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3. Annual Report 2005-2006 >
4. Section 1. A. Reviews of CSIS security intelligence activities

Annual Report 2005-2006 - An Operational Review of CSIS Activities

Section 1: A year in review 2005-06

A. Reviews of CSIS security intelligence activities

How SIRC carries out its review function

The Security Intelligence Review Committee is the only independent, external body equipped with the legal mandate and expertise to review the activities of CSIS. SIRC was established under the CSIS Act (1984) to provide assurance to the Parliament of Canada and to Canadians that CSIS is complying with law, policy and Ministerial Direction in the performance of its duties and functions. In doing so, SIRC seeks to ensure that the fundamental rights and freedoms of Canadians are respected.

To fulfill its mandate, SIRC directs staff to undertake a number of reviews each year. These provide a retrospective examination and assessment of specific CSIS investigations and functions. Under the CSIS Act, SIRC has virtually unlimited power to review CSIS's performance. With the sole exception of Cabinet confidences, SIRC has the absolute authority to examine all information concerning CSIS's activities, no matter how highly classified that information may be.

Each review includes SIRC's findings and recommendations. Upon completion, the report is forwarded to the Director of CSIS and the Inspector General of CSIS.

SIRC is also authorized under Section 54 of the CSIS Act to provide special reports to the Minister of Public Safety on any matter that Committee Members identify as having special importance or that the Minister requests SIRC to undertake.

SIRC's research program is designed to address a broad range of subjects. In deciding what to review, SIRC considers:

• priorities and concerns identified by Parliament or in the media;
• particular activities that could intrude on individual rights and freedoms;
• the CSIS Director's classified report to the Minister;
• the need to assess regularly each of the Service's branches and regional offices;
• SIRC's statutory authorities as detailed in the CSIS Act;
• events with the potential to cause threats to the security of Canada;
• commitments by SIRC to re-examine specific matters;
• issues identified in the course of SIRC's complaints function; and
• new policy directions or initiatives announced by CSIS or the Government of Canada.

This approach allows SIRC to manage the inherent risk of being able to review only a small percentage of CSIS activities in any given year. Each review results in a “snapshot” of the Service's actions in relation to applicable laws, policies and Ministerial Direction. Over the past two decades, SIRC's reviews have provided Parliament and Canadians with a comprehensive picture of the Service's operational activities, and assurance that CSIS is acting lawfully.

SIRC is but one of several mechanisms designed to ensure CSIS's accountability. The Service also remains accountable for its operations through the existing apparatus of government, specifically the Minister of Public Safety, the Inspector General of CSIS, central agencies, as well as the Auditor General, the Information Commissioner, and the Privacy Commissioner of Canada.

SIRC reviews in 2005-06

Review of a counter-terrorism investigation - Report # 2005-01

Background

This review focused on a CSIS investigation of a terrorist organization suspected of raising funds in Canada for its activities abroad.

Methodology

SIRC examined this investigation for the period from January 1, 2004- January 31, 2005. It reviewed hard-copy and electronic documentation pertaining to the following operational activities of the Service:

• the targeting of individuals suspected of engaging in threat-related activities, as well as the targeting-approval process;
• the direction of human sources against authorized targets;
• all exchanges of information with domestic partners; and
• advice to government.

Findings

Overall, the Service's activities were in compliance with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policy during the review period. SIRC found that CSIS had reasonable grounds to suspect that the targets of the investigation posed a threat to the security of Canada and that the targeting authorities were proportionate to the seriousness of the threats. CSIS investigators collected only information that was strictly necessary to the investigation.

Further, the Service's use of human sources and its exchanges of information with domestic partners complied with the CSIS Act and applicable Ministerial Direction. Although there were a few administrative errors in CSIS's management of sources, they did not affect the quality of the investigation, nor did SIRC see them as serious. SIRC also found that all reports CSIS distributed to senior government officials accurately reflected information in its operational reports.

SIRC was concerned about one exchange of information involving a foreign agency and noted a problem that arose as a consequence of a domestic partner's misuse of CSIS information.

SIRC also learned that CSIS's investigation of the terrorist organization brought it into contact with a sensitive Canadian institution.

