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4. Section 2.C CSIS Operational Activities

Annual Report 2002-2003 - An Operational Review of CSIS Activities

Section 2: CSIS Accountability Mechanisms

C. CSIS Operational Activities

In addition to carrying out in-depth reviews of selected CSIS operations each year, the Committee requests written and oral briefings from the Service about several activities that are relevant to the Committee's mandate. The information we receive relates to the Service's plans and priorities, especially as they pertain to its main operational branches. Although this information is not independently verified unless it forms part of an in-depth Committee review, it nonetheless helps the Committee to stay apprised of and to monitor the Service's priorities and perspectives, from year to year.

This section of the Annual Report summarizes information the Committee received in written and oral briefings. It also provides data obtained from the Service in accordance with section 38(a)(vii) of the CSIS Act, which requires the Committee to compile and analyze statistics on the operational activities of the Service.

COUNTER PROLIFERATION

In a significant restructuring of its operational programs, CSIS created in July 2002 a new branch devoted to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The goals of the Counter Proliferation (CP) branch, the Service reported, are to identify countries developing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and gather information about these activities so as to advise the Government on possible threats to Canada's national security and public safety.

Among CP's most important concerns is the potential threat posed by terrorist organizations that might manage to obtain the information and materials necessary to use such weapons themselves. According to the Service, the CP branch integrates programs, personnel and resources previously located in the Counter Terrorism and Counter Intelligence branches. The reorganization is intended to better focus existing technical skills and investigative resources.

Given that CSIS is refocusing its operations to counteract the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and in light of the importance that CSIS has given to this organizational restructuring, the Committee sought and received a detailed classified briefing from the Service about its scope and intent. Our in-depth reviews will encompass this new operational branch and we will report our findings in future annual reports.

COUNTER TERRORISM

The role of the Counter Terrorism (CT) branch is to advise the Government on emerging threats of serious violence that could affect the safety and security of Canadians and of Canada's allies. Whether of domestic or foreign origin, addressing the threat of violence in support of political, religious or ideological objectives continues to be one of the Service's chief priorities.

The Service reported a significant reorganization of CT branch's structure in 2002-2003. Several operational units were transferred to the newly created Counter Proliferation branch. Other areas were restructured to improve effectiveness and to handle added responsibilities arising out of new and revised legislation-most notably the Anti-terrorism Act.

As in 2001-2002, the threats presented by Sunni Islamic terrorism remained a major focus of CT's operational activities. According to the Service, the interdiction and removal of suspected terrorists continued to be a key objective. Investigations aimed at preventing terrorists from using Canada as a venue for financing operations have also grown in importance and complexity.

In this Annual Report, the Committee has examined Service investigations of Sunni Islamic extremism as viewed through two studies. Future Annual Reports will present results of other reviews of counter-terrorism investigations carried out by the Service.

Threat Assessments

CSIS provides threat assessments to departments and agencies within the Federal Government based on relevant and timely intelligence. CSIS prepares these assessments—dealing with special events, threats to diplomatic establishments in Canada and other situations—either upon request or unsolicited.

The CSIS unit responsible for preparing threat assessments was moved from CT branch to the newly created CP branch part way through the period under review. Between them, CT and CP branches issued 659 threat assessments in 2002-2003. This number was smaller than the year previous but still an increase over 2000-2001.

As in the past, the Committee continues to examine those threat assessments that are relevant to its in-depth reviews of CSIS operational activities.

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

The Counter Intelligence (CI) branch investigates threats to national security caused by the hostile intelligence activities of foreign governments, as well as threats to Canada's social, political and economic infrastructure. The Service reported that since the threat environment had altered little since the previous year, the operational and investigative focus of the CI program remained essentially unchanged.

There was some organizational restructuring to reflect changes brought about by the new Security of Information Act and to foster greater administrative streamlining generally. In addition, CI's program on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was made part of the new CP branch.

As in previous years, the Service's counter intelligence activities continue to form part of the Committee's review of Service operations.

RESEARCH, ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION

The Service's Research, Analysis and Production (RAP) branch is responsible for producing and disseminating finished intelligence product to the Government of Canada on threats to the security of Canada through such documents as CSIS Reports, CSIS Studies and CSIS Intelligence Briefs. When appropriate, RAP intelligence product is also distributed to a broader readership.

Authorized disclosures of information obtained in the performance of CSIS's duties and functions-subject to section 19( 2)( a) through (d) of the CSIS Act-are another means by which RAP disseminates intelligence product. RAP reported that in 2002-2003 there were 1335 section 19 disclosure reports, an increase over the 778 reports in 2001-2002.

