Annual Report 2002-2003 - An Operational Review of CSIS Activities

Section 1 : SIRC Review and Complaints Functions

A. Reviews of CSIS Security Intelligence Activities

How SIRC Carries Out Its Review Function - An Overview

THE COMMITTEE'S ROLE IN CSIS'S ACCOUNTABILITY STRUCTURE

A significant component of SIRC's review activity takes the form of research projects carried out by staff, directed by Committee Members. As a matter of policy, and in accordance with the Committee's role in the Service's governance and accountability structure, the Committee reviews CSIS's performance of its duties and functions retrospectively to assure itself—and, by extension, Parliament and the people of Canada—that the Service has acted appropriately and within the law.

The Service continues at all times to be accountable for current operations through the existing apparatus of government, specifically the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Inspector General of CSIS. With respect to its financial administration, CSIS, like almost all federal bodies, is responsible to government through a Minister of the Crown (in the Service's case, the Solicitor General), the central agencies of government and directly to Parliament through the Office of the Auditor General of Canada.

THE FOCUS OF SIRC STUDIES-CHOICES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The Committee's review function is essentially one of risk management. It decides which areas of the Service's extensive operational activities warrant the most careful monitoring. The content of any individual study and its findings arise from examining the relevant documents and interviewing individuals who are pertinent to that study. The findings of any single review are not to be read as a judgment on the Service's operations as a whole.

SIRC research projects for any given year are designed to yield assessments across the range of CSIS's operational activities. This approach helps ensure that, over time, the Committee comes to understand comprehensively the Service's activities and is thus able to either assure Parliament that the Service has acted appropriately, or to inform Parliament in a timely and instructive manner that it has not.

A number of factors influence which topics are selected for in-depth inquiry:

• the nature of the international threat environment;
• public undertakings by the Committee to follow up on past reviews or to launch new ones;
• issues arising from complaints brought before the Committee;
• alterations in government policy or practice with significant implications for CSIS operations; and
• SIRC's statutory obligations under section 38 of the CSIS Act.

The selection of topics for review is approved by the Committee at the beginning of each fiscal year. However, the Committee has the capacity to adjust its review plans to respond to unexpected events and has done so on several occasions.

SIRC REVIEWS IN 2002-2003

Several of the factors listed above worked to determine which reviews were selected for 2002-2003. With our report on CSIS's investigation into Sunni Islamic extremism in two regions, the Committee fulfills a commitment made in last year's Annual Report to follow up on its foundation study of this complex area. Similarly, our review of the Ahmed Ressam matter completes a public undertaking the Committee made early in 2001 to look into the case at a later date.

The Committee's report on certain domestic threats reflects our continued special interest in any Service operation that has the potential to impact upon lawful advocacy, protest and dissent. Finally, examinations of several CSIS arrangements with foreign intelligence services, and our study of the Service's role in collecting foreign intelligence in Canada, both speak to another essential element in the Committee's strategy-the regular monitoring of the Service's important operational activities and the execution of our obligations under section 38 of the Act.

Readers will also note that three of the five reports deal with matters of terrorism or politically motivated violence. As we have noted in previous Annual Reports, the Service's chief preoccupation since the mid-1990s has been with threats to public safety posed by terrorism and other forms of serious violence. As CSIS devotes an ever-growing share of its investigative resources to dealing with such threats, the Committee has adjusted its own focus accordingly.

In the Matter of Ahmed Ressam

Report # 2002-03

BACKGROUND

On December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressam was arrested while attempting to enter the United States from Canada with explosives hidden in the trunk of his rental car. Ressam was subsequently convicted on charges related to his unsuccessful attempt to carry out a terrorist attack at the Los Angeles International Airport to mark the beginning of the new millennium. Ressam's case attracted intense media coverage and contributed to a perception that Canada was a "safe haven" for terrorists to plan and undertake attacks against the United States.

Following these events, the Review Committee made a public commitment to examine the actions of the Service in respect of Ahmed Ressam at a future date. This report summarizes the Committee's findings and conclusions in the matter.

