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4. Section 2.C CSIS Operational Activities

Annual Report 2003-2004 - An Operational Review of CSIS Activities

Section 2: CSIS Accountability Mechanisms

C. CSIS Operational Activities

In addition to carrying out in-depth reviews of selected CSIS operations each year, the Committee requests written and oral briefings from the Service about several activities that are relevant to the Committee's mandate. The information we receive relates to the Service's plans and priorities, especially as they pertain to its main operational branches. Although this information is not independently verified unless it forms part of an in-depth Committee review, it nonetheless helps the Committee to stay apprised of and to monitor the Service's priorities and perspectives, from year to year.

This section of the Annual Report summarizes information the Committee received in written and oral briefings.

COUNTER PROLIFERATION

The goal of the CP Branch is to collect information related to the biological, chemical and nuclear weapons development programs of foreign governments. The Branch also investigates state sponsorship of terrorism.

Among CP's most important concerns is the potential threat posed by terrorist organizations that might manage to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Some foreign governments that support terrorist organizations continue to provide these groups with training, arms, money, materials and logistical support. The Service gathers information regarding these activities in order to advise the Government on possible threats to Canada's national security and public safety.

According to the Service, another key challenge has been to remain vigilant throughout significant changes in the international environment, such as the hostilities in Iraq and Libya's December 2003 declaration that it would dismantle its weapons of mass destruction program.

SIRC is always interested in assessing whether CSIS needed to change its priorities to address new operational considerations or unforeseen events. The Service reported that world events such as the ones described above had a definite impact on CP investigations. CSIS reallocated resources and adjusted its collection methods to ensure that it could continue to forewarn the Government of potential threats to national security. The Service also reported that the Branch reorganized itself to provide more focussed investigations of particular threats.

Acknowledging the international nature of the CP threat environment, the Service also reported that it continues to look beyond the borders of Canada to collect information related to Canada's national security interests, as per section 12 of the CSIS Act. CSIS reported that a key factor affecting its success abroad is CP's ability to train its personnel appropriately and to expand its relations with foreign agencies in order to exploit joint operational possibilities.

In last year's annual report, we commented that future in-depth reviews would include this new operational Branch. This year SIRC reviewed the Service's investigation of the threat to Canadian security posed by a foreign state's activities in support of its weapons of mass destruction program (see the summary of Report #2003-04 in Section 1 A). We will continue to report findings on the activities of the CP Branch in future annual reports.

Fiscal year 2003–2004 marked the first full year that CSIS's Threat Assessment Unit operated within the CP Branch. Working alongside other CSIS assessment groups, such as the Research, Analysis and Production Branch, the Unit co-operates with and draws upon operational areas at Headquarters, in the regions and at Security Liaison Posts. It provides tactical threat assessments that forewarn Government of Canada departments and agencies of threats to the security of Canada. These assessments can focus on activities of terrorist organizations, threats to diplomatic establishments in Canada and abroad, travel advisories for Canadian diplomats, and other situations affecting Canadian interests both directly and indirectly.

The Unit produced 650 threat assessments during the year. This represents a slight decrease from the 709 assessments produced in 2002–2003. As in the past, we continue to examine threat assessments that are relevant to our in-depth reviews of CSIS operational activities.

COUNTER TERRORISM

The role of the Counter Terrorism (CT) Branch is to advise the Government on emerging threats of serious violence that could affect the safety and security of Canadians and of Canada's allies. Addressing the threat of violence used to support political, religious or ideological objectives continues to be one of the Service's chief priorities. These threats could originate in Canada or abroad.

As in 2001–2002 and 2002–2003, Sunni Islamic extremism remained a major focus of CT's operational activities. Additional challenges surfaced due to international events such as the war in Iraq, but the Service reported that the Branch's priorities remained unchanged during the year.

The Service reported no major structural changes to the Branch in 2003–2004 following the significant reorganization of the previous year. However, to adapt to the evolving threat environment and to better utilize resources, the Branch made some organization improvements.

In 2004–2005, we will review CSIS counter-terrorism investigations as well as the Service's advice to government with regards to terrorist financing. We will present the results of these studies in next year's Annual Report.

