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4. Section 1.A Reviews of CSIS Security Intelligence Activities

Annual Report 2003-2004 - An Operational Review of CSIS Activities

Section 1: SIRC Review and Complaints Functions

A. Reviews of CSIS Security Intelligence Activities

How SIRC Carries Out Its Review Function—An Overview

THE COMMITTEE'S ROLE IN CSIS'S ACCOUNTABILITY STRUCTURE

In creating SIRC, Parliament through the CSIS Act authorized SIRC to review the performance by CSIS of its duties and functions. To meet this legislated requirement, the Committee Members direct staff to undertake a number of research projects each year. These reviews provide a retrospective assessment of specific CSIS activities and investigations.

At the completion of each review, the Committee makes findings and recommendations and then forwards the reviews to CSIS and to the Inspector General. The Committee may also prepare special reports to the Minister on any matter that Committee Members identify as having special importance.

Through this review function, the Committee is able to advise Parliament and the Canadian public on the activities of CSIS and offer evidence as to whether the Service's actions were carried out in accordance with the laws of Canada, Directions from the Minister (formerly the Solicitor General, now the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), and CSIS operational policy.

The Committee is one of several accountability mechanisms designed to review CSIS's performance. The Service is accountable to the Minister of Public Safety and the Office of the Inspector General of CSIS. The Director of CSIS, under the direction of the Minister, is responsible for the control and management of the Service. For its financial administration, CSIS accounts to the government through the Minister of Public Safety and the central agencies of government, and to Parliament through the Office of the Auditor General of Canada. The Service is also accountable to Canada's Information and Privacy Commissioners.

IDENTIFYING SIRC STUDIES—CHOICES AND CHALLENGES

Each year, the Committee applies the principles of risk management in its selection of CSIS activities that will be the focus of detailed reviews. The Committee takes into consideration such matters as the importance and scope of CSIS investigations, the potential for particular activities to intrude on individual rights and liberties, priorities and concerns for Parliament and the Canadian people, the CSIS Director's report on operational activities, and the importance of producing regular assessments of each of the Service's branches.

Each report is the result of a detailed review of CSIS documents, interviews with Service staff and senior managers, and an assessment of the Service's actions in relation to applicable laws, policies and Ministerial Directions.

The Committee seeks to examine as broad a spectrum of CSIS's duties and functions as is possible with its small team of researchers. Over a period of years, the body of completed research projects has provided the Committee with a comprehensive assessment of the Service's operational activities and has given the Committee Members, Parliament and the public a thorough evaluation of the organization.

In addition to the need to ensure a comprehensive assessment of CSIS, the Committee considers a number of other factors when it approves specific areas for review:

• world events and their impact on threats to the security of Canada;
• trends or concerns identified in previous Committee reports;
• commitments by the Committee to re-examine specific issues or investigations;
• issues identified in the course of the Committee's complaints functions;
• new policy directions or initiatives announced by the Government of Canada; and
• the Committee's statutory duties under the CSIS Act.

Taking all these factors into consideration, the Committee identifies a number of specific projects at the beginning of each fiscal year. The research plan remains flexible throughout the year in order to respond in a timely fashion to unforeseen issues and events.

SIRC REVIEWS IN 2003–2004

In the period following September 11, 2001, SIRC reviews focussed to a significant extent on the Service's Counter Terrorism Branch investigations, particularly investigations into Sunni Islamic extremism, because of the intense and immediate importance of those subjects to Canadians. In 2003–2004, we were able to return to a broader focus in our studies, in keeping with our interest in maintaining an overview of the Service's activities across the spectrum of its responsibilities.

Our studies included reviews of two relatively new areas of CSIS activity—its participation in the Front End Screening Program, which screens refugee claimants in Canada, and its Counter Proliferation Branch, which was created in 2002. Our findings here will provide a baseline for future reviews of these activity areas.

We also looked at the Service's handling of an internal security breach in a CSIS regional office, completing a review we had begun the previous year.