CSIS has a mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, no matter how sensitive the venue in which those threats arise. Nevertheless, certain Ministerial Directions and operational policies require CSIS to take particular care when there is the possibility that its investigative activities will bring it into contact with a sensitive Canadian institution, which includes the academic, media, political, religious and trade union sectors.

These policies are more stringent than those governing other aspects of CSIS operations. They require that CSIS balance the use of intrusive investigative techniques against possible damage to civil liberties or to these fundamental societal institutions. This review identified an area where, in SIRC's opinion, operational policy needs to be expanded to cover CSIS's contact with the sector in question.

SIRC therefore recommended that CSIS extend its sensitive sector policy to require senior-level approval for certain investigative techniques. It is worth noting that SIRC made a similar recommendation in last year's annual report (see SIRC study # 2004-06).

CSIS liaison with foreign agencies: review of a security liaison post - Report # 2005-02

Background

CSIS maintains a number of Security Liaison Officer (SLO) posts outside Canada. With the exception of Washington, London and Paris, the location of these posts is classified. This year, SIRC reviewed one of the busiest of these posts, which receives thousands of messages annually and has numerous exchanges with foreign security and intelligence agencies located in that country.

Methodology

SIRC's objective was to determine whether the exchanges of information with the foreign agencies at this post were within the scope of the approved liaison agreements in place. SIRC also assessed whether activities at this post complied with the CSIS Act, with Ministerial Direction and with the Service's operational policies and procedures.

SIRC conducted this study by reviewing documents at CSIS Headquarters, as well as through on-site visits to the post. For context, the report also considered trends identified in previous SLO studies and SIRC's ongoing reviews of CSIS's foreign arrangements.

Findings

SIRC found that the SLO post in question was managed effectively and that its operations complied with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction, as well as with CSIS operational policy and guidelines.

SIRC made five recommendations.

First, SIRC reiterated a recommendation from its Section 54 report on Maher Arar—that CSIS Security Liaison Officers should maintain a written record when requests for information from CSIS Headquarters are transmitted verbally to foreign intelligence agencies.

The four remaining recommendations concerned issues related to the documentation used by CSIS to manage its foreign relationships.

SIRC recommended that CSIS update the post profile.

To ensure that CSIS Headquarters and SLOs are kept apprised of information exchanged with foreign partners, operational policy requires that CSIS employees submit a written report following a contact or visit with a representative of a foreign service. Not only are these reports important for managing CSIS's foreign relationships, they also help to keep the appropriate SLOs informed of discussions with foreign agencies and of information exchanged with their foreign counterparts. During the review period, such reports were not submitted regularly to CSIS Headquarters by the post. SIRC recommended that CSIS Headquarters remind operational branches and SLOs to submit these reports in a timely fashion.

SIRC also recommended that CSIS produce an assessment document concerning a new relationship with a specific foreign agency, especially since CSIS Headquarters made the same request in 2003.

Finally, with respect to CSIS's documentation of a separate and relatively new foreign arrangement with a particular intelligence agency, SIRC noted a lack of any written documentation regarding possible human-rights concerns cited by organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. As a result, SIRC recommended CSIS develop an operational policy for documenting its relationships with agencies that are known or reputed to have engaged in human-rights abuse.

Review of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre - Report # 2005-03

Background

In April 2004, the Government of Canada announced Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy. One outcome was the establishment of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) in July 2004, to ensure that terrorist threat assessments can be quickly transmitted to those decision-makers who need this information. It officially opened in October 2004.

ITAC allows for increased involvement by municipal and provincial authorities in evaluating and countering threats to Canada's national security. Located at CSIS Headquarters, ITAC is a functional component of the Service. It is governed by the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction, CSIS operational policies, and is subject to review by SIRC.

The ITAC Director is appointed by the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Director of CSIS. The current ITAC Director, seconded from the RCMP, was appointed in July 2005 for a two-year term. CSIS's role with respect to other ITAC partners is one of first among equals. The Service supplies the Centre's administrative, security and support services and administers its budget.

Methodology

This review was a foundation study to be used as a basis for future SIRC reviews. SIRC examined all available documentation concerning the formation and operations of ITAC, as well as its predecessor, the Integrated National Security Assessment Centre (INSAC).