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

The Counter Intelligence (CI) Branch investigates threats to national security from the hostile intelligence activities of foreign governments. These activities may include espionage, foreign-influenced activity, transnational crime and threats to Canada's social, political, and economic infrastructure.

The Service reports that foreign intelligence services continue to modify their collection methods in Canada. For example, CSIS has uncovered aggressive targeting of Canadian institutions by a foreign intelligence service, and has acted to counter it.

The CI Branch has to remain abreast of these methods and develop investigative strategies that will permit it to gather its own intelligence in an effective manner. It maintains close liaison with foreign and domestic security and intelligence agencies, and works closely with Canadian government organizations to help them guard against threats from hostile intelligence services.

As in previous years, our review of CSIS operations includes the Service's counter intelligence activities.

RESEARCH, ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION

The Service's Research, Analysis and Production (RAP) Branch is responsible for writing intelligence reports on threats to the security of Canada (see Inset for a description of RAP reports). These reports provide senior federal decision-makers with policy-neutral assessments on a wide range of security intelligence issues. When appropriate, RAP products are distributed to external clients within the intelligence community.

RAP publications generally fall under two categories:

• Public safety reports examine the threat to Canadians at home and abroad from international terrorism.
• National security reports address activities in Canada of the intelligence services of other governments, as well as global issues such as terrorism and transnational criminal activity.

According to the Service, international instability and evolving security concerns have increased demand for RAP assessments. Examples from 2003–2004 include support for the Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan and reports on current events such as the security implications of SARS. RAP also plays a role in the wider government assessment community as a contributing member of the interdepartmental Intelligence Assessment Committee.

Sections 19 (2)(a) through (c) of the CSIS Act authorize the Service to disclose information obtained in the performance of its duties and functions to, respectively, Canadian law enforcement, diplomatic and defence personnel. CSIS makes such disclosures through RAP reports. CSIS advised us that in 2003–2004 RAP issued 1623 Section 19 disclosure reports under these sections, a two-fold increase from 2001–2002. We reported on disclosures under section 19(2)(d) .

SIRC uses RAP products to obtain context for our reviews of the Service's investigations, to identify the Service's perspective on specific threats, and to enhance our own knowledge of the nature of the analysis and advice CSIS provides the government.

SECURITY SCREENING

Section 13(1) of the CSIS Act authorizes the Service to provide security assessments to federal government institutions. The Act defines a security assessment in section 2 as “an appraisal of the loyalty to Canada and, so far as it relates thereto, the reliability of an individual.” The Service may also, under sections 13(2) and (3), enter into arrangements to provide assessments to provincial government institutions or police forces, or to foreign governments and international institutions.

Under sections 14 and 15 of the CSIS Act, the Service conducts security screening investigations and provides advice to CIC and the CBSA to assist in the processing of refugee and immigration applications. The Service's advice in these cases is based on the classes of individuals deemed inadmissible under the IRPA. The Service also provides security assessments to CIC to assist the screening of citizenship applications pursuant to the Citizenship Act.

In this section, we refer to the Service's median turnaround times for processing screening requests, rather than average (mean) times. We believe this represents more accurately the typical processing times by mitigating the impact of unusually short or lengthy processing times.

Table 2 Turnaround Times for Security Screening of Refugee Claimants and Immigration Applicants (2003–2004)

CSIS Security Screening Programs	Median Turnaround (Days)
	Non-adverse Advice	Information Briefs	Inadmissible Briefs
Front End Screening of Refugees	31	332	214
Applications for permanent residence within Canada—refugee determination program (EDE / hard copy)	53 (52 / 114)	472	419
Applications for permanent residence within Canada—immigration program (EDE / hard copy)	46 (42 / 133)	454	431
Applications for permanent residence from the USA (hard copy only)	153	557	599
Applications for permanent residence from outside Canada	5	238	106

Government Security Screening

In 2003–2004, CSIS received a total of 74 835 security clearance and “site access” assessment requests, 4093 of which required field investigations. During the same period the Service issued 21 information briefs and four recommendations for denial of a security clearance.

