking, SIRC found CSIS to be in compliance with operational policies in the handling of its human sources.

Section 2 of the CSIS Act prohibits the investigation of individuals involved in lawful advocacy, protest or dissent (LAPD), unless such activities are carried out in conjunction with threats to the security of Canada. Operational policy therefore requires that investigations which come into contact with LAPD receive special, high-level authorization.

SIRC noted one case where policy requirements were not met. The Service was investigating several members of a Canadian-based community centre because it believed these individuals were engaged in threat-related activities unrelated to the centre's LAPD endeavours. SIRC's review confirmed that the Service's investigation was not focussed on these LAPD activities. Nonetheless, operational policy requires senior-level authorization because of the individuals' involvement in LAPD activities. SIRC found that CSIS investigators failed to obtain the appropriate senior-level authorization in this case, and reminded the Service of their obligation to do so.

The Service's exchanges of information with domestic and international partners were appropriate, although a difficult working relationship with one foreign agency did affect CSIS's investigations during the review period. SIRC also saw one case where ineffective coordination between CSIS and the RCMP resulted in CSIS losing track of an individual for several months. The RCMP and CSIS had exchanged information irregularly on this person. As a consequence of the RCMP's decision to downgrade its investigation, CSIS no longer had accurate information regarding the individual's whereabouts. CSIS could not locate the individual in the ensuing five months, until it learned that the individual was no longer in the country, whereupon CSIS terminated its investigation.

Finally, SIRC reviewed a case of a Canadian citizen detained by a foreign country for suspected involvement in terrorist activity. Media reports alleged that the individual had been mistreated while in detention. SIRC concluded that the Service had conducted an effective and appropriate investigation of the terrorism allegations and of the alleged mistreatment of the detainee. It also found that CSIS upheld its responsibility to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)—the lead agency responsible for this case.

There were no recommendations arising from this review.

Review of a Section 16 activity - Review 2006–04

Background

Under the provisions of Section 16 of the CSIS Act, either the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Foreign Affairs may request in writing the assistance of the Service in collecting foreign intelligence within Canada. Foreign intelligence is defined as information or intelligence relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of any foreign individual, state, organization or terrorist group as they relate to international affairs, defence or security.

If the Minister of Public Safety agrees with the request, it is passed to the Director of the Service, along with written concurrence and direction. CSIS may retain in its Section 12 database any foreign intelligence it collects only if it aids investigations falling under Section 12 of the CSIS Act.

The Act specifically prohibits any Section 16 collection being directed at Canadian citizens, landed immigrants or Canadian corporations. In the event that CSIS chooses not to retain Section 16 information for a Section 12 investigation, SIRC's jurisdiction ends once the material has been provided to the requesting minister.

A 1987 Tri-Ministerial Agreement establishes the roles and responsibilities of all parties involved in Section 16 collection. One such party is the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), which provides technical assistance in the collection of foreign intelligence.

Section 16 information which CSE provides to the Service is routinely “minimized” to comply with various directions governing the prohibition against targeting Canadian nationals and Canadian businesses. Thus, the name of a Canadian person or entity, collected incidentally, would be reported to the Service using language such as “a Canadian person” or “a Canadian company.” Under specific circumstances defined in policy, the Service may request identification from CSE if it can demonstrate that the information relates to activities that could constitute a threat to the security of Canada as defined in Section 2 of the CSIS Act.

Methodology

SIRC examined CSIS Section 16 collection on a foreign country (“Country A”)— assessing that activity against the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and, in particular, the 1987 Tri-Ministerial Agreement. Specifically, SIRC reviewed the following:

• all Section 16 reporting to and feedback from DFAIT in 2005;
• the application for and use of Section 16 warrant powers and handling of associated documents;
• the management of human sources who provided both threat-related information and foreign intelligence; and
• the authorization for a corresponding investigation of threat-related activities, as well as all exchanges of information with DFAIT based on this threat.

SIRC staff also received a briefing from CSIS and spoke informally to other Service employees.

Findings

CSIS's foreign intelligence collection against Country A met the requirements of the CSIS Act, in that it did not involve any targeting of Canadians or Canadian organizations. The application for and use of Section 16 warrant powers, and the management of the human sources reviewed, were also appropriate and in accordance with legal and policy requirements.

The CSIS Act restricts Section 16 collection to “within Canada.” This means that CSIS cannot task human sources to collect Section 16 information abroad. Although some sources undertook travel abroad, CSIS did not task these human sources to collect Section 16 information while they were outside of Canada. CSIS did, however, have the authority to task these human sources to collect information abroad under a Section 12 investigation of the threat-related activities of Country A. Some of that information proved to be valuable in meeting DFAIT's Section 16 requirements.

