Navigation Links
Common menu bar
Breadcrumb
- Home >
- Annual Reports >
- Annual Report 2003-2004 >
- Key Findings and Recommendations
Annual Report 2003-2004 - An Operational Review of CSIS Activities
Appendix C : Key Findings and Recommendations
FRONT END SCREENING PROGRAM
This report provides the results of the Committee's first review of the FES Program for refugee claimants in Canada. We also examined the existing Port of Entry Interdiction Program (POEIP), under which CSIS provides timely, verbal advice to CIC in screening persons, including prospective refugee claimants, whom CIC considers to be potentially inadmissible to Canada.
We found that the Service's advice to CIC under the FES Program was appropriate and sufficiently supported by the information in the possession of the Service. The Service complied with the CSIS Act and operational policy when providing advice to CIC. There was no evidence that the Service has used the POEIP or FES Program as a pretext for other investigative activities.
The Service uses security profiles during the screening process. We are satisfied that these security profiles do not target individuals based on ethnicity or religion.
We found that the FES Program is an efficient means to ensure that refugee claimants in Canada are properly screened against the inadmissibility criteria of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Under the POEIP and the FES Program, the Service provided CIC with valuable advice at key stages of the refugee application process.
We found that several of the POEIP reports reviewed did not indicate clearly the nature of the advice provided verbally by the Service to CIC.
We recommend that the Service develop a standard reporting format for POEIP interview reports that will include either a clear record of the advice provided verbally to CIC by CSIS investigators, or document that there was insufficient information for the Service to provide such advice.
As we have recommended several times in the past, we believe that verbatim records of the Service's section 15 FES interviews would be invaluable in the event that the contents of these interviews are disputed at a later date.
The Committee again recommends that the Service create verbatim records of its section 15 interviews.
CSIS SECTION 12 OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY OUTSIDE CANADA
Overall, we found that the operations reviewed were carried out in conformity with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction, CSIS operational policy and relevant legislation in managing section 12 investigative activities.
The review determined that CSIS has a clear mandate to conduct section 12 investigative activities outside Canada, and concluded that such operations will undoubtedly increase as the threat posed by international terrorism grows.
We made two recommendations related to the administrative management of CSIS's investigative activities under section 12 of the CSIS Act.
The Committee recommended that the Service's policy for approving investigative activities outside Canada be amended to include certain information.
The Committee recommended that the Service amend its operational policy to enhance its administrative rigour.
REVIEW OF A COUNTER INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION
SIRC concluded that, based on the information in the Service's possession, CSIS had reasonable grounds to suspect that this foreign intelligence service, or its agents, were involved in threat-related activities in Canada. The level and intrusiveness of the Service's investigation was proportionate to the suspected threat, and the Service collected only that information strictly necessary to fulfill its mandate.
The Service's investigation during the review period was in compliance with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policy. The human source operations reviewed were well-managed by the Service and complied fully with Ministerial Direction and operational policy.
The Service's cooperation and exchanges of information with domestic and foreign partners complied with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and operational policy.
REVIEW OF A COUNTER PROLIFERATION INVESTIGATION
SIRC concluded that, based on the information in the Service's possession, CSIS had reasonable grounds to suspect that each of the authorized targets of investigation posed a threat to the security of Canada. The level and intrusiveness of the Service's investigations was proportionate to the suspected threat, and the Service collected only that information strictly necessary to fulfill its mandate.
The Service met all of the requirements of the CSIS Act and operational policy with respect to warrant acquisition. SIRC reviewed the Service's application to the Federal Court for warrant powers and found all of the statements in the affidavit to be reasonable and adequately supported. SIRC found that, in implementing the powers authorized by the warrant, the Service complied with the CSIS Act, operational policy and the conditions imposed by the Federal Court. The Service managed human source operations well and complied fully with Ministerial Direction and operational policy.
We did find one case of non-compliance with operational policy by a CSIS regional office. We also brought to the Service's attention a small number of administrative errors or omissions in operational reporting.
CSIS LIAISON WITH FOREIGN AGENCIES: REVIEW OF A SECURITY LIAISON POST
SIRC's observations, reviews of documentation and interviews led us to conclude that the Post carried out its operations in accordance with the CSIS Act, Ministerial Direction and the Service's operational policies and procedures. We found that the Post had contributed to the Service's ability to perform its duties and functions under the CSIS Act. We also assessed that CSIS had managed the arrangements with these foreign agencies effectively, collecting information in accordance with the applicable section 17 arrangements.
We concluded that the Post's staff were appropriately addressing human rights issues associated with the countries under the Post's purview. The documentation we reviewed indicated that the Service was diligent in ensuring that no information provided to or received from these countries' agencies was associated with human rights abuses.
We noted that the Security Liaison Officer (SLO) had implemented an effective tracking system for all outstanding security screening referrals. However, we were concerned that no master list existed at the Post when the current SLO took office.
The Committee recommended that the Service identify the reasons for the absence of a list and tracking system at the Post and determine whether other Posts would benefit from a uniform standard for managing security screening requests.
INTERNAL SECURITY BREACH IN A CSIS REGIONAL OFFICE
In the course of SIRC review #2002-05, summarized in our 2002–2003 Annual Report, CSIS informed us of a security breach within the Service that resulted in an internal investigation by CSIS to determine the nature and scope of the breach.
We reviewed the documentation related to the internal investigation, and were satisfied with the Service's investigation of the allegations. We concluded that existing CSIS operational policies were adequate for the Service to investigate the breach and address the conduct of the officer in question. We found that the Service had taken appropriate measures to minimize the effect of the breach and had acted in accordance with operational policies governing security breaches and employee conduct.
REVIEW OF FOREIGN ARRANGEMENTS
We found that the establishment of the new arrangements and the expansions of the existing ones were carried out in compliance with the CSIS Act and the Minister's conditions for approval as set out in Ministerial Direction.
We found that the Service had informed itself of the human rights situation in all the countries in question and that it proceeded cautiously with activities and exchanges of information involving countries with a questionable human rights record.