In 2002-2003, RAP also produced 61 classified reports compared to 83 the previous year. RAP's intelligence publications generally fall under two categories:

• Public safety reports examine the threat to Canadians at home and abroad from international terrorism.
• National security reports address activities in Canada of other governments' intelligence services, as well as global issues such as counter proliferation and transnational criminal activity.

Through RAP, CSIS also contributes to the wider government intelligence community by participating in the Intelligence Assessment Committee (IAC). This body is made up of senior officials from departments and agencies of the Government of Canada most concerned with intelligence matters. In the year under review, RAP staff wrote or contributed to the writing of 13 IAC reports.

The Committee uses RAP reports, studies and briefs to obtain context for the Service's investigations, to identify the Service's perspective on specific threats, and to enhance its own knowledge of the nature of the analysis and advice, which CSIS provides to government pursuant to section 12 of the CSIS Act.

SECURITY SCREENING

The Service has the authority, under section 13( 1) of the CSIS Act, to provide security assessments to federal government departments. The Service may also, with appropriate Ministerial approval, enter into arrangements to provide assessments to provincial government departments or provincial police forces, as outlined in section 13( 2). Arrangements for providing security screening advice to foreign governments, foreign agencies and international institutions and organizations are authorized under section 13( 3).

For federal employment, CSIS security assessments serve as the basis for determining whether an individual should be granted access to classified information or assets. In immigration cases, Service assessments can be instrumental in CIC's decision to admit an individual into the country and in granting either permanent resident status or citizenship.

CSIS reported to the Committee that it had significantly expanded its security screening program-performed on a cost-recovery basis-for non-federal agencies. These new clients include several provincial governments and operators of nuclear power facilities. CSIS also reported that an increasing proportion of its security screening cases were being processed electronically, permitting greater efficiency in the delivery of security screening services to a growing list of clients.

Another event that impacted the Branch in 2002-2003 was the coming into force in June 2002 of the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which superceded the Immigration Act. The new Act governs the policies and operations of CIC, the Service's largest security screening client.

Immigration Security Screening Programs

Under the authority of sections 14 and 15 of the CSIS Act, the Service conducts security screening investigations and provides advice to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). Generally speaking, the Service's assistance takes the form of information-sharing on matters concerning threats to the security of Canada as defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act and the form of “assessments” with respect to the inadmissibility classes of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Immigration requests for security screening resulted in 445 briefs from CSIS to CIC—242 information briefs and 203 inadmissible briefs. Of those requests, the median time required for a “no reportable trace” (NRT) was 57 days, for an information brief 400 days and for an inadmissible brief 461 days. For the year previous, the median figures were 55 days, 401 days and 498 days, respectively.

Unlike previous years, the Service reported on citizenship applications as a separate category. An information brief with respect to a citizenship application took a median time of 129 days.

During fiscal year 2002-2003, the Service provided 87 update letters (updates to briefs) and 22 incidental letters to CIC.

Applications for Permanent Residence from Within Canada

The Service has the sole responsibility for screening immigrants and refugees who apply for permanent residence status from within Canada. In 2002-2003 the Service received 33,837 such screening requests. Of these requests, 21,950 were immigration applications and 11,887 came through the Refugee Determination Program.

According to the statistical information provided by the Service, the time required for the Service to issue a recommendation on an immigration application varies considerably depending on how the application was filed. Those applications filed using the Electronic Data Exchange from within Canada took a median of 45 days, and electronic filings within the Refugee Determination Program took 55 days. For those applications filed on paper, the median turnaround time for immigration applications from within Canada was 70 days; for applications from the U. S. it was 150 days, and for paper applications from within the Refugee Determination program 94 days.

Application for Permanent Residence from Outside Canada

Immigration and refugee applications for permanent residence that originate outside Canada or the United States are managed by the Overseas Immigrant Screening Program under which the Service shares responsibility for security screening with CIC officials based abroad. Generally, CSIS only becomes involved in the screening process either upon being requested to do so by the Immigration Program Manager or upon receiving adverse information about a case from established sources. CSIS reports that this division of labour allows the Service to concentrate on higher-risk cases.

In 2002-2003, the Service received 23,691 requests to screen refugee and immigration applications initiated outside Canada. Of these, CSIS reported that 6776 were referred to Security Liaison Officers (SLOs) for consultation, marginally fewer than the year previous.

Citizenship Applications and the Watch List

As part of the citizenship application process, the Service receives electronic trace requests from CIC's Case Processing Centre in Sydney, N. S. The names of the citizenship applicants are cross-checked against the names in the Security Screening Information System database. The Service maintains a Watch List that contains the names of individuals who have come to the attention of CSIS through, inter alia, Target Approval and Review Committee-approved investigations.