The Service has reported that the creation of the CBSA has impacted both the Immigration and Government programs of the Security Screening Branch significantly. The Service also reported that, as a result of the changes in the Government in late 2003 and the establishment of the O'Connor Commission, the Security Screening Branch faced increased pressure to expedite the processing of several Level 3 Top Secret security clearance assessments.

Security Clearances

The Service reported that it received 37 508 requests for new or updated security clearances—down from 51 262 during the previous fiscal year. The year under review, 2003–2004, saw an overall decrease in the median turnaround times for Levels I (Confidential) and II (Secret) assessments and a notable increase in the median turnaround time for Level III (Top Secret) assessments. The median turnaround times for the Service to provide its assessments to government clients can be found in Table 3.

Table 3 Turnaround Times for Security Screening of Government Clients

Category	Level	Median Number of Days
		2002-2003	2003-2004
DND	I (Confidential)	28	20
	II (Secret)	29	18
	III (Top Secret)	47	96
Other Government Departments and Agencies	I (Confidential)	5	7
	II (Secret)	13	11
	III (Top Secret)	51	82

Site Access

In 2003–2004, the Service received 28 822 requests under the Airport Restricted Access Area Clearance Program. The median turnaround time for the Service's response to these requests was 14 days.

The Service also received 8505 requests related to “site access.” These included requests from federal government departments and agencies, nuclear power facilities and the Parliamentary Precinct (which includes all facilities controlled by the Parliament of Canada). The median turnaround time for a response to a “site access” request was one day.

Screening on Behalf of Foreign Agencies

The Service may enter into reciprocal arrangements with foreign agencies to provide security assessments on Canadians and other individuals who have resided in Canada. Under these arrangements the Service does not make recommendations to foreign agencies to deny security clearances, but simply reports its findings concerning the individual(s).

In 2003–2004, the Service conducted 1208 screening checks on behalf of foreign agencies, 48 of which included field investigations. This is down from 1797 screening checks and 177 field investigations during the previous year.

Security Screening for Refugee and Immigration Applicants

CSIS received 96 477 requests for security screening of immigration and refugee applicants in 2003–2004. The Service provided immigration officials with a total of 221 information briefs and 99 inadmissible briefs—a decrease from the 247 information briefs and 215 inadmissible briefs issued during the previous year.

In 2003–2004 the Service also provided 19 incidental letters and 28 updates to briefs previously issued to CIC. A description of the types of advice CSIS provides to CIC can be found in the inset on page 46.

Security screening of refugee and immigration applicants is carried out under the three main programs listed below. The graphic on page 9 illustrates the flow of information between CIC, the CBSA and CSIS.

Table 4 Security Screening of Refugee Claimants and Immigration Applicants (2003–2004)

CSIS Security Screening Programs	Requests Received	Information Briefs	Inadmissible Briefs
Front End Screening of Refugees	22 681	66	26
Applications for permanent residence within Canada (including USA-based applications)	49 553	130	52
Applications for permanent residence from outside Canada	24 243	25	21
Total	96 477	221	99

Front End Screening of Refugee Claimants

The Front End Screening (FES) Program, implemented by the Government in November 2001, aims to identify potential security concerns with refugee claimants in Canada as early as possible in the refugee determination process. For 2003–2004 the Service reported receiving 22 681 applications under the FES Program. During the same period, the Service provided its advice on 24 424 cases, which included 66 information briefs and 26 inadmissible briefs.

Under the FES Program, the median turnaround time for the Service to issue non-adverse advice was 31 days. Median turnaround times were 332 days for information briefs and 214 days for inadmissible briefs.

SIRC recently completed its first in-depth examination of the Service's role in the FES Program. The findings of this study can be found on pages 7–9 of this report.

Applications for Permanent Residence from Within Canada

The Service is responsible for security screening all persons who apply for permanent residence status from within Canada. In 2003–2004 the Service received 44 907 screening requests—28 401 under the immigration program and 16 506 through the refugee determination program. The Service also received 4646 requests to provide screening advice for applications submitted to Canadian Immigration offices in the United States.

The median turnaround times for the Service to provide its advice in these cases varied considerably depending on whether the Service received the request in hard copy (paper application) or via Electronic Data Exchange (EDE).

