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4. Section 2. D. CSIS operational activities

Annual Report 2005-2006 - An Operational Review of CSIS Activities

Section 2: CSIS accountability mechanisms

D. CSIS operational activities

The following section describes CSIS operational activities, and provides an overview of the priorities and achievements of each operational branch during 2005-06. This information provides a useful background that helps SIRC carry out its own work. It should be noted that many of the organizational units discussed below have changed as a result of the May 2006 reorganization.

Counter Intelligence Branch

The Counter Intelligence Branch focuses its operations on the hostile activities of foreign intelligence services known to be operating within Canada. The branch investigates threats to national security, including espionage and foreign-influenced activities (e.g., attempts to monitor, influence or coerce émigré communities in Canada). The branch is also responsible for investigating threats to Canadian economic security, specifically economic espionage, the clandestine acquisition of technologies and transnational criminal activity. For an example of a SIRC study in this area, see Review of a counter-intelligence investigation (#2005-04) in this annual report.

In 2005-06, the Service reported to SIRC that espionage activities in Canada are becoming steadily more complex and sophisticated. This is particularly true of cyber-based and other electronically-based attacks on Canadian targets. The branch reported that several successful operations were undertaken against the espionage activities of a number of foreign states.

CSIS also noted that this branch had received an increasing number of requests from other Canadian government departments to contribute its assessment and analysis on a range of issues. For example, the branch examined over 80,000 visa applications during the period under review, and successfully detected a number of known or suspected intelligence officers seeking entrance into Canada.

Table 3 Authorized targets (2005-06)

Branch	Individuals	Organizations	Issues/events	Totals
Counter Intelligence	152	36	4	192
Counter Proliferation	55	6	6	67
Counter Terrorism	274	31	30	335
Totals	481	73	40	594

Counter Proliferation Branch

The Counter Proliferation Branch investigates activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through the development and procurement programs of foreign states of concern or terrorist organizations. The branch keeps a close watch on rogue states or groups who sponsor or commit acts of terrorism, as well as the activities of foreign intelligence services. The branch also examines the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism.

The branch reported a number of successes in its investigations, allowing the Service to play an important role in sharing intelligence with its foreign partners. It also expanded its intelligence collection activities on state-sponsored terrorism and participated in Canadian government efforts to identify covert attempts to transfer funds to international terrorist organizations.

The Counter Proliferation Branch also has units that assist other CSIS operations. These include the Threat Assessment Unit (TAU), which produces threat assessment reports on a wide range of topics, and the Immigration Assessment Unit, which liaises with the Canada Border Services Agency. TAU's assessments serve as an early warning mechanism to the government about threats to Canada and to Canadian interests abroad. In 2005-06, it produced 360 threat assessments—compared to 450 in the previous year.

Counter Terrorism Branch

The role of the Counter Terrorism Branch is to advise the Government of Canada on threats of serious violence that could affect the safety and security of Canadians and Canada's allies.

For the fifth year in a row, Islamic extremism—particularly al-Qaida-inspired or related—remains the main concern of this branch. Moreover, the Service believes that the threat posed by these terrorist groups has increased in 2005-06. A priority of the branch is the interdiction and removal of such radicals from Canada.

The Service initiated several new investigations of alleged foreign extremists or terrorist groups that may have infiltrated into Canada. The Service also identified several previously unknown domestic extremists involved in threat-related activities. In cooperation with other domestic agencies, the branch prevented a suspected foreign extremist from entering Canada, and disrupted a Canadian-based terrorist cell.

Many of the Counter Terrorism Branch's operations are conducted in cooperation with the RCMP. The Service advises the government on threats to Canada's national security and the RCMP investigates criminal activity that poses a similar threat. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act (2001), the role of the RCMP in combating international terrorism was enhanced, resulting in closer ties with CSIS in matters of national security. This has resulted in successful, collaborative intelligence gathering and technical operations.

CSIS reported to SIRC that while there remains some duplication of investigations, efforts are being made within each organization to address this matter. Also, as noted in previous annual reports, CSIS continues to participate in four of the RCMP's Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs), located in several regions across Canada. Now in its fifth year of operation, this program is projected to expand to a fifth region in 2006.

The participating CSIS regions report positive working relationships with the teams. Close cooperation and regular communication have limited potential overlap between the mandates of both organizations.