METHODOLOGY OF THE REVIEW

The objective of the review was to examine CSIS's investigation of the threat posed by Ressam within the context of Sunni Islamic extremism. As in all Committee reviews, our goal was to ensure that the Service's activities complied with the law, ministerial direction and operational policy.

The review covered the period from Ressam's arrival in Canada in February 1994 through March 31, 2001 and included all relevant Service documents and files (electronic and hard-copy). To complete its inquiries, the Committee examined, as necessary, additional material falling outside this period.

The Committee hoped to answer five key questions:

1. What was the nature and the extent of the Service's knowledge of Ressam prior to his arrest?
2. What was the substance of the Service's co-operation and exchange of information with domestic and foreign agencies regarding Ressam?
3. How did the Service's operational interest in Ressam change following his arrest?
4. What was the substance and value of the information CSIS received from United States authorities arising from Ressam's agreement to co-operate with American authorities?
5. Did the Ressam matter prompt any changes in CSIS policy or operational practice?

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

CSIS's Knowledge of Ressam Prior to his Arrest

Ahmed Ressam first came to the Service's attention as a result of his contacts with persons suspected of engaging in threat-related activities. During this period CSIS did not regard Ressam's activities in themselves as a threat to the security of Canada. In 1998 the Service learned that Ressam had departed Canada to attend a paramilitary training camp in Afghanistan.

Prior to his departure in 1998, Ressam successfully exploited weaknesses in the Canadian passport application process (since altered), enabling him to obtain a genuine Canadian passport bearing the pseudonym "Benni Antoine Norris". Returning to Canada in February 1999 using this passport, Ressam's re-entry went undetected at the time by Canadian authorities. Sometime later, the Service received unsubstantiated information that Ressam had returned to Canada. However, his whereabouts and activities remained unknown to the Service until his arrest by U. S. authorities on December 14, 1999.

Upon reviewing all the relevant documentation, the Committee concluded that the Service did not possess specific information that would have forewarned it of Ressam's planned terrorist operations. In the Committee's view, the actions CSIS took to locate Ressam in 1999 were appropriate in light of the information available at the time. The Committee saw no evidence that it was a lack of vigilance on the part of the Service that contributed to Ressam's ability to escape detection after his return in 1999.

CSIS Activities Post-Arrest

In late 1999 the Service and its partner agencies, both domestic and foreign, were in a heightened state of alert, working actively to identify and disrupt terrorist operations possibly being planned for the turn of the millennium. These efforts became both more intense and more focused after Ressam's arrest in December.

The Committee found that the Service's investigative activities following Ressam's arrest were appropriate and proportionate to the threat. The Service complied with the requirements of law, ministerial direction and policy. All the information collected was strictly necessary to its investigation of an imminent threat to the security of Canada.

All information exchanges between the Service and the RCMP on the Ressam matter were appropriate and, in general, both timely and thorough. This case showed the capacity of the Service and the RCMP to assist each other effectively while working within their respective mandates. Similarly, the exchanges of information between the Service and its U.S. partners were timely and comprehensive, indicating a smooth-functioning and productive relationship.

Intelligence Gathered from Ressam Post-arrest

Shortly after his conviction in April 2001, Ressam signed an agreement to co-operate with U. S. authorities in exchange for a reduction of his sentence to a minimum of 27 years' imprisonment. Ressam agreed to participate in detailed debriefings by intelligence officers and to provide testimony in future terrorism-related criminal proceedings. The Service briefed the Committee on the information provided by Ressam and on its utility.

The Service also briefed the Committee on the lessons it drew from the Ressam case-lessons that, for reasons of national security, cannot be discussed in detail here. Although CSIS did not believe changes to operational policy were necessary, these events have influenced the Service's methods respecting an overall approach to the Sunni Islamic extremist threat.