Intelligence from abroad is increasingly important in today's security environment. We examined CSIS section 12 investigative activities outside Canada, and reviewed the activities of a Security Liaison Post abroad. We also conducted our annual review of CSIS foreign arrangements.

We rounded out our review program with a study into a particular CSIS counter intelligence investigation.

Front End Screening Program - Report # 2003-01

Background

In our 1997–1998 Annual Report, the Committee expressed concern about the lack of systematic security screening of the large numbers of refugee claimants in Canada. Many enter Canada without adequate documentation and remain here until their claims are determined. We suggested the Service could and should assist Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) to screen these individuals.

In 2001, SIRC reported that the Service and CIC had developed a Front End Screening (FES) Program for refugee claimants in Canada. Under the FES Program, CIC submits refugee applications to the Service during the initial phase of the refugee determination process. This allows CSIS to record identifying data on all claimants, including those who withdraw from the process prior to its completion. Applications go through an initial screening phase, and undergo further analysis if the initial screening raises security concerns.

This report provides the results of the Committee's first review of the FES Program. We also examined the existing Port of Entry Interdiction Program (POEIP), under which CSIS provides timely, verbal advice to CIC in screening persons, including prospective refugee claimants, whom CIC considers to be potentially inadmissible to Canada.

Under the POEIP, prospective refugee claimants may be interviewed before they have been determined eligible to file a claim.¹ Upon receipt of a request from CIC, a CSIS investigator will review the case and, if sufficient security concerns exist, the investigator will attend a joint CIC/CSIS interview. Joint interviews at Ports of Entry are led by an Immigration Officer, with the Service investigator acting as an advisor.

Following a joint interview, the Service investigator may provide verbal advice to the Immigration Officer to assist CIC's admissibility determination under section 34(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). It is important to note that, regardless of the advice provided by the Service, only CIC has the authority to determine a person's admissibility to Canada.

For the first year of its existence, the FES Program was carried out in the absence of program-specific operational policy. During this period, security screening analysts and investigators relied on directives from management, existing policies and prior experience with other similar programs such as POEIP that were covered by existing operational policies. In November 2002, the Service introduced a new operational policy governing both the POEIP and the FES Program.

We note that this review was concluded before the December 2003 announcement of the creation of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), which now shares responsibility with CIC for screening visitors, refugee claimants and immigration applicants to Canada.

Methodology of the Review

From November 1, 2001 to March 31, 2003, CSIS received 32 933 requests for screening under the FES Program. In the vast majority of these cases, the Service informed CIC following the screening process that it had no security concerns. We chose to review the 17 cases concluded during this period for which the Service provided advice to CIC by means of an inadmissibility brief, information brief, or incidental letter.² For each case, we examined all material used by the Service in support of its advice to CIC.

For the POEIP portion of the review, we examined 109 of the 527 interview reports that regional investigators submitted to CSIS Headquarters between November 1, 2001 and December 31, 2002. Under the POEIP, interview reports serve as a record of the advice CSIS investigators provided verbally to CIC. We also reviewed documentation related to the Service's overall
co-operation with CIC.

During this review, we met with officials from the Service and CIC to discuss their respective roles in the POEIP and the FES Program.

Findings of the Committee

The Screening Process

CSIS processes an average of 7500 security screening cases each week. Under normal operating capacity, the caseload in Security Screening Branch at any given time is approximately 17 000 cases. FES is considered high priority relative to other immigration security screening programs, given the objective of providing advice prior to the refugee claimant's hearing before the Immigration and Refugee Board.

We found that CSIS's advice to CIC under the FES Program was appropriate and sufficiently supported by the information in the possession of the Service. There were no instances of unreasonable delay by the Service in the 17 FES cases reviewed.

The Service complied with the CSIS Act and operational policy when providing advice to CIC. There was no evidence that the Service has used the POEIP or FES Program as a pretext for other investigative activities.