Research, Analysis and Production Branch

The Research, Analysis and Production Branch produces security intelligence assessments to support the Service's operations and the Canadian government's decision-making in relation to threats to national security. It develops strategic and operational analyses of current threats and emerging issues. The Intelligence Briefs, CSIS Reports and CSIS Studies are the key documents prepared by this branch. CSIS produced 41 of these reports in 2005-06 and distributed them throughout the security intelligence community and to other clients.

As SIRC reported in its 2004-05 annual report, CSIS has a role in the Terrorist Entity Listing process, including developing Security Intelligence Reports (SIRs) that describe the grounds for listing an entity. These reports help the Minister of Public Safety decide whether to recommend to the Governor-in-Council to add a particular entity to the Terrorist Entity list.

In 2005-06, the branch produced nine SIRs. It also began its second two-year review of existing SIRs in the same period, to determine whether it is reasonable to maintain or to de-list an entity.

Finally, the branch supports CSIS's consultations with Foreign Affairs Canada on listing the names of persons or groups under Schedule 1 of the United Nations Suppression of Terrorism Regulations (UNSTR).

Security Screening Branch

One of the largest branches of CSIS, Security Screening has two program streams, government screening and immigration screening.

Government screening

CSIS performs security clearance investigations for all government employees⁵ whose duties require access to classified assets or information. In each investigation, the Service provides requesting departments or agencies with a security assessment, which is an appraisal of an individual's reliability as it relates to loyalty to Canada. The largest clients of this service are Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) and the Department of National Defence (DND)—accounting for over 25 percent and 20 percent respectively of all requests in 2005-06.

As indicated in Table 4 below, CSIS received 42,100 requests for new or updated security clearances and provided 37,800 security assessments in 2005-06. Although the volume of requests increased by about 15 percent from the previous fiscal year, the number of security assessments issued by CSIS remained roughly the same, indicating that not all requests could be completed within the period under review.

Table 4 Government screening*

	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06
Requests from DND	9,900	9,100	9,200
Requests from other departments or agencies	27,600	27,400	32,900
Total	37,500	36,500	42,100
Assessments issued to DND	10,100	9,000	8,900
Assessments issued to other departments or agencies	27,600	27,600	28,900
Total	37,700	36,600	37,800

* Figures have been rounded to the nearest 100.

To track its efficiency in responding to security screening requests, CSIS calculates its turnaround times using a median number of days.⁶ As indicated in Table 5, the median turnaround times generally decreased in 2005-06 from the previous fiscal year. There was a significant decrease in the time taken to prepare security assessments for DND at all levels.

Table 5 Median turnaround (in days)

		2003-04	2004-05	2005-06
DND	Level I (Confidential)	20	49	24
	Level II (Secret)	18	63	19
	Level III (Top Secret)	96	70	39
Non-DND	Level I (Confidential)	7	12	15
	Level II (Secret)	11	14	13
	Level III (Top Secret)	82	69	60

The Service does not issue denials of security clearance. Rather, it advises the requesting department or agency of information that would affect CSIS's ability to recommend clearance. On rare occasions, CSIS will recommend to a requesting agency that a clearance be denied. However, it is the responsibility of the requesting agency to accept or reject this recommendation. In 2005-06, the Service issued 19 information briefs reporting information of an adverse nature, and issued one denial brief.

CSIS also provides site-access screening. Unlike a government security clearance, a site-access clearance only gives an individual access to certain secure areas within installations or provides accreditation for a special event. In 2005-06, CSIS received over 60,000 requests for this type of screening, and provided four information briefs to requesting agencies.

Table 6 Site-access screening programs*

	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06
Parliamentary precinct	1,400	1,100	1,000
Airport restricted-access area	28,800	31,100	37,600
Nuclear facilities	5,700	6,800	10,600
Free and Secure Trade (FAST)	N/A	**21,500	3,100
Special events accreditation	0	1,800	5,600
Other government departments	1,400	2,300	2,400
Total	37,300	64,600	60,300

* Figures have been rounded to the nearest 100.
** Refers to a one-time request to review previously granted passes, due to elevated security concerns related to the U.S. presidential elections.

Immigration screening

CSIS's Security Screening Branch also conducts investigations and provides advice to Citizenship and Immigration Canada as well as the Canada Border Services Agency to support the processing of refugee claims or applications for immigration or citizenship. The Service's authority in this regard is provided under Sections 14 and 15 of the CSIS Act.

