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4. Section 2.C CSIS Operational Activities

Annual Report 2004-2005 - An Operational Review of CSIS Activities

Section 2 : CSIS Accountability Mechanisms

C. CSIS Operational Activities

Counter Proliferation

The Counter Proliferation (CP) Branch collects information related to biological, chemical and nuclear weapons development programs of foreign governments. It also investigates state sponsorship of terrorism.

This is a relatively new branch, created in 2002. As such, in 2002–2003, SIRC committed to undertake in-depth reviews of this group in future years. In 2003–2004, the Committee undertook a review of the Service's investigation of the threat to Canadian security posed by one country's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program (see SIRC study # 2003-04). In 2004-2005, SIRC reviewed a CP Branch investigation of actions by another country regarding WMD.

The branch's Threat Assessment Unit produces threat assessment reports on a wide range of topics. In 2004-2005, the CP Branch produced 406 of these reports—a significant reduction from 650 in the previous fiscal year. CSIS reported that the reduction was attributable to a number of factors, including revisions to reporting practices, changes in staffing and the creation of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) which, in 2004, replaced the branch's Integrated National Security Assessment Centre.

The Service also briefed SIRC on the creation of a new unit that manages the Service's investigations of certain foreign state-driven weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and proliferation-related activities.

As reported in previous SIRC annual reports, one of the priorities of CP Branch in 2004-2005 was the investigation of efforts by a certain country to advance its WMD programs and capabilities.

The Branch also expanded its intelligence collection regarding states that sponsor terrorism, as well as the terrorist groups that benefit from that support. The CP Branch reported to SIRC that it had succeeded in identifying, recruiting and directing human sources to report on these matters.

The Branch provided SIRC with information on the role played by CSIS in connection with the November 2004 visit to Canada by United States President George W. Bush. The Branch worked closely with other Service branches and government partners responsible for security during this event. The Threat Assessment Unit prepared numerous threat assessment reports, and the CP Branch seconded staff to the RCMP National Operations Centre for the duration of the visit.

The Service also reported on information provided to a government agency pertaining to efforts of a particular country to acquire restricted technology. Based on information from both domestic sources and a foreign intelligence agency, CSIS also learned of an institution operating in Canada which had possible links to a terrorist organization.

Counter Terrorism

The role of the Counter Terrorism (CT) Branch is to advise the Government of Canada on emerging threats of serious violence that could affect the safety and security of Canadians and of Canada's allies. These threats could originate in Canada or abroad.

As reported in SIRC's previous three annual reports, Sunni Islamic extremism remained the major focus of the Counter Terrorism Branch's operational activities. It undertook certain restructuring to respond to the fluidity of this priority. Additional reassignments at the supervisory level were also implemented within the branch in 2004-2005.

It also reported on a new and growing extremist threat in Canada and other Western democracies, in which targets are in their twenties, technologically savvy and completely westernized.

The CT Branch also reported on support to the RCMP and a foreign intelligence service. A total of 137 Section 19 disclosure letters were issued by the Branch in 2004-2005. This section of the CSIS Act authorizes the Service to disclose information obtained in the performance of its duties and functions to Canadian law enforcement, diplomatic and defence personnel. The Branch also provided SIRC with details regarding the total number of individual and organizational targets that were the subject of ongoing investigations during the year under review.

In 2004-2005, the Committee reviewed CSIS counter-terrorism investigations as well as the Service's advice to the government concerning terrorist financing. The results of these studies are presented in this report. SIRC will continue to undertake reviews of CSIS's counter-terrorism investigations in 2005–2006.

Counter Intelligence

The Counter Intelligence (CI) Branch investigates threats to national security from the hostile intelligence activities of foreign governments. These activities may include espionage, foreign-influenced activity, transnational crime and threats to Canada's social, political, and economic infrastructure.

The Service reports that there have been no structural changes to the Branch and the 2005–2006 Annual Plan has made no changes to the priorities as outlined in the annual plan for the previous year. The Service notes that the espionage activities of CI's targets continue to become more complex and sophisticated. CSIS reported to SIRC on the measures taken to address these challenges. The CI Branch continues to place great importance on human source recruitment to maximize its operational effectiveness.