SIRC was provided with all threat assessments produced by INSAC between February 2003 and July 2004, as well as ITAC threat assessments produced between October 2004 and February 2005. Of these, SIRC reviewed a sample of INSAC and ITAC reports to assess whether drafting, review and distribution processes complied with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policy.

Findings

SIRC found that, for the most part, the Service complied with the Act as well as Ministerial Direction. However, SIRC also found that the Service had not yet integrated the operations of the Centre into existing operational policies or approved new ITAC-specific policies. SIRC recommended that CSIS review its policies to determine where ITAC-specific amendments are required to address the role of this organization.

ITAC produces assessments that warn the government about terrorist threats to Canada and to Canadian interests abroad. The Centre consults with its partners and clients in identifying specific topics, and with an advisory committee to develop its work plan. Each assessment integrates open-source and classified intelligence obtained from various domestic and foreign agencies. Classified information is extracted by ITAC staff on-site from partner agencies' respective electronic networks that hold criminal, intelligence and immigration information. SIRC found that ITAC's electronic capacity gives it unprecedented and far-reaching access to Canadian intelligence sources.

Once completed, ITAC's threat assessments are distributed to agencies and departments at the federal, provincial, territorial and municipal levels of government, as well as to Canadian law enforcement agencies. They are also provided to foreign agencies. SIRC found that most of these exchanges were conducted using approved CSIS cooperation agreements with foreign security and intelligence agencies. However, the Committee noted that CSIS was exchanging information with another foreign fusion centre without a Section 17 arrangement, as required under the CSIS Act. SIRC recommended that CSIS formalize its relationship with this centre and seek an approved foreign arrangement from the Minister of Public Safety.

ITAC also redistributes within the Canadian government the threat assessments produced by counterparts in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. These assessments accounted for almost three-quarters of all reports distributed by ITAC between October 2004 and August 2005. SIRC noted that, as of January 2005, ITAC was in the process of analyzing distribution problems and was studying its network to identify bottlenecks.

Review of a counter-intelligence investigation - Report # 2005-04

Background

SIRC examined a long-running counter-intelligence investigation, which was last reviewed in 1996. A foreign intelligence service was suspected of covert espionage and foreign interference in Canada, as defined by Sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the CSIS Act.

CSIS sought to identify which sectors or industries (aeronautical, telecommunications, military, scientific or technological) were being targeted by the foreign intelligence service. It also looked into suspected incidents of spying on expatriates who had relocated to Canada.

Methodology

SIRC's review concentrated on the Service's management of this investigation between January 2002 and December 2004, plus some material outside of the review period. This included hard-copy and electronic documentation related to targeting decisions and the management of human sources.

Findings

Overall, the counter-intelligence investigation complied with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policy during the review period.

SIRC concluded that:

• CSIS had reasonable grounds to suspect that this foreign intelligence service or its agents posed a threat to the security of Canada;
• the level and intrusiveness of the investigation were proportionate to that threat; and
• the Service only collected information strictly necessary to fulfill its mandate.

CSIS's investigation was terminated during the review period. SIRC noted that CSIS had thoroughly investigated all suspected espionage and foreign interference activities, and was satisfied that these were either unsupported by corroborative evidence or were isolated incidents. Further, the Service assured SIRC it was prepared to deal on a case-by-case basis with any future threats posed by the foreign intelligence service in question.

Based on the information available for its review, SIRC accepted the Service's evaluation that this foreign intelligence service no longer presented a threat to the security of Canada.

There were no recommendations arising from this review.

Report # 2005-05

Note: SIRC is currently working on review # 2005-05, but it had not been finalized at the time this annual report went to print. A summary of this review will appear in SIRC's 2006-07 annual report.

Review of foreign arrangements with countries suspected of human rights violations - Report # 2005-06

Background

The CSIS Act authorizes CSIS to enter into arrangements with foreign intelligence agencies for purposes of exchanging information concerning threats to the security of Canada. In cases involving countries that have a questionable commitment to human rights, Ministerial Direction stipulates that arrangements will be considered only if they are required to protect the security of Canada. Once an arrangement is established, CSIS continues to monitor the foreign agency's human rights record through annual assessments.

As provided under Section 38(a)(iii) of the CSIS Act, SIRC reviews these arrangements and monitors the information and intelligence that is exchanged. This year, SIRC chose to review CSIS's relationships with agencies from four countries suspected of human rights violations.