For the immigration program, the median turnaround time was 42 days for EDE requests and 133 days for hard copy requests. The median turnaround times for the refugee determination program were 52 days for EDE requests and 114 days for hard copy requests. In 2003–2004, all requests from Canadian visa offices in the USA were submitted in hard copy. The median turnaround time for these cases was 153 days.

In 2003–2004 the Service issued 130 information briefs and 52 inadmissible briefs in response to screening requests from within Canada and the United States. The median turnaround times for these cases ranged from 14 to 20 months.

Applications for Permanent Residence from Outside Canada

For permanent residence applications that originate outside Canada or the United States, the Service shares responsibility for security screening with immigration officials at Canadian missions abroad. For these cases, CSIS only becomes involved in the process upon receipt of a request from the Immigration Program Manager. This process allows the Service to focus on higher-risk cases.

In 2003–2004 CSIS received 24 243 requests for screening under this program. In addition, the Service's Security Liaison Officers were consulted on 4814 cases. The Service issued 25 information briefs and 21 inadmissible briefs. The median turnaround times were 238 days for information briefs, 106 days for inadmissible briefs and 5 days for non-adverse advice.

Security Screening for Citizenship Applications

As part of the citizenship application process, CIC forwards electronic trace requests to the Service. The names of citizenship applicants are cross-checked against a security screening Watch List that contains the names of individuals who have come to the attention of CSIS through, inter alia, investigations approved by the Target Approval and Review Committee.

In 2003–2004 the Service received 203 356 trace requests for citizenship applicants. The Service provided CIC with 150 information briefs, and in four cases requested deferral of its advice in order to postpone the initiation of action on those cases.

CSIS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ARRANGEMENTS

Domestic Arrangements

Under section 17(1)(a) of the CSIS Act, the Service may, with the approval of the Minister, conclude written co-operation arrangements with domestic agencies for the purpose of performing its duties and functions as outlined in section 12 of the Act.

In the year under review, CSIS had 16 domestic arrangements in effect with federal government institutions, and 10 with provincial government institutions. During the period under review, the Service did not enter into any new section 17 domestic arrangements, and no agreements were terminated. The Service amended one domestic arrangement with a department of the federal government.

Relationships with the RCMP

In reviewing the Service's arrangements with domestic liaison partners, we have always paid particular attention to CSIS's relationships with the RCMP. The two organizations need to work closely together to protect the interests of Canada and Canadians, but at the same time they must maintain an appropriate separation between the law enforcement function of the RCMP and CSIS's national security mandate.

For the year under review, the Service recorded 613 exchanges of information (written and oral) originating with the RCMP. The Service, for its part, provided 215 disclosure letters to the RCMP (of which 18 related to Air India), 11 verbal disclosures and 15 advisory letters. A disclosure letter from CSIS to the RCMP allows the Force to use Service information to pursue a criminal investigation. If the RCMP wishes to use CSIS information in a court of law, it must request an advisory letter from the Service.

The Service reported on the secondment arrangements between CSIS and the RCMP. The Service noted that RCMP officers are now in four CSIS regional offices across the country and at Headquarters, whereas one year earlier, RCMP secondees were located in only three CSIS regional offices. The goal of this program, under which RCMP officers are seconded to CSIS, is to foster closer co-operation between CSIS and the RCMP.

The Service also reported to the Committee on the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs). The program, now in its third year, is still evolving. The Service expects that, over the long term, the program will enhance the relationship between the two organizations. It has already noticed improved understanding and appreciation in each organization of the strengths and challenges in the other, and greater dialogue on matters of mutual interest.

The Service reported that other initiatives are also facilitating liaison and co-operation with the RCMP. For example, the Joint Management Team, a management-level committee that meets several times a year, allows CSIS and RCMP employees at Headquarters to discuss informally topics of concern to both organizations. Similarly, RCMP representatives are among members of the Canadian security and intelligence community who attend the quarterly meetings of CSIS's new Threat Assessment Working Group.