In 2005-06, the branch received approximately 92,000 requests under various immigration screening programs (see Table 7)—slightly fewer than in previous years. There was a significant drop—almost 20 percent—in the number of refugee determination screening requests, compared to the previous year. Meanwhile, the number of citizenship requests almost doubled. Also of note, there was an increase— about 13 percent—in the number of immigration screening requests.

Table 7 Types of immigration screening requests

	Requests*			Briefs
	2003- 04	2004- 05	2005- 06	2003- 04	2004- 05	2005- 06
Within and outside Canada	57,300	56,100	63,200	106	88	133
Front End Screening**	22,700	22,900	17,100	92	184	89
Refugee determination***	16,500	14,200	11,700	122	110	127
Subtotal	96,500	93,200	92,000	320	382	349
Citizenship applications	203,400	161,200	308,000	150	124	120
Total	299,900	254,400	400,000	470	506	469

* Figures have been rounded to the nearest 100.
** Represents those individuals who arrive at the Canadian border claiming refugee status.
*** Represents those refugees (as defined by IRPA) who apply from within Canada for permanent resident status.

The above table shows that CSIS finds no adverse information in the vast majority of its screening investigations of refugee claimants or immigration/citizenship candidates—one in every 250 immigrant applications or refugee claims screened, and one in every 2,500 citizenship applications screened. In 2005-06, of the total briefs regarding immigration screening (349), CSIS issued 232 information briefs and 117 inadmissibility briefs. There were also 12 incidental letters.

SIRC noted that generally the Service's turnaround times for the provision of information or inadmissibility briefs are quite lengthy. For information briefs related to immigration cases, it takes between 12 to 18 months to complete, depending on where the application was filed. In refugee cases, the median turnaround time was ten months for files subject to the Front End Screening program. For inadmissibility briefs, SIRC noted similar median times. For immigration files, the turnaround times ranged from a year to 18 months, while refugee files ranged from eight to 11 months.

Table 8 provides a three-year highlight of the Service's median turnaround time in providing notices of assessment.

Table 8 Median turnaround time (in days) for notices of assessment

	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06
Citizenship	1	1	1
Immigration requests from within Canada	46	44	70
Immigration requests from overseas	5	7	16
Immigration requests from the U.S.	152	150	62
Refugee determination	53	56	96
Front End Screening program	32	27	23
Visa vetting	12	13	11

Other screening activities

In 2005-06, the Security Screening Branch vetted over 36,000 visa applications of foreign nationals. It also started participating in the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program and conducted over 3,000 security assessments of truck drivers who applied for a FAST border pass under this program. Consult the Canada Border Services Agency website at cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/prog/fast-expres/menu-eng.html for more information on this program.

Other programs

The Front End Screening (FES) and the Electronic Data Exchange (EDE) programs were introduced in 2001 to facilitate Canada's immigration and refugee screening processes. The FES program checks all refugee applications against CSIS records to identify potential security risks as early as possible in the refugee determination process. Further information on the FES program can be found in SIRC study # 2003-01, which was summarized in SIRC's 2003-04 annual report.

The EDE is an electronic network for filing screening applications that serve to accelerate processing times. Over 50 government clients use this service, such that almost all screening requests for refugee claimants or immigration/citizenship candidates are filed electronically. As in previous years, CSIS reported to SIRC that it is continuing to expand EDE access to additional clients, including six new government clients and two new immigration posts in the fiscal year.

Foreign Liaison and Visits Branch

The Foreign Liaison and Visits (FLV) Branch manages the Service's liaison with foreign agencies and coordinates visits to CSIS Headquarters and CSIS regional offices by foreign representatives. FLV is also responsible for coordinating all Section 17(1) arrangements with foreign security intelligence or law enforcement agencies, as well as the operation of security liaison posts abroad.

At the end of the 2005-06 fiscal year, CSIS had a total of 265 foreign arrangements with 144 countries. During that period, CSIS received Ministerial approval to establish six new arrangements, modify or enhance four others, and to suspend three arrangements.

Of the 265 foreign arrangements, 217 were active, 39 were dormant (i.e., no liaison contact for a period of at least one year), and nine were suspended or restricted (including the three mentioned in the previous paragraph). Any foreign arrangement classified as “dormant” or “restricted” remains as such until an update assessment of the relationship is completed.