Sunni Islamic Extremism - A Review of CSIS Regional Investigations

Report #2002-05

BACKGROUND

Following the events of September 11, 2001 the Review Committee launched a broad-based study into CSIS's investigation prior to the terrorist attacks of the Al Qaida organization and Sunni Islamic extremism generally. Our findings were presented in last year's Annual Report to Parliament.

As the Committee stated at the time, the goal of the study was to lay the foundation for additional focused reviews of specific elements of the Service's long-standing investigation of Sunni Islamic extremism and its connections to terrorism. Presented here are findings from one such in-depth review.

Based on information gathered from the initial survey study, the Committee elected to examine in depth a complex set of related CSIS investigations into Sunni extremism managed from two separate CSIS regional offices during the period April 2001 through March 2002. The regions were selected because among the Service's regional offices, these two were mounting the most intense counter-terrorist investigations of the Sunni extremist threat, thus providing the Committee with the greatest range of CSIS activities to observe.

Besides providing perspective on the Service's conduct of its Sunni Islamic extremist investigation, the Committee's experience is that comprehensive examinations of CSIS regional office activities produce unique insights into how the Service employs the range of investigative tools it has at its disposal. Taken together, the actions of targeting, acquiring and inplementing warrants, conducting interviews in communities, exchanging information with law enforcement and other intelligence agencies, and handling human sources are the quintessence of counter-terrorist intelligence work.

Understanding these activities allows the Committee to assess the manner in which ministerial direction and CSIS operational policies are being implemented by those sections of CSIS employing the most powerful and intrusive instruments available to government.

METHODOLOGY OF THE REVIEW

The Committee examined all electronic and hard-copy documentation during the review period related to five broad operational activities:

1. the targeting request and approval process, and the investigating of targets;
2. the acquiring and implementing of warrants;
3. the recruiting, developing and directing of human sources;
4. the conducting of interviews in the community; and
5. the exchanging of information and other forms of liaison with domestic agencies.

In addition, the Committee visited the regional offices under review and conducted on-site interviews of CSIS senior management.

As in all its reviews of CSIS investigations, the Committee weighed several essential questions in assessing the appropriateness of the Service's activities:

• Did the Service have reasonable grounds to suspect a threat to the security of Canada?
• Was the level and intrusiveness of the investigation proportionate to the seriousness and imminence of the threat?
• Did the Service collect only that information strictly necessary to fulfill its mandate to advise the Government of a threat?

Although not related directly to the Service's Sunni extremism investigation, the Committee also took the opportunity to review each regional office's internal security procedures and any associated issues.

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

Targeting and Investigations

The Committee selected a sample of targets to examine in detail, a selection determined by the relatively high level of investigative activity for each. The Committee found that in all cases the Service had reasonable grounds to suspect the target's involvement in activities that constituted a threat to the security of Canada and that the levels of investigation were proportionate to the threat activities observed.

In obtaining targeting authorities and conducting the investigations, the Service met all the requirements set out in law, ministerial direction and operational policy. It collected only the information strictly necessary for the investigation.

Two instances drew the Committee's attention and required additional inquiries of the Service. In the first, the Committee reviewed documentation about an unusual event involving one of the selected targets. Upon receipt of additional information from the Service, the Committee was satisfied that no improper conduct on the part of CSIS contributed to the event, nor did any Service employee contravene operational policy.

The second instance related to an error on the part of the Service that had been rectified by CSIS as soon as it was noticed. This error involved an instance of mistaken identity. Unusual and extenuating circumstances contributed to the error and the Committee is satisfied that it was unintentional. Further, the Committee was able to confirm that the Service took the proper administrative and operational measures to correct the error as soon as it became evident. The Committee believes that the authorities subsequently invoked by the Service were appropriate.

Warrant Acquisition and Implementation

Under section 21 of the CSIS Act, only the Federal Court of Canada can grant CSIS the warrant powers required to exercise its most intrusive investigative techniques, such as telephone or mail intercepts. To obtain such powers, the Service must present an affidavit to the Court attesting to the facts that require their use.