The Service uses security profiles during the screening process. We are satisfied that these security profiles do not target individuals based on ethnicity or religion. The profiles allow the Service to identify, and focus its attention on, higher risk cases.

We found that the FES Program is an efficient means to ensure that refugee claimants in Canada are properly screened against the inadmissibility criteria of the IRPA. Under the POEIP and the FES Program, the Service provided CIC with valuable advice at key stages of the refugee application process.

The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act: New Protection for Classified Evidence

During the first year of the Front End Screening Program, the IRPA replaced the Immigration Act. While the criteria for inadmissibility to Canada essentially remained the same, the IRPA introduced a new provision for the protection of classified information in the course of admissibility hearings.

The Committee specifically examined the Service's assistance to CIC in a case involving the use of this new provision. The evidence package the Service drafted for use by CIC was well prepared. It demonstrated a timely, effective use of CSIS information in support of enforcement initiatives.

We continue to believe that subjects of admissibility hearings should be provided with as much information as possible about the government's case against them, to allow them reasonable opportunity to respond. However, this case demonstrates that the new IRPA provisions work. This case also demonstrated noteworthy co-operation between CSIS and CIC.

POEIP Reporting

We found that several of the POEIP reports reviewed did not indicate clearly the nature of the advice provided verbally by the Service to CIC. Consequently, we made the following recommendation which the Service advises it has accepted and implemented:

We recommend that the Service develop a standard reporting format for POEIP interview reports that will include either a clear record of the advice provided verbally to CIC by CSIS investigators, or document that there was insufficient information for the Service to provide such advice.

Section 15 FES Interviews³

As we have recommended several times in the past, we believe that verbatim records of the Service's section 15 FES interviews would be invaluable in the event that the contents of these interviews are disputed at a later date. Should the need arise, both the Service and the interviewee could refer to such records and they would enable SIRC to reconstruct more accurately what transpired during an interview.

The Committee again recommends that the Service create verbatim records of its section 15 interviews.

The Service, having received this recommendation, chose not to accept it for a number of reasons which have been shared with SIRC and the Minister. The Committee maintains that verbatim records of section 15 interviews would be useful.

Effectiveness of FES

Although FES is still relatively new, some cases have already gone through both FES and subsequent screening for permanent residence. We found that the FES Program is an efficient means for the Service to provide timely, systematic security screening advice for all refugee claimants in Canada. This is a clear improvement over previous refugee processing procedures which saw numerous refugee claimants residing in Canada for extended periods without having been screened by CSIS.

While the Service can track the number of inadmissible persons identified by FES, SIRC notes there is no reliable way to determine the number of potentially inadmissible persons the program did not identify. It would be unrealistic to expect the program to identify all inadmissible persons. Information about refugee claimants is usually scarce. In addition, refugee claimants often arrive in Canada without proper identification documents, and the situation in their countries of origin can make confirmation of their identities difficult if verification is sought.

CSIS and SIRC will be in a better position to determine the effectiveness of the FES Program once more refugees who have undergone FES apply for permanent residence and complete the next stage of screening.

CSIS Section 12 Operational Activity Outside Canada - Report # 2003-02

Background

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Western countries have reassessed their intelligence agencies' abilities to discover and thwart threats to public safety and national security. This reassessment has included the examination of intelligence gathering capabilities beyond national borders.

CSIS has not been immune to this scrutiny. Some Canadian political leaders and media have called for the creation of a separate Canadian agency authorized to gather foreign intelligence abroad, or have advocated for increased powers to CSIS so that it may undertake investigative activities abroad. However, CSIS has consistently noted that it already has the mandate, and will continue, to conduct operations outside Canada.

Section 12 of the CSIS Act allows the Service to collect, analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may, on reasonable grounds, be suspected of constituting a threat to the security of Canada. The collection of section 12 intelligence has no geographic restrictions. Section 2 of the Act allows CSIS to investigate threats to the security of Canada “within or relating to Canada,” which includes investigations of threats outside Canada's borders. It is within this context of CSIS operations abroad that this SIRC study was situated.

