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Annual Report 2002-2003 - An Operational Review of CSIS Activities
Appendix C: Key Findings and Recommendations
IN THE MATTER OF AHMED RESSAM
On December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressam was arrested while attempting to enter the United States from Canada with explosives hidden in the trunk of his rental car. Ressam was subsequently convicted on charges related to his unsuccessful attempt to carry out a terrorist attack at the Los Angeles International Airport to mark the beginning of the new millennium.
Upon reviewing all the relevant documentation, the Committee concluded that the Service did not possess specific information that would have forewarned it of Ressam's planned terrorist operations. In the Committee's view, the actions CSIS took to locate Ressam in 1999 were appropriate in light of the information available at the time. The Committee saw no evidence that it was a lack of vigilance on the part of the Service that contributed to Ressam's ability to escape detection after his return in 1999 to Canada.
The Committee found that the Service's investigative activities following Ressam's arrest were appropriate and proportionate to the threat. The Service complied with the requirements of law, ministerial direction and policy.
This case showed the capacity of the Service and the RCMP to assist each other effectively while working within their respective mandates. Similarly, the exchanges of information between the Service and its U.S. partners were timely and comprehensive, indicating a smooth-functioning and productive relationship.
SUNNI ISLAMIC EXTREMISM-A REVIEW OF CSIS REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
The Committee examined all electronic and hard-copy documentation during the review period related to five broad operational activities:
- the targeting request and approval process, and the investigating of targets;
- the acquiring and implementing of warrants;
- the recruiting, developing and directing of human sources;
- the conducting of interviews in the community; and
- the exchanging of information and other forms of liaison with domestic agencies.
Targeting and Investigations
The Committee found that in all cases the Service had reasonable grounds to suspect the target's involvement in activities that constituted a threat to the security of Canada and that the levels of investigation were proportionate to the threat activities observed.
In obtaining targeting authorities and conducting the investigations, the Service met all the requirements set out in law, ministerial direction and operational policy. It collected only the information strictly necessary for the investigation.
Two instances drew the Committee's attention and required additional inquiries of the Service. In the first, the Committee reviewed documentation about an unusual event involving one of the selected targets. The Committee was satisfied that no improper conduct on the part of CSIS contributed to the event, nor did any Service employee contravene operational policy.
The second instance related to an error on the part of the Service that had been rectified by CSIS as soon as it was noticed. Unusual and extenuating circumstances contributed to the error and the Committee is satisfied that it was unintentional. Further, the Committee was able to confirm that the Service took the proper administrative and operational measures to correct the error as soon as it became evident.
Warrant Acquisition and Implementation
With respect to all the warrants examined in both regions and based on the information made available to the Committee for review, we found that CSIS conducted the warrant acquisition process in a thorough and objective manner and used supporting information appropriately. Affidavits were complete and balanced, and the facts and circumstances of the cases were fully, fairly and objectively expressed.
The Committee also found that in executing the warrant powers obtained, CSIS exercised its powers appropriately and complied with all warrant clauses and conditions. With minor exceptions, both regions strictly observed operational policies concerning the collection and retention of information obtained under the warrants.
Recruitment and Direction of Human Sources
In all cases the Committee found that the Service had acted appropriately and within the law and had properly followed all policies and procedures relating to the recruiting and directing of human sources. In one especially sensitive area of the Service's use of human sources-one that has drawn the Committee's attention previously-the Committee found that CSIS managed the relationship with the source appropriately. The Committee did identify some minor errors and oversights in one Region's human source record keeping.
Interviews in the Community
The Committee's review of relevant CSIS documentation showed that it conducted its interviews in the community in a fair and appropriate manner and with sensitivity to the interviewees' civil liberties and religious freedoms. In all the interviews reviewed, CSIS was careful to make interviewees aware that it was investigating threats posed by Sunni Islamic extremism, not investigating the Sunni community as a whole.
Liaison and Exchanges of Information with Domestic Agencies
The Committee's examination showed that all exchanges of information, disclosures by the Service and joint operations were conducted in accordance with law and policy. The Service's efforts in both Regions to build strong and co-operative relationships with other agencies were evident to the Committee. In the months following the September 11 attacks, the benefit of these initiatives was especially important because available resources to investigate threats were stretched thin.
Issues of Internal Security
In one region, the Committee identified a number of security violations and no breaches. In the other region, the Service had documented five security breaches: one unauthorized contact, one conflict of interest situation and three involving unauthorized disclosures. In four of the cases the Committee agreed with the measures CSIS took to mitigate possible impacts from the breaches and found that the administrative measures the Service took in relation to the employees concerned were appropriate. The fifth case remains under review by the Committee.
DOMESTIC THREATS IN CONJUNCTION WITH LAWFUL ADVOCACY, PROTEST AND DISSENT
The Committee found that overall, CSIS conducted this complex set of investigations in an appropriate, lawful and professional manner, taking considerable care in implementing policy measures designed to prevent intrusion into legitimate political activity. The Committee believes, based on its investigation, that the Service took seriously its obligation to weigh the requirement to protect civil liberties against the need to investigate threats to national security.
The Committee identified a number of issues that gave rise to several recommendations.
- In the case of two individual targets where it was clear that threat activities had abated, the Committee believes CSIS should have terminated its investigations earlier than it did. In addition to the general policy guidance, CSIS officers responsible for the investigation received explicit direction from management to end the investigations if no threat activities were reported.
To avoid such occurrences in the future, the Committee recommended that:
CSIS maintain a strict awareness of operational policy and executive directive requiring the timely termination of targeting authorities in the absence of targets' threat-related activity. - In executing valid warrant powers against an individual target, CSIS reported extensively on a non-targeted individual and collected information on that person's threat-related activities without seeking a separate targeting authority. In the Committee's view, the Service should have sought a separate targeting authority rather than rely on another investigation to collect the information it did.
Accordingly, based on this case the Committee recommended that:
In its collection of information through the execution of warrant powers, CSIS avoid extensive reporting on non-targeted individuals, and be vigilant in seeking targeting authority once an individual's threat-related activities become evident. - The Committee identified several administrative oversights and delays in the Service's handling of a human source file. None had any material impact on the course of the investigation or the information collected. Nevertheless, based on this case the Committee recommended that in future:
CSIS pay strict attention to operational policy requirements regarding the administrative handling of human source files. - The Committee found evidence of some friction in exchanges with domestic agencies. This clearly presented challenges but did not, in the Committee's view, materially impact upon the Service's effectiveness in conducting its investigations.
Accordingly, the Committee has recommended to the Service that:
It examine whether the negotiation of co-operative agreements between CSIS and its domestic partners would be of benefit and enhance their relationships.
COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
The Committee concluded that in implementing ministerial requests for assistance under section 16, CSIS complied with all legal and administrative requirements.
The review identified no irregularities or other concerns regarding the authorizations for, and the management of, the collection of information under Federal Court warrants. All requests for supplementary information that CSIS sought from CSE were appropriate and in compliance with law and policy. The Committee saw no information about Canadians collected in the course of section 16 operations that had been inappropriately retained in Service files.
REVIEW OF FOREIGN ARRANGEMENTS
The Committee's review found that the establishment of the new arrangements and the expansion of the existing ones was carried out in compliance with the CSIS Act, ministerial direction and the Solicitor General's conditions for approval. The Committee took special care to examine information relevant to the human rights records of the agencies' host countries, including open-source reporting from reputable international human rights agencies.
In this regard, the Committee took note of several new relationships where the Service will need to exercise vigilance to ensure that no information received from an agency is the product of human rights violations, and that no intelligence transferred to an agency results in such abuses.