There were no recommendations arising from this review.

Review of a counter-terrorism investigation - Review 2006–05

Background

Known for its support of al Qaida, this foreign-based group was among the first to be placed on Canada's List of Terrorist Entities. This was SIRC's first review of a Service investigation into suspected threat-related activity in Canada by this foreign-based group. It afforded SIRC the opportunity to look into a particular investigative technique occasionally employed by CSIS.

Methodology

SIRC reviewed the Service's investigation from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2005. The objective of this review was to gain an understanding of this investigation and its challenges, and to assess the Service's compliance with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policies.

Specifically, SIRC reviewed the:

• investigation and the targeting approvals of suspected group members;
• implementation and execution of Federal Court warrant powers against the principal targets;
• management of human sources, including those under development;
• advice to government and domestic exchanges of information; and
• exchanges of information and cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies.

In addition, SIRC received two briefings—an overview of the Service's investigation, plus a meeting with the lead CSIS investigator to discuss the Service's interaction with the principal targets.

Findings

Overall, SIRC found that the Service complied with the CSIS Act, as well as Ministerial Direction and operational policies in its investigation of the targets. The information collected by CSIS did not indicate that the group's members were involved in terrorist activities while in Canada, and CSIS therefore concluded that they were not an active, operational terrorist cell within Canada. SIRC agreed with CSIS's assessment that it had reasonable grounds to suspect that the activities of the principal targets posed a potential threat to the security of Canada.

There were no recommendations arising from this review.

Review of CSIS's collaboration and exchanges of intelligence post-9/11 - Review 2006–06

Background

This review was prompted in part by changes in CSIS's relationships with foreign and domestic partners post-9/11. CSIS is exchanging greater amounts of information with its foreign partners, and with a greater number of foreign partners than in the past. Domestically, the RCMP's role in investigating security threats has grown following the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act, which criminalized actions affecting the national security of Canada. As a result, there is increasing pressure on CSIS to provide support for RCMP prosecutions.

Methodology

This review examined CSIS's relationship with one of its foreign partners and with the RCMP. The objective was to assess compliance with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction, Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) and operational policies, and to review generally CSIS's performance in the context of its relationship with the RCMP.

To that end, SIRC examined all exchanges of information with the RCMP, all files pertaining to the CSIS-RCMP relationship at headquarters and in two regional offices, and all documents pertaining to CSIS's relationship with two Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams for the 2005 calendar year.² SIRC also examined CSIS's targeting of two individuals between January 1 and July 31, 2005.

Concerning the foreign agency, SIRC reviewed all exchanges of information between 2001 and 2005, CSIS's 2001 and 2006 assessments of the agency, and all files pertaining to its relationship with the agency for the 2005 calendar year.

Findings

CSIS's exchanges of information with the foreign agency were within the scope of the foreign arrangement and complied with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and relevant operational policies. SIRC had some concerns about internal mis-communication, as some CSIS officers did not know the status of CSIS's relationship with the foreign agency during the 2002–04 period. This resulted in the SLO receiving incorrect tasking. There was, however, no improper exchange of information.

CSIS's exchanges of information with the RCMP were authorized under the CSIS Act and in accordance with Ministerial Direction and relevant operational policies. Looking more generally at the CSIS-RCMP relationship, SIRC noted a spirit of goodwill between the two organizations, as reflected in the new MOU—signed on September 12, 2006—and other initiatives. This new MOU replaces the original one signed in 1990, which had become obsolete.

However, certain challenges remain. SIRC identified two instances that appeared to cause significant friction between CSIS and the RCMP in 2005. The first was an attempted RCMP prosecution using CSIS information. The second concerned the activities of a CSIS human source, which complicated an RCMP investigation for the purposes of criminal prosecution. SIRC notes, however, that there have been positive developments in the CSIS-RCMP relationship in that region since 2005.

SIRC has already noted that the mechanism for exchanging information—in particular, the requirement that the RCMP seek and receive CSIS's explicit permission before using CSIS information in judicial proceedings—was “brought into question”³ by the 1991 Supreme Court decision, R. v. Stinchcombe, requiring the Crown to disclose all relevant information to defence counsel. In 2007, CSIS and the RCMP established a working group to review and improve the process for using security intelligence in criminal prosecutions of national security offences.

There were no recommendations arising from this review.