Methodology of the Review

The purpose of our study was to examine CSIS section 12 investigative activity outside Canada. The operational activities selected by the Committee for this review spanned the Service's operational branches and regions as well as investigations. We examined several investigative operations conducted between April 1, 2001 and March 31, 2002.

Findings of the Committee

Overall, we found that the operations reviewed were carried out in conformity with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction, CSIS operational policy and relevant legislation in managing section 12 investigative activities.

The review determined that CSIS has a clear mandate to conduct section 12 investigative activities outside Canada, and concluded that such operations will undoubtedly increase as the threat posed by international terrorism grows. It also identified a few issues which will merit continued interest by the Committee in future reviews, such as the implications of the Anti-Terrorism Act and co-operation with domestic partners.

We intend to increase our scrutiny of CSIS's investigative activities abroad to determine for Parliament and Canadians whether the Service is adhering fully to legislative and policy requirements.

This study provided us with an opportunity to examine the Service's role in collecting or receiving information from outside Canada related to the conduct of the international affairs of Canada or the defence of Canada. The Service may accept unsolicited information relevant to other investigations when conducting section 12 investigations abroad. When this occurs, the Service is authorized under section 19 to disclose that intelligence to the appropriate Government department.

The Committee will continue to maintain a watchful eye on CSIS investigative activities outside Canada.

We made two recommendations related to the administrative management of CSIS's investigative activities under section 12 of the CSIS Act.

The Committee recommended that the Service's policy for approving investigative activities outside Canada be amended to include certain information.

The Committee recommended that the Service amend its operational policy to enhance its administrative rigour.

The Service has responded that, in its opinion, current policy addresses SIRC's first recommendation and that further to SIRC's second recommendation, the Service intends to propose a policy amendment.

Review of a Counter Intelligence Investigation - Report # 2003-03

Background

This report outlines the results of SIRC's examination of the Service's investigation of the threat-related activities of a foreign intelligence service in Canada. The Service has been monitoring the activities of this particular foreign intelligence service for several years. However, developments raised the profile of the threat posed.

Methodology of the Review

This review covered the period from April 1, 1999 to December 31, 2002. To ensure a thorough review, the Committee also examined some documentation that fell outside the review period.

SIRC examined all electronic and hard-copy documentation during the review period, related to the Service's investigation. As in all SIRC reviews of CSIS investigations, the Committee assessed the Service's compliance with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policy by examining key operational activities:

• targeting decisions and investigations;
• implementation of warrant powers and special operations;
• management of human sources and sensitive operations;
• co-operation and exchanges of information with domestic partners;
• co-operation and exchanges of information with foreign partners; and
• advice to government.

The Committee sought to ascertain if:

• the Service had reasonable grounds to suspect a threat to the security of Canada;
• the level and intrusiveness of the investigation was proportionate to the seriousness and imminence of the threat; and
• the Service collected only that information strictly necessary to fulfill its mandate to advise the Government of a threat.

Findings of the Committee

Throughout the review period, the foreign intelligence service was the subject of a Target Approval and Review Committee authorized Level III investigation for suspected threat-related activities as described in sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the CSIS Act.

SIRC concluded that, based on the information in the Service's possession, CSIS had reasonable grounds to suspect that this foreign intelligence service, or its agents, were involved in threat-related activities in Canada. The level and intrusiveness of the Service's investigation was proportionate to the suspected threat, and the Service collected only that information strictly necessary to fulfill its mandate.

The Service's investigation during the review period was in compliance with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policy.

The human source operations reviewed were well-managed by the Service and complied fully with Ministerial Direction and operational policy.

The Service's co-operation and exchanges of information with domestic and foreign partners complied with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policy. The Service relied heavily on information from foreign partners to develop its advice to client departments.

We noted a small number of administrative errors or omissions in the early operational reporting, which were subsequently corrected by the Service. We found no such problems in recent reporting.