The FLV Branch is also responsible for security liaison posts. The Service relies on these posts to liaise with foreign security and intelligence agencies. Security liaison officers are also called upon to assess the effectiveness of individual Section 17 foreign arrangements and submit annual assessments on each foreign agency in terms of their reliability as a partner, and their human rights record. For more information, see CSIS liaison with foreign agencies: review of a security liaison post (# 2005-02) in this annual report.

As in past years, SLO posts abroad faced increasing workloads related to immigration screening requirements. As a result, CSIS Headquarters provided temporary assistance and relief to certain SLO posts to assist with screening backlogs.

Federal Court warrants and warrant statistics

Warrants are one of the most powerful and intrusive tools available. They provide CSIS with Federal Court authorization to use investigative techniques that would otherwise be illegal, such as monitoring of telephone communications. For this reason, the use of warrants by CSIS deserves continued scrutiny—a task that SIRC takes very seriously.

Each year, SIRC collects statistics on the Service's warrant applications and on warrants granted by the Federal Court. Though SIRC does not have the resources to examine all warrants granted to the Service by the Federal Court, it will look at a certain number of warrants as part of its annual reviews.

When SIRC examines a warrant, it looks into all aspects of the warrant process, starting with the development of the warrant application. SIRC verifies whether:

• CSIS's justification for requesting warrant powers was reasonable;
• CSIS complied with the applicable legal and policy requirements in applying for warrant powers; and
• the warrant application accurately reflected the information held by CSIS.

SIRC also looks at the actual warrant approved by the Federal Court and what happens after that approval (i.e., how the warrant powers were used by CSIS).

Table 9 Warrant statistics

	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06
New	68	40	24
Replaced or renewed	130	207	203
Total	198	247	227

During the period under review, 24 new warrants were approved by the Federal Court.

It also approved the renewal or replacement of 203 warrants. Included among the 227 warrants were 31 urgent warrants approved in 2005-06: more than three times the number approved in the previous year. In 2005-06, there were 248 expired or terminated warrants, compared to 220 in the previous fiscal year.

The Service also reported judicial decisions in 2005-06 that affected its applications for warrants, the execution of powers contained in warrants, or the warrant process generally. In two cases, the Court did not approve warrant powers. In the first instance, the judge decided that although the activities of the individual clearly constituted a threat to the security of Canada, the granting of warrant powers was premature. In the second instance, the judge refused the application on factual grounds. On other applications, the Federal Court requested additional information and clarification before approving the warrants. It also requested that the Service submit interim reports on the execution of certain warrant powers to ensure they were used for the purposes intended.

During 2005-06, the Federal Court dismissed an application for warrants. The decision was based on the fact that the Service had not provided full, fair and accurate disclosure of all material facts in the affidavit. The Court's decision was without prejudice to the right of the Service to bring forward a new application in relation to the same targets.

The Service subsequently provided the Court with a full explanation of the circumstances in question, and at that time, also informed the Minister of Public Safety, SIRC and the Office of the Inspector General. As a precautionary measure, the Director imposed a moratorium on the filing of warrant applications with the Federal Court until he was satisfied, on a case by case basis, that the Service's disclosure obligations had been addressed.

The Director has instigated a full review of the warrant process under the leadership of the Service's General Counsel. This request stemmed from his concerns about efficacy, timeliness and accountability of the current procedures, as the warrant application process has become increasingly complex and cumbersome over recent years. The implementation of the recommendations of the warrant review, which is scheduled for Fall 2006, is subject to consultation with the Department of Justice and the Department of Public Safety.

Moreover, since the dismissal of the warrant application, CSIS's Director and General Counsel have appeared before a Federal Court panel to discuss the case and the process for preparing and submitting warrant applications.

Also of note, although Section 28 of the CSIS Act authorizes the Governor-in-Council to make regulations governing the forms of warrants, practices and procedures applicable to the application hearings, as well as the location and manner in which hearings may be held, there were no such regulations made during this or any previous review period.

Integrated Threat Assessment Centre

For details on the Centre's mandate and how it operates, see Review of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (# 2005-03) in this annual report. During 2005-06, ITAC issued 98 threat assessments and redistributed 382 others that were produced by the fusion centres of allied intelligence agencies. ITAC was also responsible for advising the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister concerning several special threat assessments.

The majority of ITAC staff are seconded from partner agencies for a period of two years. Secondees are subject to the CSIS Act in the same fashion as CSIS employees. Despite being operational for two years, ITAC was not fully staffed at the end of the period under review.

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Date Modified:

2010-10-14