During the year under review, the CI Branch did not issue any Section 19 disclosure letters or advisory letters. The Branch informed SIRC of the number of targets and level of targeting authority; these include individual, organization and issue-based targets.

Research, Analysis And Production (Rap) Branch

RAP is responsible for producing security intelligence assessments to support the Service's operations and the Government of Canada's decision-making in relation to threats to national security. Given the nature of today's security environment and the immediacy of information, RAP must ensure that the information provided to decisionmakers is accurate and timely.

In fiscal year 2004-2005, RAP chose to focus on the production of strategic and operational analyses of current threats and emerging issues. The Intelligence Briefs, Reports and Studies remain core RAP documents, and are distributed widely throughout the security intelligence community, including SIRC.

In 2004-2005, responsibility for two programs was redirected to RAP. This branch is now the central point for the management of all the information received from one of the Service's major allies and for the subsequent dissemination of this information on behalf of the CT, CI and CP branches.

The Research, Analysis and Production Branch took on responsibility for the Terrorist-Entity Listing Process this year, at the time of the two-year review of the listings process. As indicated in SIRC study # 2004-03, RAP described their involvement in the first two-year review of the terrorist list as a “major project.” The review process involved five research librarians from the Information Centre, twelve RAP analysts, and four lawyers. RAP estimates that approximately ten days were necessary to research and write a two-year review SIR for each of the 35 entities listed. RAP noted that “the involvement of this many of RAP's resources resulted in successfully satisfying the legislative requirements of the listing process; however, it did affect the ability of RAP to maintain its ‘normal’ research and production responsibilities.”

Finally, RAP must report Section 19 disclosures. RAP discloses information to the RCMP under Section 19(2)(a), of which there were 155 disclosures in 2004-2005. The CT, CP and CI Branches reported to SIRC on their Section 19(2)(a) disclosures to law enforcement agencies. As for Section 19(2)(b) disclosures to Foreign Affairs Canada, the Service reported that there were 673 in 2004-2005. Finally, there were 384 disclosures to the Department of National Defence by RAP under Section 19(2)(c).

Security Screening

Section 13(1) of the CSIS Act authorizes the Service to provide security assessments to federal government institutions. The Act defines a security assessment in Section 2 as “an appraisal of the loyalty to Canada and, so far as it relates thereto, the reliabilityof an individual.” The Service may also, under Sections 13(2) and (3), enter into arrangements to provide assessments to provincial government institutions or police forces, or to foreign governments and international institutions.

Under Sections 14 and 15 of the CSIS Act, the Service conducts security screening investigations and provides advice to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and the Canada Border Services Agency to assist in processing refugee, immigration and citizenship applications. The Service's advice in these cases is based on the classes of individuals deemed inadmissible under the security-related criteria of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. CSIS also provides security assessments to CIC to assist in screening citizenship applications, pursuant to Section 19 of the Citizenship Act.

Table 2 Turnaround Times for Security Screening of Refugee Claimants and Immigration Applicants (2004-2005)

CSIS Security Screening Programs	Median16 Turnaround (Calendar Days)
	Non-adverse Advice	Information Briefs	Inadmissible Briefs
Front-end screening of refugees	27	336	248
Applications for permanent residence within Canada—refugee determination program	56	515	527
Applications for permanent residence within Canada—immigration program	44	511	333
Applications for permanent residence from the USA	150	599	642
Applications for permanent residence from outside Canada (excluding USA)	7	531	236

In 2004-2005, CSIS received a total of 101,097 government security clearance and “site-access” assessment requests. This represents a significant increase over the 74,835 requests processed in 2003–2004. Also of note during 2004-2005, the Service issued 39 information briefs and three recommendations for denial of government security clearances. For the same period, the Service received a total of 254,364 requests for immigration, refugee, front-end screening and citizenship screening.

There was one structural change within the Branch during the past fiscal year, to process site-access requests. The Branch reported that there were no changes to security screening priorities as outlined in their 2004-2005 annual plan.