Review of security screening outside of the federal government - Review 2006–07

Section 13 of the CSIS Act enables the Service to provide security assessments to federal and provincial governments, as well as police forces and foreign entities. The goal of the Security Screening program is twofold: to prevent a non-Canadian who poses a security concern or risk from entering or receiving status in Canada, and to prevent anyone of security concern from gaining authorized access to sensitive government assets, locations or information.⁴

CSIS security assessments fall into two main program categories:

1. Immigration, whereby the Service provides security assessments to Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Canada Border Services Agency to support the processing of refugee claims or applications for immigration or citizenship; and
2. Government Security Screening, whereby the Service:
   • provides security assessments to all federal departments and institutions, with the exception of the RCMP;
   • complies with requests from foreign agencies (via arrangements with other countries) concerning Canadians who are candidates for employment in a foreign country and require access to classified material; and
   • provides security assessments for non-clearance related programs such as: nuclear sites, the Parliamentary Precinct, provincial governments, sites of interest in respect to national security (e.g., airports and ports) and other programs.

It should be noted that some programs fall under the Government Security Policy while others, such as the Airport Restricted Access Clearance Program and the Free and Secure Trade program, are performed under different authorities and thresholds.

This review focused on assessments for non-clearance related programs.

Methodology

SIRC assessed CSIS's compliance with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction, operational policies, the Government Security Policy and relevant Memoranda of Understanding between the Service and its clients. SIRC conducted an in-depth review of a six-month sample of cases and a detailed analysis of all Information Briefs⁵ issued during the review period (there were no denial briefs issued during the review period of April 1, 2004 to March 31, 2006).

Findings

SIRC found considerable variance in the uniformity of Information Briefs, and a lack of consistency in the recording and transcribing of interviews conducted for use within these briefs.⁶ SIRC was pleased to note that the Service only conducted screening checks for foreign agencies where an approved arrangement was in place, and that no recommendations were made, as per policy, to foreign entities. Finally, the Service complied with Ministerial Direction in keeping security screening information segregated from the Service's other information holdings because of its sensitivity for the individuals undergoing assessment.

Recommendations

SIRC made two recommendations arising from this review:

• SIRC observed a lack of differentiation in Information Briefs between varying degrees of risk posed by security screening subjects. For example, the Service assessments of a subject's links with individuals known or thought to be threats to national security were supported in some cases by what SIRC considered to be less compelling information than in others. In another example, although some security screening subjects were offered the opportunity to address security issues in an interview with Security Screening Branch, others were not. SIRC found it problematic that no gradation exists within Information Briefs to address varying degrees of risk of screening applicants, and that these briefs were neither uniform nor consistent as required by policy. SIRC consequently recommended that the Service create policy to address this issue.
• SIRC noted that midway through the review period, the Service abandoned the practice of retaining written consent forms for security assessments conducted for a foreign agency, making it impossible to determine that consent had, in fact, been sought and obtained. SIRC recommended that in cases where the Service cannot access written consent forms after the fact (i.e., foreign agencies), these forms be obtained for all security assessments.

Review 2006–08

Note: Review 2006–08 had not been finalized at the time this annual report went to print. A summary of this review will appear in SIRC's 2007–08 annual report.

Review of the CSIS Counter Espionage Investigations desk - Review 2006–09

Background

Since 9/11, western intelligence agencies have increasingly shifted their attention and resources to counter-terrorism investigations. But there remain other security threats that need to be addressed. In 2006, CSIS and other federal authorities were involved in the arrest and deportation of a Russian spy who had been living in Canada for several years under a false identity. The case serves as a reminder that Canada remains a target of foreign espionage.

This was acknowledged by CSIS Director Jim Judd in an October 2006 address to the annual Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies conference. He noted that “foreign espionage is, if anything, growing and in fact becoming even more sophisticated through the application of new technologies.”

One of the ways the Service combats this threat is through its Counter Espionage Investigations desk. It was formed in 2002 to compartmentalize sensitive counterespionage investigations which could lead to the prosecution of individuals who knowingly provide sensitive information or assets to hostile intelligence services or foreign governments in a manner detrimental to Canadian interests.

Methodology

SIRC's review examined the activities carried out by the Counter Espionage Investigations desk to assess compliance with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policies. It also explored how the Service investigates and supports the prosecution of counter-espionage offences through information sharing with law enforcement agencies.

SIRC chose two investigations for in-depth review. For each, SIRC examined targeting decisions, investigative activities, operational reporting, as well as cooperation and exchanges of information with domestic and foreign partners. Because of the sensitivity of these cases, SIRC is prevented from offering any further details in this report.

Findings

SIRC found that CSIS complied with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policies in carrying out counter-espionage investigations.

In the first investigation, SIRC found that close cooperation between CSIS and its domestic and foreign counterparts allowed a “serious security issue” to be resolved in a timely and efficient manner.

In the second investigation, SIRC found that CSIS's disclosure of information allowed the RCMP to take action against an individual engaged in unlawful activities.

There were no recommendations arising from this review.

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Date Modified:

2010-10-14