In this section of the review the Committee examined the procedures by which Headquarters obtained warrant powers against the selected targets, as well as the procedures followed by the Regions in executing those powers. By selecting for review those warrants specifically related to the targets, the Committee hoped to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the Service's approach to the Sunni Islamic extremist investigation at a most critical time-the months immediately before and immediately following the events of September 11, 2001.

With respect to all the warrants examined in both regions and based on the information made available to the Committee for review, we found that CSIS conducted the warrant acquisition process in a thorough and objective manner and used supporting information appropriately. Affidavits were complete and balanced, and the facts and circumstances of the cases were fully, fairly and objectively expressed.

In one of the affidavits reviewed, the Committee identified two minor errors and inconsistencies. In the Committee's view, however, these did not materially affect the validity of the cases presented to the Federal Court.

In another affidavit reviewed, an instance of mistaken identity resulted in a similar error in the use of warrant powers. Once the Service investigators recognized their mistake, CSIS returned to the Federal Court with a new affidavit and the Court issued a supplemental warrant.

The Committee also found that in executing the warrant powers obtained, CSIS exercised its powers appropriately and complied with all warrant clauses and conditions. With minor exceptions, both regions strictly observed operational policies concerning the collection and retention of information obtained under the warrants. In one Region, however, the Committee identified administrative errors in the recording of information emanating from warrant powers. We drew the Service's attention to these lapses in accuracy.

Recruitment and Direction of Human Sources

The use of human sources to collect information is essential to the Service's effective investigation of threats to public safety and national security. However, the sensitivity of such operations is such that they are the subject of special ministerial direction and detailed operational policy. All requests by CSIS investigators to employ human sources, which impact or appear to impact on "sensitive" or "fundamental" institutions (generally defined as trade unions, the media, religious institutions and university and college campuses) require the approval of CSIS senior management or, in some cases, the Solicitor General.

The Committee selected for review a number of human source cases associated with the Sunni extremist investigation in the two regions. We examined all relevant files and logs, and all notifications and requests for approval related to sensitive institutions.

In all cases the Committee found that the Service had acted appropriately and within the law and had properly followed all policies and procedures relating to the recruiting and directing of human sources. In one especially sensitive area of the Service's use of human sources—one that had drawn the Committee's attention previously (see SIRC Report 2001-2002, page 8)—the Committee found that CSIS managed the relationship with the source appropriately.

The Committee did identify some minor errors and oversights in one Region's human source record keeping. Although the Committee does not believe these lapses were representative of the overall high quality of CSIS's management of the human source cases reviewed, the importance of proper documentation to human source operations generally required that we bring even these relatively minor administrative errors to the attention of the Service.

Interviews in the Community

To aid an investigation, CSIS may conduct interviews with leaders of communities or interest groups concerning threats to the security of Canada that may affect their communities. There is specific operational policy guidance for such interviews: Service employees must clearly identify themselves as such, the interviewee must be made aware that co-operation is voluntary, and the interviews must be carried out in such a way that it is clear that it is a threat that is being investigated, not the community itself.

In determining whether these interviews were conducted appropriately, the Committee examined the stated rationale for conducting the interviews, CSIS reporting on both the content of the interviews and the manner in which they were conducted, and the extent to which the interviews may have aided or impeded the Service's investigations into Sunni Islamic extremism.

The Committee's review of relevant CSIS documentation showed that it conducted its interviews in a fair and appropriate manner and with sensitivity to the interviewees' civil liberties and religious freedoms. In all the interviews reviewed, CSIS was careful to make interviewees aware that it was investigating threats posed by Sunni Islamic extremism, not investigating the Sunni community as a whole. The Committee also concluded that the interviews were of operational assistance to the Service in identifying specific threats to public safety and national security.

Liaison and Exchanges of Information with Domestic Agencies

The Committee examined all relevant information regarding liaison and co-operation between the Service and other domestic agencies that pertained to the targets under review. Included in this documentation were all logged exchanges of intelligence with other domestic agencies related to those targets. The Committee was especially concerned to determine whether co-operation was timely, effective and in conformity with law, ministerial direction and operational policy.