There were no recommendations arising from this review.

Review of a Counter Proliferation Investigation - Report # 2003-04

Background

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a threat to international peace and security. Canada is a party to several international agreements that aim to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and the means to produce and deliver them.

Some foreign states attempt to obtain expertise and technology applicable to WMD and weapons delivery systems from Canada. The Government of Canada has directed CSIS to investigate this threat to Canadian security.

In July 2002, CSIS created the Counter Proliferation Branch, bringing together proliferation-related investigations that the Counter Terrorism and Counter Intelligence Branches had previously carried out. In 2003–2004, SIRC reviewed a CSIS counter proliferation investigation, offering us our first opportunity to examine the Service's counter proliferation activities under the new organizational structure.

For this study, SIRC reviewed the Service's investigation of the threat to Canadian security posed by the activities of one foreign state in support of its WMD programs. CSIS considered the activities of this particular foreign state to fall under the definition of threat-related activities as described in sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the CSIS Act.

Methodology of the Review

At the outset of this review, SIRC examined lists of all CSIS targets, warrants and human sources connected to the Service's investigation. From this material, SIRC selected several files for in-depth review. For each file, we examined all electronic and hard-copy documentation covering the period from April 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003. To ensure a thorough review, we also examined some documentation that fell outside the review period.

As in all reviews of CSIS investigations, SIRC assessed the Service's compliance with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policy by examining key operational activities:

• targeting decisions and investigations;
• implementation of warrant powers and special operations;
• management of human sources and sensitive operations;
• co-operation and exchanges of information with domestic partners;
• co-operation and exchanges of information with foreign partners; and
• advice to government.

SIRC sought to ascertain if:

• the Service had reasonable grounds to suspect a threat to the security of Canada;
• the level and intrusiveness of the investigation was proportionate to the seriousness and imminence of the threat; and
• the Service collected only that information strictly necessary to fulfill its mandate to advise the Government of a threat.

Findings of the Committee

SIRC concluded that, based on the information in the Service's possession, CSIS had reasonable grounds to suspect that each of the authorized targets of investigation posed a threat to the security of Canada. The level and intrusiveness of the Service's investigations were proportionate to the suspected threat and the Service collected only that information strictly necessary to fulfill its mandate.

Overall, the Service's investigation during the review period was in compliance with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policy.

The Service met all of the requirements of the CSIS Act and operational policy with respect to warrant acquisition. SIRC reviewed the Service's application to the Federal Court for warrant powers and found all of the statements in the affidavit to be reasonable and adequately supported. SIRC found that, in implementing the powers authorized by the warrant, the Service complied with the CSIS Act, operational policy and the conditions imposed by the Federal Court. The Service managed human source operations well and complied fully with Ministerial Direction and operational policy.

In this investigation we found no problems or issues of concern with respect to the Service's co-operation with its domestic or foreign partners. Co-operation and exchanges of information with foreign partners were important components of the investigation. Overall, the Service's co-operation and exchanges of information with domestic and foreign partners complied with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policy.

We did find one case of non-compliance with operational policy by a CSIS regional office. CSIS has informed SIRC that the regional office has since amended its procedures to prevent similar problems from reoccurring. We also brought to the Service's attention a small number of administrative errors or omissions in operational reporting, which the Service has subsequently corrected.

During this review, SIRC noted references to the Service's activities under its Liaison Awareness Program. Under this program, the Service provides counter proliferation briefings to individuals working or studying in the private sector who might be vulnerable to targeting by foreign entities of proliferation concern. We did not identify any problems or issues of concern with respect to this operational activity.

There were no recommendations arising from this review.

CSIS Liaison with Foreign Agencies: Review of a Security Liaison Post - Report # 2003-05

Background

Under sections 13(3) and 17(1) of the CSIS Act, the Service may enter into arrangements with foreign states or international organizations of states, or with their institutions. Section 13 arrangements authorize CSIS to provide security assessments, while section 17 arrangements help the Service perform its duties and functions under sections 2 and 12 of the Act. Both sets of arrangements specify the scope of activities and exchanges that may take place between the parties.