Security Clearances

The Service reported that it received 36,519 requests for new or updated security clearances—down slightly from 37,508 during the previous fiscal year. In 2004-2005, there was a significant increase in the turnaround times for Level I (Confidential) and II (Secret) security assessments for the Department of National Defence (DND), and an improvement in the turnaround time for DND on Level III (Top Secret) clearances. For the balance of federal departments and agencies, there was a small increase in the median turnaround for Level I and II clearances, with an improvement to Level III turnaround times.

The median turnaround times for the Service to provide its assessments to government clients can be found in Table 3 below.

Table 3 Turnaround Times for Security Screening of Government Clients

Category	Level
		Median Number of Calendar Days
		2003–2004	2004-2005
DND	I (Confidential)	20	49
	II (Secret)	18	63
	III (Top Secret)	96	70
Other departments and agencies	I (Confidential)	7	12
	II (Secret)	11	14
	III (Top Secret)	82	69

Site-Access Programs

The Service received a total of 64,578 site-access requests in 2004-2005. This is an increase compared to the 28,822 requests received in 2003–2004. Of these, the Service received 31,086 requests under the Airport Restricted Access Area Clearance Program. The median turnaround time for the Service's response to these requests was 24 calendar days.

Included in the 64,578 processed requests were 7,857 requests by nuclear power facilities and the Parliamentary Precinct (which includes all facilities controlled by the Parliament of Canada). The median turnaround time for a response to these site-access requests was one calendar day. The balance of the requests (i.e., those received from other government departments) were processed in one calendar day.

Table 4 Site-Access Programs

Program	Number of Site-Access Requests Processed	Median Turnaround Time (Calendar Days)
Parliamentary Precinct Program	1,110	1
Airport Restricted Area Program	31,086	24
Nuclear facilities	6,747	1
Other government departments	25,635	1

Screening on Behalf of Foreign Agencies

The Service may enter into reciprocal arrangements with foreign agencies to provide security assessments on Canadians and other individuals who have resided in Canada. Under these arrangements, the Service does not make recommendations to foreign agencies to deny security clearances, but simply reports its findings concerning the individual(s).

In 2004-2005, the Service concluded 869 screening requests on behalf of foreign agencies—down from the 1,208 checks concluded in 2003–2004. Field investigations were conducted in 151 of these screening requests.

Security Screening for Refugee Claimants and Immigration Applicants

In 2004-2005, CSIS received 97,761 requests for security screening of immigration and refugee applicants—a decrease of 3,529 applications from the previous fiscal year. The Service provided immigration officials with a total of 232 information briefs and 150 inadmissible briefs. In the previous fiscal year, CSIS produced 221 information briefs and 99 inadmissible briefs.

In 2004-2005, the Service also provided 16 incidental letters and 55 updates to briefs previously issued to CIC. A description of the types of advice CSIS provides to CIC can be found in the inset on page 64.

Security screening of refugee and immigration applicants is carried out under the three main programs listed in Table 5 below.

Table 5 Security Screening of Refugee Claimants and Immigration Applicants (2004-2005)

CSIS Security Screening Programs	Requests Received	Information Briefs	Inadmissible Briefs
Front-end screening of refugees	22,871	115	69
Applications for permanent residence within Canada	38,628	84	65
Applications for permanent residence from outside Canada (including SLO referrals)	36,262	33	16
Total	97,761	232	150

Front-End Screening of Refugee Claimants

The Front-End Screening (FES) Program, implemented by the Government of Canada in November 2001, identifies potential security concerns about refugee claimants in Canada as early as possible in the refugee determination process. For 2004-2005, the Service reported receiving 22,871 applications under this program. During the same period, the Service provided advice on 22,227 cases—including 115 information briefs and 69 inadmissible briefs.

Under the FES Program, the median turnaround time for the Service to issue non-adverse advice was 27 days. Median turnaround times were 336 days for information briefs and 248 days for inadmissible briefs. This represents a small increase over last year's numbers of 332 days for information briefs and 214 days for inadmissible briefs.

Applications for Permanent Residence from Within Canada

The Service is responsible for security screening all persons who apply for permanent residence status from within Canada. In 2004-2005, the Service received 38,628 requests—24,389 under Canada's immigration program and 14,239 through the refugee determination program.