Methodology

This study examined CSIS's foreign arrangements with seven foreign agencies, as well as information exchanged as a result of these arrangements.

For each foreign agency, SIRC examined:

• the rationale for establishing and—if applicable—expanding the arrangement;
• the relationship between CSIS and the agency;
• the nature of the information exchanged;
• special conditions or limitations on the collection or use of information; and
• an assessment of the intelligence disclosed to—and received from—the foreign agency.

The review covered the period January 1, 2002-December 31, 2004. Some information was also requested outside this period.

Findings

Overall, SIRC found that CSIS's exchanges of information with these agencies were within the scope of the respective foreign arrangements, and that the Service complied with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policies.

However, SIRC did note some concerns. First, it found that, even though CSIS was fully compliant in providing certain information to a foreign agency, this could have contributed to that agency's decision to detain a Canadian citizen (who was also a CSIS target) upon arrival in that foreign country.

Second, SIRC was concerned that, even though CSIS was fully compliant in conducting the exchanges in question, information the Service received and used from a foreign agency may have been obtained under duress. SIRC also noted that questions submitted by CSIS to this agency via a third party may have been used in interrogating a Canadian citizen in a manner that violated his human rights. CSIS had assessed both of these individuals as posing a threat and it obtained the necessary authority to launch investigations. However, it is outside SIRC's capacity to review whether other domestic or foreign agencies, who were also investigating these individuals, may have contributed to these individuals' detention and/or questioning.

Regarding information that could have been obtained through human rights violations, SIRC asked whether CSIS treated it differently than information received by other means. CSIS replied that it takes “no piece of information at face value and must find a way to independently corroborate the information before an assessment as to the reliability of the information is assigned.” CSIS further acknowledged that in most cases, it “will not know whether a piece of information originated from an abuse of human rights, [but] if suspected, the Service has to balance that against the need to secure information to protect Canadians and Canadian interests.”

CSIS noted that employees are expected to scrutinize closely the information received or exchanged with agencies in countries with questionable human rights records, and are encouraged to use due diligence when assessing the information obtained. While the Service indicated that human rights issues are taken into account during the exchange process, there is currently no specific operational policy requiring that it do so.

SIRC recognizes that for CSIS to safeguard Canada's national security the Service must maintain relationships and exchange information with agencies around the world—some of whom have questionable human rights records. Nevertheless, SIRC believes that CSIS's policy framework should reflect the challenges of dealing with countries suspected of human rights violations.

SIRC recommended that CSIS amend its policy governing the disclosure of information to foreign agencies, to include consideration of the human rights record of the country and possible abuses by its security or intelligence agencies.

As part of its review, SIRC also noted references to secure telephone conversations that took place between a Security Liaison Officer (SLO) stationed abroad and CSIS Headquarters. When SIRC inquired about the content of these conversations, the Service responded that there were no written records of these verbal discussions.

As a result, SIRC recommended that CSIS Headquarters should maintain a written record of secure telephone conversations with SLOs—specifically conversations that contain operational information—and include this in its reporting.

SIRC also learned that detailed discussions on the parameters and terms of arrangements are usually held between CSIS and the foreign agencies only after a foreign arrangement has been established. SIRC believes that these issues should be raised earlier in the process of establishing such arrangements.

SIRC recommended that CSIS review its procedures so that the parameters and methods of exchange—as well as the Service's expectations—are communicated to the foreign agency prior to entering into new foreign arrangements.

Review of CSIS's electronic-surveillance and information-gathering techniques - Report # 2005-07

Background

When CSIS was created in 1984, there were fewer than ten major telephone companies operating in Canada, and it would be a decade before the Internet would become a household word. Since then, telecommunications services have grown exponentially, as have the online activities of Canadians.

Rapidly evolving technologies have resulted in dramatic changes to the types of techniques that can be used to conduct electronic surveillance. Advances in broadband and wireless communication are increasingly challenging the ability of CSIS and police to lawfully access information needed to ensure public safety. Currently Canadian telephone and Internet service providers are not required to build or maintain intercept capabilities in their networks. As a result, when a new technology is introduced, CSIS and the police often have to research and engineer unique and costly means of gaining lawful access to these networks.