In 2002-2003, the Service reviewed 158,675 citizenship applications for CIC. Of these, 185 resulted in information briefs. The Service reported issuing no inadmissible briefs. In six instances CSIS reported seeking Ministerial approval to defer its advice.

Front-End Screening

The Front-End Screening (FES) program was implemented by the Government to identify and filter potential security and criminal cases from the refugee claimant stream as early as possible in the determination process. For fiscal year 2002-2003— the first full year in which the program was active—the Service reported receiving 27,407 cases from CIC for processing. Of these, 21,735 were completed by March 31, 2003.

CSIS advised the Committee that administrative difficulties in the transfer of information from CIC that created delays at the startup of the program had since been rectified. The Committee is reviewing the Service's participation in the FES program and will report its findings in a future annual report.

Screening on Behalf of Foreign Agencies

The Service may enter into reciprocal arrangements with foreign agencies to provide security checks on Canadians and other individuals who have resided in Canada. For 2002-2003, the Service reported that 1797 screening checks were carried out on behalf of foreign agencies. Of these, 177 resulted in field investigations.

In a clarification of information provided previously to the Committee and presented in last year's Annual Report, the Service advised the Committee that it does not make recommendations to foreign agencies to deny security clearances. The Service only provides the results of findings, either as a NRT report or a report of adverse information in the form of an information brief.

Security Screening for Federal Employees

2002-2003 Key Statistics

• The Service received 51,262 requests for security screening assessments for clearance, levels one through three, new, upgraded and updated. Also, 870 requests were for action relating to administrative procedures such as downgrades and transfers.
• The Committee asked CSIS to report the median turnaround time for security assessments in two separate categories-Department of National Defence (DND), and all other government departments and agencies. For the period 2002-2003, the Committee noted that the turnaround time for DND assessments, as compared with other government departments, has been considerably reduced from the previous year (Table 2).
• The Service informed us that it conducted 3578 field investigations in order to complete the security screening requests from all government departments and agencies.
• The Service received 34,010 requests for assessments under the Airport Restricted Access Area Clearance Program (ARAACP). This number represents a marginal increase over the previous fiscal year. At 15 days, the median turn around time for ARAACP requests was unchanged from the previous year.
• There were 13,613 requests for security assessments related to “site access,” with requests coming primarily from Ontario Power Generation, Bruce Power, Atomic Energy of Canada and the National Capital Commission.
• The Service reported that their security screening investigations resulted in 26 information briefs and 3 denial briefs.
• CSIS processes certain categories of security screening site access requests with the RCMP acting as intermediary on behalf of the original requester. In 2002-2003, the Security Accreditation Program processed approximately 1450 requests for the Parliamentary Precinct (which includes all facilities, offices and buildings controlled by the Parliament of Canada) and some 13,500 requests for accreditation to other special events and functions to which access is controlled.
• The Service reported that more than 82 percent of screening requests from government clients were processed through the EDE program. The Service also informed the Committee about already implemented and proposed expansions of the EDE program in its SLO posts abroad.

Table 2 Turnaround Times for Security Screening

Category	Level	Median Number of Days 2001-2002	Median Number of Days 2002-2003
DND	1 (Confidential)	43	28
	2 (Secret)	50	29
	3 (Top Secret)	97	47
Government	1 (Confidential)	2	5
	2 (Secret)	30	13
	3 (Top Secret)	62	51

CSIS DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Relations with the RCMP

Among the Service's domestic liaison partners, the Committee has always paid particular attention to CSIS's arrangements with the RCMP. Again this year, the Service reported that its relationship with the RCMP was undergoing considerable change-a process driven by the increased awareness by government of the need to protect public safety and national security, and by significant new legislation enacted since the events of September 11, 2001.

For the year under review, the Service recorded 2270 written exchanges (originating from either direction) with the RCMP, compared to 1503 in 2001-2002. The Service sent 221 disclosure letters to the RCMP (of which 91 related to the Air India disaster) and 6 advisory letters.

The Service noted that the most important change in its operational liaison with the RCMP was in the manner in which the two organizations exchange personnel. Following a 2001-2002 pilot program carried out in a particular region allowing for mutual secondments of officers, the Service reported that similar arrangements had been fully implemented in three regions of the country. Structured around the RCMP's INSET (Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams) program, the goal of the secondment arrangements is to foster closer operational co-operation between CSIS and the RCMP so that “each party can better respond to common requirements in the area of national security.”

The Service reported that although it was generally pleased with how these new regionally based coordinating bodies had developed, working arrangements and protocols were still being refined. In the Service's view, the INSET program was not sufficiently far along in its implementation to measure successes or identify particular concerns. The Service's participation in the INSET program will be part of a future Committee review of the Service's domestic co-operative relationships.