The Committee's examination showed that all exchanges of information, disclosures by the Service and joint operations were conducted in accordance with law and policy. The Service's efforts in both Regions to build strong and co-operative relationships with other agencies were evident to the Committee. In the months following the September 11 attacks, the benefit of these initiatives was especially important because available resources to investigate threats were stretched thin.

The Service's relations with the RCMP have been of long-standing interest to the Committee. Based on our review of the two regions in question, the Service's Sunni Islamic extremist investigations benefited from an effective working relationship between the two agencies.

Issues of Internal Security

Internal security issues are an integral part of any Committee review of a Service regional office. In assessing the adequacy of security practices and procedures, the Committee can observe how operational policies, developed centrally, are implemented in the field. In the event of security violations or more seriously, security breaches, the Committee requests a follow-up from the Service so it can determine whether these have been addressed satisfactorily. The Committee's review of internal security covers the period since our last review.

In one region, the Committee identified a number of security violations and no breaches. * The Region took remedial action in the form of security training sessions whose aim was to re-sensitize employees to the need for strict adherence to security procedures.

In the other region, the Service had documented five security breaches: one unauthorized contact, one conflict of interest situation and three involving unauthorized disclosures. In four of the cases the Committee agreed with the measures CSIS took to mitigate possible impacts from the breaches and found that the administrative measures the Service took in relation to the employees concerned were appropriate. The fifth case remains under review by the Committee.

CONCLUSIONS

The investigations reviewed here straddle the months before and after the events of September 11, 2001. It was evident to the Committee that the Service's investigations of Sunni Islamic extremism in general, and the specific targets we examined, were well underway before September 11. The Service had identified targets, sought and obtained warrant powers, developed useful human sources and had regular and extensive exchanges of information with other relevant Canadian agencies.

The events of September 11 certainly intensified the Service's own activities and the level of exchanges with other agencies. However, the nature and intent of the overall investigation did not change. Before and after September 11 the Service's investigations in both regions appeared to the Committee to be thorough, well managed and appropriately documented. Rules and procedures designed to protect individual civil liberties and religious and social institutions were scrupulously observed throughout. The Committee identified no evidence or information that would indicate that CSIS had in its possession any information that should have alerted it, and through it the Government, to the impending events of September 11.

Domestic Threats in Conjunction with Lawful Advocacy, Protest and Dissent

Report #2002-04

BACKGROUND

Historically, the Committee has taken special interest in Service investigations involving threat-related activities that occur at the same time or in the same location as legitimate political advocacy and dissent. It is here where the national security imperative to use intrusive investigative techniques must be weighed most carefully against potential damage to individual rights and fundamental institutions. Invariably, such investigations are sensitive and complex, circumstances in which the Committee is especially concerned to ensure that the Service is complying fully with existing law and policy.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE REVIEW

The purpose of this study was to examine CSIS's investigation of groups and individuals whose activities were suspected of being directed towards threats of serious violence while in the course of advocating for or protesting about issues of social and economic concern. The Committee reviewed Service investigations of 13 targets: 2 issue/ events-based targets, 3 organizations and 8 individuals. The Committee reviewed all relevant Service documentation and information (both electronic and hard-copy) for the period April 1, 2000 through June 30, 2002.

The scope of CSIS operational activities reviewed was comprehensive. The Committee's examination encompassed the targeting request and approval process; investigations of targets; the implementation of warrant powers and special operations; the recruitment, development, and tasking of human sources; and the nature of co-operative activities within liaison relationships, including exchanges of information with domestic agencies and departments.

For all the investigations reviewed, the Committee needed to assure itself on five essential matters:

1. Did the Service have reasonable grounds to suspect a threat to the security of Canada?
2. Was the level of investigation proportionate to the seriousness and imminence of the threat?
3. Did the Service collect only information strictly necessary to advise the Government of a threat?
4. Were the exchanges of information between CSIS and other agencies in conformity with the law, ministerial direction and relevant Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs)?
5. In conducting its investigations, did the Service respect the rights and civil liberties of individuals and groups to engage in lawful protest and dissent?