The median turnaround times for the Service to provide its advice in these cases varied considerably in 2004, depending on whether the Service received the request in hard copy or via Electronic Data Exchange (EDE). The Service noted that electronic exchanges are already well established for Canada's immigration program—with the exception of overseas immigration and vetting of visa applications. Ninety-five percent of inland Canada immigration applications were conducted electronically (EDE). For 2004-2005, the median turnaround time for hard-copy applications was 33 days, and 45 days for EDE applications.

Applications for Permanent Residence from Outside Canada

For permanent residence applications originating outside Canada or the United States, the Service shares responsibility for security screening with immigration officials at Canadian missions abroad. In such cases, CSIS only becomes involved in the process when they receive a request from the Immigration Program Manager. This process allows the Service to focus on higher-risk cases.

During this review period, the Service received 5,408 requests to provide screening advice for applications submitted to Canadian immigration offices in the United States. For these applications, the median turnaround time was 25 calendar days for electronic (EDE) applications and 288 days for hard-copy applications.

Forty-four percent of immigration applications originating in the United States were submitted electronically. The median turnaround time for immigration security screening cases that resulted in a Notice of Assessment—Checked on the Basis of Information Supplied or No Reportable Trace was 150 days.

For applications from outside Canada, other than the United States, the Service concluded 26,430 requests. Eighty-three percent of these applications were managed electronically by EDE. The median turnaround time for hard-copy applications was 38 calendar days—electronic applications took six calendar days. In addition, the Service's Security Liaison Officers were consulted on 4,593 cases. The Service issued 17 information briefs and 11 inadmissible briefs. The median turnaround times were 531 days for information briefs, 236 days for inadmissible briefs and seven days for non-adverse advice.

Foreign Liaison and Visits (FLV) Branch

The Foreign Liaison and Visits (FLV) Branch is responsible for the Service's liaison with foreign agencies. It uses liaison channels to exchange information on threats to the security of Canada.

Under Section 17(1) of the CSIS Act, the Service may enter into an arrangement with foreign states—including foreign governments or international organizations of states or institutions thereof—for the purpose of performing its duties and functions. While Ministerial Direction and Service operational policy outline the principles regarding the establishment and management of such arrangements, the scope of a foreign arrangement determines the nature and extent of the Service's cooperation and exchanges with a foreign agency. The scope also identifies the specific type of information sharing that can occur.

At the end of fiscal year 2004-2005, the Service had 257 foreign arrangements with 143 countries. During that period, the Service received Ministerial approval to establish ten new arrangements and submitted a request for two others. CSIS also modified or expanded one foreign arrangement and asked for Ministerial approval to expand three others.

Of the Service's 257 foreign arrangements, 42 were identified as dormant (with dormancy defined as no liaison contact for at least one year). The Service continues to maintain restrictions on exchanges of information in the case of five of these dormant arrangements, due to:

• concerns about the foreign agency's human rights record;
• one or more violations of the rule against transferring information to a third party; or
• an overall lack of reliability of the liaison contact.

The Service can opt to re-activate dormant arrangements in cases where regional conflicts and political events that may affect Canadian national security interests may transpire.

The FLV Branch is also responsible for security liaison posts. As part of its foreign liaison program, the Service maintains security liaison posts abroad, normally co-located with Canadian diplomatic missions. The Service relies heavily on its security liaison posts to assess the usefulness of individual CSIS Section 17 foreign arrangements, as well as the reliability of those foreign agencies. These posts also provide significant support to Citizenship and Immigration Canada related to Sections 14 and 15 immigration screening requirements (see Report # 2004-01 in this year's annual report).

The FLV also coordinates visits to CSIS Headquarters and CSIS Regional Offices by foreign agency representatives, including foreign ambassadors, as well as travel abroad by Service representatives.

CSIS Domestic Arrangements

The discharge of the Service's mandate under Sections 12–16 of the CSIS Act routinely requires cooperation among governments at the federal and provincial level, as well as with police services in a given province. Cooperation can take the form of exchanges of information, providing operational assistance, or conducting joint operations. CSIS does not require a formal arrangement when disclosing information to any domestic government department, agency or police service in accordance with its responsibility to advise government. Classified information passed under these circumstances to any federal department or agency is protected under normal provisions of the Government Security Policy.