The Service also reported that, besides on-going exchanges of personnel, CSIS officers contributed to several RCMP training programs and for the first time participated in a key RCMP operational planning session.

Of major importance for the CSIS-RCMP relationship, from the Service's point of view, was the Anti-terrorism Act enacted in late in 2001. Criminalizing a range of activities specifically related to terrorism put an added premium on closer co-operation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies and, according to CSIS, was directly responsible for the increase in flow of operational exchanges between the two organizations.

Other Domestic Arrangements

In carrying out its mandate CSIS co-operates both with police forces and with federal and provincial departments and agencies across Canada. Contingent on Ministerial approval, the Service may conclude written co-operation arrangements with domestic agencies pursuant to section 17( 1) of the CSIS Act.

In the year under review, the Service finalized one new letter of agreement, in this case with a provincial body.

Foreign Arrangements

Pursuant to section 17( 1)( b) of the CSIS Act, the Service must obtain the approval of the Solicitor General—after consulting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs—to enter into an arrangement with the government of a foreign state or international organization. During the initial phases leading to the approval of an arrangement, CSIS is not permitted to pass classified information to the foreign agency; it may, however, accept unsolicited information.

The Service reported that during fiscal year 2002-2003 it had received the Minister's approval to establish 5 new liaison arrangements and to modify arrangements with 21 others. The Service continued to maintain restrictions on exchanges of information with five agencies due to concerns either about the agencies' human rights records, violations of the rule against transferring information to third parties or their overall reliability.

The Service also reported that of the 237 established foreign arrangements, 42 were regarded as dormant (dormancy is defined as no liaison contact for at least one year). Requests for 7 proposed new arrangements have been submitted by CSIS to the Solicitor General and are still under consideration. The Committee continues to monitor the Service's foreign arrangements and will convey our findings in a future annual report.

As part of its foreign liaison program, the Service maintains liaison posts abroad normally co-located with Canadian diplomatic missions. CSIS opened three new posts during 2002-2003 and is expected to open another during fiscal year 2003-2004. The Service reported that the most significant challenge to the foreign liaison program, as in recent past years, was that its overseas posts continue to face an ever-increasing security screening workload arising from its program of assistance to CIC. As in previous years, the Committee will conduct a review of a specific liaison post and report its findings in due course.

FEDERAL COURT WARRANTS AND WARRANT STATISTICS

Warrants are one of the most powerful and intrusive tools in the hands of any department or agency of the Government of Canada. For this reason alone their use bears continued scrutiny-a task that the Committee takes very seriously. In the course of our in-depth reviews of CSIS investigations, warrants are generally the subject of detailed examination. In the past, the Committee has also focused solely on warrants as an individual study.

Each year, the Committee asks CSIS to provide statistics about CSIS warrant applications and on warrant powers granted by the Federal Court. Table 3 compares the number of warrant powers issued in each of the last three fiscal years.

According to the Service, the Federal Court issued 25 urgent warrant powers during 2002-2003 compared to 49 in the previous year. Although no applications for warrants were denied by the Court, CSIS reported six instances where the presiding Federal Court Judge requested significant amendments prior to issuing the warrant.

Table 3 New and Replaced/ Renewed Warrant Powers

	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003
New warrant powers	56	111	52
Replaced/ renewed warrant powers	150	155	150
Total	206	266	202

Two new conditions were imposed by the Court, both to be included in all future warrants where relevant. One condition related to obtaining financial records, whereas the second pertained to how persons subject to warrant powers are identified. As a general rule, conditions in a warrant serve to restrict how CSIS may exercise its warrant powers or what it may do with the information collected during its execution.

Finally, CSIS implemented four revisions to existing warrant powers-two were case specific, whereas the other two have become standard in all future warrants. Among the latter, one ensured consistency with new legislation and the other expanded the legal definition of a certain technical device.

The Service reported that in 2002-2003 there were no judicial decisions with significant impact on any individual warrant power or on the warrant process generally.

Warrant Statistics in Perspective

Although the data collected by the Committee provide insight into how often the Service seeks warrant powers from the Federal Court in a given year, comparing these numbers between years is of limited use. A range of factors, as disparate as court decisions and new developments in technology, introduce significant variations into how often warrant powers are applied for and how they are implemented. In addition, a single warrant can authorize the use of several warrant powers against one person, several people or an organization. Considered in isolation, therefore, warrant numbers are not a definitive indicator of the level of Service investigative activity. It is also important to bear in mind that warrants are only one of several investigative instruments available to CSIS.

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Date Modified:

2010-10-14