The pace of technological change—and the speed with which terrorists and foreign intelligence agencies are adopting these innovations—means that Canadian law enforcement and security agencies must stay abreast of new developments. So too must SIRC, to continue to perform its review function.

Section 21(3) of the CSIS Act permits the Service, with the authorization of a Federal Court judge, to “intercept any communication or obtain any information, record, document or thing.” However, Canada is one of the few G-8 countries that does not have legislation outlining mandatory requirements for companies to provide interception capability. The proposed Modernization of Investigative Techniques Act would have addressed this deficiency.

Some groups expressed concern about the impact that this proposed legislation could have had on privacy rights in Canada. SIRC believes that these concerns could be accommodated, however, in a modernized legislative framework, bringing Canada in line with other close allies. It is worth noting that a 2006 public opinion survey suggested that 49 percent of Canadians believe that police and intelligence agencies should have more powers to ensure security, even if it means Canadians have to give up some personal privacy safeguards.¹

Methodology

SIRC reviewed two warrant applications approved by the Federal Court in 2004, one for a counter-intelligence investigation and the other for a counter-terrorism investigation. SIRC examined hard-copy and electronic documentation pertaining to each of the warrant applications, as well as the implementation of warrant powers against authorized targets.

Findings

SIRC found that the Service complied with the CSIS Act and all relevant operational policies in its application for, and execution of, warrant powers in support of the counter-intelligence investigation.

Contrary to operational policy, SIRC found that CSIS continued to collect information on a counter-terrorism target for a short period of time after terminating its investigation. CSIS confirmed, however, that it did not process this information and that it subsequently deleted the information. In addition, SIRC was unclear why CSIS believed that warrant powers were necessary to investigate another counter-terrorism target.

SIRC also noted some administrative delays within CSIS in submitting documents related to the implementation of warrant powers against certain counter-terrorism targets. It also found that several other warrant implementation files did not contain all the documents required by operational policy.

SIRC agreed with CSIS that different situations may require different types of documentation and that these requirements may change over time. In the interest of accountability and efficiency, however, SIRC recommended that CSIS review and revise the warrant policy in question so that it reflects current best practices. Pursuant to this recommendation, the Service has undertaken to revise its policy in this regard.

Review of activities and investigations in a CSIS region - Report # 2005-08

Background

SIRC frequently reviews CSIS's activities in a particular region of Canada. These regional reviews provide insights into how investigations authorized by CSIS Headquarters are implemented in the field, and help SIRC to gain a better understanding of a region's activities, priorities and challenges.

This regional review was timely as it allowed SIRC to examine the first warranted investigation of a new and emerging threat within Canada: homegrown Islamic extremism.

Methodology

With respect to the warranted investigation, SIRC assessed the Service's compliance with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and relevant operational policy by examining CSIS's:

• acquisition and execution of warrant powers, along with special operations;
• targeting approval process and investigation of targets;
• recruitment, development and tasking of human sources;
• cooperation, liaison and exchanges of information with domestic partners; and
• internal security measures and procedures.

This review covered the period January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004.

Findings

SIRC agrees with the Service's assessment that homegrown Islamic extremism is a serious threat to national security. CSIS's investigations identified several individuals involved in planning terrorist acts, or engaged in fundraising, recruitment and training. SIRC found that the region's description of threat-related activities in its requests for warrants accurately reflected the information held by the Service. Further, the scope of warrant powers requested and subsequently exercised by the Service were appropriate to the threat, and complied with the CSIS Act, all Federal Court conditions, as well as the Service's own operational policies.

Although human sources were handled effectively, SIRC observed that there was a lack of coordination regarding joint handling of a source by two regions. SIRC also found that one source was directed against targets within a sensitive institution prior to appropriate approval having been secured, although approval was soon granted thereafter.

SIRC had concerns about the use of a certain interception technique used by the Service and recommended that CSIS obtain an updated legal opinion governing the use of this particular technique.

A review of internal security measures, including violations and breaches, is a standard part of every regional review. SIRC found internal security issues were dealt with appropriately in the region, with the exception of a district office, where potential violations were not documented. Although SIRC was assured that other internal safeguards would have prevented any violation, SIRC recommended that existing operational policy be strictly adhered to by all regions, regardless of location, size or staff complement.

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Date Modified:

2010-10-14