However, under Section 17(1)(a) of the CSIS Act, the Service may, with the approval of the Minister, conclude written cooperation arrangements—referred to as memoranda of understanding—with domestic agencies for the purpose of performing its duties and functions.

In the year under review, CSIS entered into an arrangement with the Prime Minister's National Security Advisor in the Privy Council Office with respect to the establishment and management of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, making a total of 17 such arrangements with federal institutions. The number of domestic arrangements with the provinces (10) remained unchanged. There were no terminations or amendments to existing arrangements.

Relationship with the RCMP

Among domestic arrangements, the Memorandum of Understanding between CSIS and the RCMP figures most prominently in SIRC's review because of the volume of exchanges between these two organizations and their ongoing history of joint operations.

In 2004-2005, there were 855 written or verbal exchanges of information provided to the Service by the RCMP—a significant increase over the 615 exchanges in the previous year. The Service, for its part, provided the RCMP with 227 disclosure letters in 2004-2005, and 215 in the previous year. A disclosure letter from CSIS is required to allow the RCMP to use Service information to pursue a criminal investigation.

During 2004-2005, CSIS also provided the RCMP with 24 advisory letters—compared to 15 letters in 2003–2004. The RCMP request advisory letters from the Service to use CSIS information in court proceedings.

The year under review marks the fourth year of operation for the RCMP-led Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs), to which CSIS staff from four regions, as well as CSIS Headquarters, have been seconded. The Service reports that the INSETs have proven to be beneficial in that they have fostered closer cooperation between the Service and the RCMP. Because INSETs are operationally led by the RCMP, SIRC has a very limited capacity to review their activities—and indeed these joint operations once again highlight the limitations of SIRC's mandate in the increasingly operationally integrated security sector.

This year, two SIRC studies (2004-02 and 2004-07) examined the substance of the information exchanged with the RCMP and the nature of cooperation between the two organizations during the course of its reviews of regional offices and CSIS investigations.

Federal Court Warrants And Warrant Statistics

Warrants are one of the most powerful and intrusive tools available to the Government of Canada. They provide an organization with Federal Court authorization to use investigative techniques—such as monitoring of telephone communications—that would otherwise be illegal. For this reason alone, the use of warrants by CSIS deserves continued scrutiny—a task that SIRC takes very seriously. In the course of the Committee's in-depth reviews of CSIS investigations, the individual warrants (along with their supporting documentation), are generally the subject of detailed examination.

Table 6 New and Replaced/Renewed/Supplementary Warrants

	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005
New warrants	52	68	40
Replaced/Renewed/Supplementary	150	130	207
Total	202	198	24717

Every year, SIRC asks CSIS to provide statistics on the Service's request for warrants (i.e., the information CSIS provides the Court in seeking a warrant), as well as on warrants granted by the Federal Court. Table 6 compares the number of warrants issued in each of the last three fiscal years.

In 2004-2005 most warrants were approved for one year. A select few were approved for a shorter span at the request of the Service. This was done to allow the expiration of these warrants to coincide with the expiration dates of other warrants on related files.

For three applications, the Court asked the Service for interim reports to provide the Court with up-to-date information on the status of a target, or to justify the continued need for—or usefulness of—the warrants.

In another case, the Court declined to grant one of the powers sought by the Service until the Court had been provided with more compelling evidence of the need for that power.

On several occasions, revisions were made to affidavits in support of applications during the hearings before the Federal Court. In one instance, the Court adjourned the hearing so that the Service could make changes. The application was approved after the submission of amended documents.

The Federal Court did not impose any new conditions or revise any existing conditions on warrants during the fiscal year under review. The Service also reported that in 2004-2005, no judicial decisions affected its applications for warrants, the execution of powers contained in warrants, or the warrant process in general.

According to the Service, the Federal Court issued nine urgent warrants during 2004-2005, compared to 30 in the previous year.

Also of note, Section 28 of the CSIS Act authorizes the Governor-in-Council to make regulations governing: the forms of warrants; the practice and procedure applicable to the hearing of applications; as well as the place where (and the manner in which) hearings may be held. There were no regulations made in 2004-2005.

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Date Modified:

2010-10-14