Our review of a Security Liaison Post addresses SIRC's obligation under section 38(a)(iii) of the CSIS Act to review arrangements entered into by the Service pursuant to subsections 13(3) and 17(1), and to monitor the provision of information and intelligence pursuant to those arrangements. This year, we chose to review a Security Liaison Post that had recently assumed responsibility from another Post for managing section 17 arrangements with the foreign intelligence agencies of several countries.

Methodology of the Review

In reviewing the Post, SIRC sought to determine whether the Post's liaison arrangements and its exchanges of information with foreign agencies were within the scope of the government-approved liaison agreements in place. We also assessed the operations at the Post in relation to the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction, and the Service's operational policies. Finally, we evaluated the security screening support provided to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) as well as the impact the screening workload had on the other functions of the Security Liaison Officer (SLO).

As has been the case in previous reviews of CSIS foreign liaison activities, we paid particular attention to any information exchanges that had the potential to result in abuses of human rights by other parties.

Findings of the Committee

Compliance and Effectiveness

SIRC noted the challenges facing the Post in liaising with the agencies involved, including concerns about the activities of one of the agencies, and weak co-operation on the part of another. Despite these challenges, SIRC's observations, reviews of documentation, and interviews led us to conclude that the Post carried out its operations in accordance with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and the Service's operational policies and procedures. We found that the Post had contributed to the Service's ability to perform its duties and functions under the CSIS Act. We also assessed that CSIS had managed the arrangements with these foreign agencies effectively, collecting information in accordance with the applicable section 17 arrangements.

Human Rights Issues

SIRC expects the Service to take all possible care to ensure that the information it exchanges with foreign agencies is not used in ways that could result in the violation of human rights. The SLO is responsible for regularly producing assessments of foreign agencies and promptly submitting these to CSIS Headquarters. The agencies are assessed both for their human rights records and their propensity, if any, to pass information on to third parties without authorization.

After reviewing the agency assessments prepared by the SLO, we concluded that the Post's staff were appropriately addressing human rights issues associated with the countries under the Post's purview. The documentation we reviewed indicated that the Service was diligent in ensuring that no information provided to or received from these countries' agencies was associated with human rights abuses.

We noted that the SLO was aware that what a foreign agency perceives as a threat to its security may not be comparable to the CSIS Act's definition of a threat to the security of Canada. In one case in which a foreign agency sought information on a political dissident, CSIS refused the agency's request.

Security Screening

One of an SLO's functions is to assist CIC to screen potential immigrants to Canada. If CIC has security concerns about an applicant, it may refer the case to the SLO, who investigates the matter and may interview the applicant.

The security screening demands placed on an SLO vary from Post to Post. In previous reviews of SLO Posts, we have observed that CSIS has on occasion had to deploy staff temporarily from CSIS Headquarters to address backlogs and work volume. During this review, we examined the impact of security screening activity on the balance of the duties and functions of the liaison officer at the Post under review.

The SLO acknowledged that during his first year on the job there was a backlog of security screening files. However, he was able to address the backlog without additional resources.

At the beginning of his term, the SLO asked Headquarters for a list of all outstanding files requiring a security screening interview. We noted that the SLO had implemented an effective tracking system for all outstanding security screening referrals. However, we were concerned that no master list existed at the Post when the current SLO took office.

The Committee recommended that the Service identify the reasons for the absence of a list and tracking system at the Post and determine whether other Posts would benefit from a uniform standard for managing security screening requests.

In response to this recommendation, the Service informed SIRC that it had looked into the issue and that it believes that adherence to the tracking systems in place is sufficient to ensure proper record-keeping.