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

The Committee found that overall, CSIS conducted this complex set of investigations in an appropriate, lawful and professional manner, taking considerable care in implementing policy measures designed to prevent intrusion into legitimate political activity. The issue/events-based authorities were implemented judiciously, with the Service seeking identity-based targeting authorities where appropriate in an expeditious manner. The Committee believes, based on its investigation, that the Service took seriously its obligation to weigh the requirement to protect civil liberties against the need to investigate threats to national security.

For all the targets investigated, the Service had reasonable grounds to suspect a threat, and the level of investigation was in each case proportionate to the nature of the threat. No information that was not strictly necessary to the investigations was collected, and all information exchanges with other agencies were conducted appropriately and within the law.

During the Committee's review of the extensive documentation related to these investigations, the Committee identified a number of issues that gave rise to several recommendations.

Terminating Investigations in a Timely Manner

Operational policy requires the Service to terminate an investigation-irrespective of the expiry date of the targeting authority-if the activities of the target no longer constitute a threat. In the case of two individual targets where it was clear that threat activities had abated, the Committee believes CSIS should have terminated its investigations earlier than it did. In addition to the general policy guidance, CSIS officers responsible for the investigation received explicit direction from management to end the investigations if no threat activities were reported.

To avoid such occurrences in the future, the Committee recommended that:

CSIS maintain a strict awareness of operational policy and executive directive requiring the timely termination of targeting authorities in the absence of targets' threat-related activity.

Implementation of Warrant Powers

In executing valid warrant powers against an individual target, CSIS reported extensively on a non-targeted individual and collected information on that person's threat-related activities without seeking a separate targeting authority. In the Committee's view, the Service should have sought a separate targeting authority rather than rely on another investigation to collect the information it did.

Accordingly, based on this case the Committee recommended that:

In its collection of information through the execution of warrant powers, CSIS avoid extensive reporting on non-targeted individuals and be vigilant in seeking targeting authority once an individual's threat-related activities become evident.

Human Source Operations

In reviewing the Service's conduct of human source operations, the Committee identified several administrative oversights and delays in the Service's handling of a human source file. None had any material impact on the course of the investigation or the information collected. Nevertheless, based on this case the Committee recommended that in future:

CSIS pay strict attention to operational policy requirements regarding the administrative handling of human source files.

Domestic Co-operation and Liaison

The requirement for CSIS to liaise and exchange information with other domestic agencies featured quite prominently in the investigations reviewed. For the most part, these relationships were professional and productive. However, the Committee did find evidence of some friction. This clearly presented challenges but did not, in the Committee's view, materially impact upon the Service's effectiveness in conducting its investigations.

Accordingly, the Committee has recommended to the Service that:

It examine whether the negotiation of co-operative agreements between CSIS and its domestic partners would be of benefit and enhance their relationships.

Collection of Foreign Intelligence

Report #2002-02

BACKGROUND

Foreign intelligence is defined as any information collected in Canada about the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign state, foreign national or foreign organization (including commercial enterprises). Under section 16 of the CSIS Act, the Secretary of State for External Affairs-now the Minister of Foreign Affairs-and the Minister of National Defence have the authority to request the assistance of CSIS in collecting foreign intelligence. The Act also expressly directs SIRC to monitor these formal requests for assistance.

METHODOLOGY

The Committee's review encompassed all requests for assistance during fiscal year 2001-2002. It included all section 16-derived information retained by CSIS for national security purposes and all exchanges of information with the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) related to foreign intelligence collection. Given the events of September 11, 2001, the Committee took special care to understand the impact, if any, on the section 16 program.