The Service stated that it has placed considerable emphasis on nurturing relationships with the RCMP at both the working and management levels. The two organizations have worked together to address challenges, such as their divergent approaches to investigations, and CSIS indicates they have collaborated successfully in a number of investigations.

SIRC examines the substance of the information exchanged with the RCMP and the nature of co-operation between the two organizations during the course of regular reviews of regional offices and CSIS investigations. During the past year, we looked at the Service's relationship with the RCMP as part of our studies of Counter Proliferation and Counter Intelligence investigations, summaries of which can be found in Section 1 A of this report.

Foreign Arrangements

Section 17(1)(b) of the CSIS Act allows the Service to enter into arrangements with the government or institutions of a foreign state or international organizations for the purpose of performing its duties and functions. An arrangement with a foreign agency enables CSIS to exchange information of mutual interest in relation to events or threats, provide or request assistance and discuss best practices.

At the end of fiscal year 2003–2004, the Service reported that it had 247 foreign arrangements in 140 countries. During that year, the Minister approved the establishment of 13 new liaison arrangements. CSIS also modified arrangements with five other agencies.

During the last fiscal year, 43 arrangements were regarded as dormant (dormancy is defined as no liaison contact for at least one year). The Service maintained restrictions on exchanges of information in the case of five of the 43 dormant arrangements due to concerns either about the agencies' human rights records, violations of the rule against transferring information to a third party, or their overall lack of reliability.

At the end of the fiscal year, CSIS had submitted requests for three proposed new arrangements to the Minister, and these were under consideration. Four additional arrangements were at the initial consultation stage with Foreign Affairs Canada.

As part of its foreign liaison program, the Service maintains liaison Posts abroad, normally co-located with Canadian diplomatic missions. CSIS opened a new Post during 2003–2004. The Service reported that the most significant challenge to the foreign liaison program, as in recent years, was the ever-increasing workload arising from its program of assistance to Citizenship and Immigration Canada.

SIRC conducted a review of a CSIS Security Liaison Post in 2003–2004, a summary of which can be found in Section 1 A (Report #2003-05). We will continue to examine security liaison Posts in 2004–2005.

FEDERAL COURT WARRANTS AND WARRANT STATISTICS

Warrants are one of the most powerful and intrusive tools available to departments or agencies of the Government of Canada. They provide an organization with Court authorization to use investigative techniques, such as the monitoring of telephone communications, that would otherwise be illegal. For this reason alone, the use of warrants by CSIS bears continued scrutiny—a task that SIRC takes very seriously. In the course of our in-depth reviews of CSIS investigations, individual warrants are generally the subject of detailed examination.

Each year, we ask CSIS to provide statistics about CSIS warrant applications (the information CSIS provides the Court in seeking a warrant) and about warrants granted by the Federal Court. Table 5 compares the number of warrants issued in each of the last three fiscal years.

Table 5 New and Replaced/Renewed Warrants

	2001–2002	2002-2003	2003-2004
New warrants	111	52	68
Replaced/renewed warrants	155	150	130
Total	266	202	198

According to the Service, the Federal Court issued 30 urgent warrants during 2003–2004 compared to 25 in the previous year. Although no applications for warrants were denied by the Court, CSIS reported seven instances where the presiding Federal Court Judge requested amendments prior to issuing the warrant.

The Federal Court did not impose any new conditions or revise any existing conditions on future warrants during the last fiscal year. The Service also reported that in 2003–2004 no judicial decisions affected its applications for warrants, the execution of powers contained in warrants, or the warrant process generally.

Warrant Statistics in Perspective

The information collected by the Committee can provide insight into how often the Service seeks warrant powers from the Federal Court in a given year. However, any year-to-year comparison of these numbers must take into consideration a number of factors affecting the application for or renewal of warrants. Such factors as court decisions and new developments in technology can introduce significant variations in how often CSIS applies for warrant powers and how warrants are implemented. In addition, a single warrant can authorize the use of warrant powers against one person, several people or an organization.

Considered in isolation, therefore, warrant numbers are not a definitive indicator of the level of Service investigative activity. It is also important to note that CSIS has access to other investigative instruments, including physical surveillance and the use of human sources.

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Date Modified:

2010-10-14