Internal Security Breach in a CSIS Regional Office - Report # 2002-05

Background

In the course of SIRC review #2002-05, summarized in our 2002–2003 Annual Report, CSIS informed us of a security breach within the Service that resulted in an internal investigation by CSIS to determine the nature and scope of the breach. We determined that the matter of the breach deserved to be examined in detail.

Methodology of the Review

Our review sought to identify the nature of the breach; the Service's response to the allegations; the damage to CSIS operational programs or investigations and national security; and the adequacy of CSIS policies to address the breach and avoid similar problems in the future. We reviewed Service documentation related to the investigation, and assessed investigative procedures against operational policies in force at the time.

Findings of the Committee

We reviewed the documentation related to the internal investigation, and were satisfied with the Service's investigation of the allegations. We concluded that existing CSIS operational policies were adequate for the Service to investigate the breach and address the conduct of the officer in question. We found that the Service had taken appropriate measures to minimize the effect of the breach and had acted in accordance with operational policies governing security breaches and employee conduct.

Review of Foreign Arrangements

In addition to its reports, SIRC conducted its annual review of foreign arrangements.

Background

Under section 17 of the CSIS Act, the Service may, for the purpose of performing its duties and functions, “enter into an arrangement or otherwise co-operate with” institutions of the government of a foreign country or with an international organization.

An overview of CSIS foreign arrangements can be found in section 2 C of this Annual Report under the heading CSIS Domestic and Foreign Arrangements.

All section 17 arrangements require the approval of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, after consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Unless a section 17 arrangement is in place, CSIS is not permitted to pass classified information to foreign agencies. It may, however, accept unsolicited information.

Section 38(a)(iii) of the Act directs SIRC to review all such arrangements. Our objective is to assess whether they are in compliance with the conditions set out in the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and CSIS Operational Policy. It is important to note that SIRC reviews new arrangements once they have been approved by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. SIRC's review of the arrangements does not include any review of exchanges of information; these exchanges are reviewed as part of SIRC's reviews of the Service's Security Liaison Posts.

Each year SIRC reviews a selection of these arrangements. During fiscal year 2003–2004, we reviewed 17 arrangements: 14 were new, one was an expansion of an existing arrangement and two were renewed arrangements.

Methodology of the Review

For each arrangement, we examined:

• all relevant information provided to the Minister by the Service;
• all correspondence relating to consultations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs;
• the co-operation file for the foreign agency in question;
• the most recent assessment of the agency in question, written by the responsible Security Liaison Officer (SLO);
• the SLO's overseas Post profile; and
• any documentation related to conditions that may have been imposed by the Minister.

Findings of the Committee

We found that the establishment of the new arrangements and the expansions of the existing ones were carried out in compliance with the CSIS Act and the Minister's conditions for approval as set out in Ministerial Direction.

When approving the establishment of a new foreign arrangement, the Minister may impose conditions or caveats governing the management and potential expansion of the arrangement. Such conditions vary from case to case in order to address matters such as political or social instability in the country in question, or human rights concerns. In the case of two of the arrangements, the Minister had directed the Service to review the arrangements, and the Service complied.

Ministerial Direction requires CSIS to pay particular attention to the human rights record of the country and the agency with which it liaises, and CSIS operational policy reflects this requirement. In conducting our review, we took special care to examine information relevant to the human rights records of the agencies' host countries, including open-source reporting from reputable international human rights agencies.

We found that the Service had informed itself of the human rights situation in all the countries in question and that it proceeded cautiously with activities and exchanges of information involving countries with a questionable human rights record.

We took note of eight new relationships in which SIRC believes the Service will need to exercise vigilance to ensure that no information it receives from an agency is the product of human rights violations, and that no intelligence CSIS transfers to an agency results in abuses. The Committee will review exchanges with these agencies in the future.

As noted, SIRC examines the substance of the information exchanged under foreign arrangements during the course of our regular reviews of individual Security Liaison Posts abroad. The summary of a review of a Post we conducted during 2003–2004 can be found in this section.

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Date Modified:

2010-10-14