The goal of the review was to:

• examine CSIS's role in section 16 requests to ensure compliance with the CSIS Act, directions from the Federal Court, any related ministerial direction, and the governing 1987 and 1990 MOUs;
• examine the nature of the CSIS/ CSE relationship as it relates to section 16 matters to ensure that it complies with the law, ministerial direction and operational policy; and
• understand the impact, if any, on the section 16 program of the terrorist attacks of September 2001.

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

Requests for Assistance

CSIS's implementation of all ministerial requests under section 16 complied with the necessary legal and administrative requirements.

Legislative, Governmental and Judicial Guidance

The Committee found that for the period under review no new CSIS policies, ministerial directions, judicial instructions or other guidelines were issued that had any impact on the section 16 program.

Warrant Implementation

The Committee reviewed a selection of warrants directed at collecting information under section 16. Our examination encompassed all related working files, affidavits and logs. The review identified no irregularities or other concerns regarding the authorisations for, and the management of, the warranted collection activity.

Requests for Identifying Information

Information that CSE gives to the Service is routinely "minimized" to comply with various directions governing the prohibition against targeting Canadian nationals and Canadian businesses. Under specific circumstances defined in policy, CSIS may request from CSE the identities of Canadians if it can demonstrate that the information relates to activities that could constitute a threat to the security of Canada as defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act.

The Committee examined all requests for supplementary information and determined that all were appropriate and in compliance with both law and policy. We saw no information about Canadians collected in the course of operations under section 16 that had been inappropriately retained in Service files.

Access to the Foreign Intelligence Data Base

Given the extremely sensitive nature of section 16 operations, access to the Foreign Intelligence Data Base is restricted to only those CSIS employees who have received special clearance and indoctrination. The database is thus not routinely accessible to intelligence officers involved in section 12 investigations. The Committee examined a random sample of correspondence related to the indoctrination of section 16 intelligence officers and their requests for access to the database. All requests examined were found to be in compliance with policy.

Impact of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks

As with most other areas of CSIS operations, the section 16 program came under considerable pressure in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. There was renewed emphasis on the Service's capacity to coordinate with the other agencies of government involved in the section 16 process.

Review of Foreign Arrangements

BACKGROUND

Under section 17 of the CSIS Act, the Service "may enter into an arrangement or otherwise co-operate with" institutions of the government of a foreign country or with an international organization. Such arrangements can only enter into effect after consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and upon the approval of the Solicitor General. Section 38 of the Act directs the Committee to review all such arrangements.

This report encompasses the review of seven arrangements: five were new; two were expanded in scope.

METHODOLOGY OF THE REVIEW

For each arrangement, the Committee examined:

• all relevant information provided to the Solicitor General by the Service;
• all correspondence relating to consultations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs;
• the co-operation file for the foreign agency in question;
• the most recent assessment of the agency in question written by the Security Liaison Officer (SLO) responsible;
• the SLO's overseas post profile; and
• any documentation related to conditions that may have been imposed by the Solicitor General.

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

Ministerial direction dictates the procedures and conditions necessary to establish a new arrangement or to expand the scope of an existing one. On March 1, 2001 the new compendium of ministerial direction came into effect, somewhat altering the guidelines for administering foreign arrangements generally. The language defining the scope of the arrangements was simplified and certain powers to modify existing relationships were delegated to the Director of CSIS.

All the arrangements examined in this review were initiated within the framework of the pre-2001 ministerial direction. CSIS informed the Committee that to the extent necessary, each has subsequently been modified so as to bring it into conformity with the revised direction.

The Committee's review found that the establishment of the new arrangements and the expansion of the existing ones was carried out in compliance with the CSIS Act, ministerial direction and the Solicitor General's conditions for approval. The Committee took special care to examine information relevant to the human rights records of the agencies' host countries, including open-source reporting from reputable international human rights agencies.

In this regard, the Committee took note of several new relationships where the Service will need to exercise vigilance to ensure that no information received from an agency is the product of human rights violations, and that no intelligence transferred to an agency results in such abuses. As a general rule, the Committee examines the substance of the information exchanged under any given foreign arrangement during the course of its regular reviews of individual Security Liaison Officer posts abroad.