1

Report of the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence, January 1999.

 2

It was determined that the definition in section 2(b) of the CSIS Act which refers to "foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person," was sufficiently broad to include serious transnational criminal activity.

 3

Also referred to as "issue-based" targeting, the generic authorization names no specific persons but instead gives the Service wide discretion to investigate a class of activities fitting a threat that is described.

 4

People and Process in Transition", Report to the Solicitor General by the Independent Advisory Team on CSIS, October 1987, and The Intelligence Assessments Branch: A SIRC Review of the Production Process, September 1988.

 5

People and Process in Transition", p. 20.

 6

People and Process in Transition", p. 35.

 7

1987-88 SIRC Annual Report, p. 40.

 8

1987-88 SIRC Annual Report, p. 41.

 9

EXIPC was created in 1987 to ensure that intelligence production was consistent with the overall requirements and priorities of the Government, as well as with the specific needs identified by clients. EXIPC has met only rarely in recent years.

10

Declared" intelligence officers are those the host country has been informed about by the foreign nation's government and whose tasks are ostensibly related to legal, official diplomatic, and liaison activities. "Undeclared" officers are those about whom the host country has not been notified and who occupy posts within the diplomatic mission not openly connected with intelligence gathering.

11

A retention period is a time limit imposed on the Service for retaining a file. A Bring Forward (BF) date is assigned to the file based on the prescribed retention period for the file category. Upon expiry of the retention period, the Service reviews the files, and decides whether they should be retained, archived or destroyed.

12

Changes to certain warrant conditions were commented on in SIRC's 1997- 98 Annual Report.

13

CSIS 36-97, Federal Court of Canada, 3 October 1997, McGillis J. SIRC commented on the McGillis Decision in its 1997-98 Annual Report.

14

During the period under review, a warrant pertaining to a particular target group expired. CSIS applied for and was granted an additional warrant by the Court on the same target. The Committee reviewed applications for and the implementation of both warrants.

15

A replacement warrant is required when the Service changes the targets, the places or the powers of the previous warrant.

16

These sections of the CSIS Act pertain to the Service attesting that the facts presented to the Court justify the belief, on reasonable grounds, that a warrant was required to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada.

17

The "resort to" clause permits the Service to use the powers granted in a warrant against a target at a place not named in the warrant, which it believes the target has resorted to or will resort. The legality of this clause has been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Thompson et al. v. The Queen, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 111.

18

The Intelligence Assessment Committee is composed of senior officials from the departments and agencies of the Government of Canada most concerned with intelligence matters.

19

The Communications Security Establishment is an agency of the Department of National Defence. As described by the Auditor General in his 1996 report to Parliament, The Canadian Intelligence Community, the CSE "analyses and reports on foreign radio, radar and other electronic emissions...and provides this foreign intelligence to Canadian Government clients."

20

SIRC Annual Report 1997-98, An Operational Audit of CSIS Activities, p. 47.

21

Pursuant to section 15 of the CSIS Act, the Service may conduct investigations in order to provide security assessments to:

• departments and agencies of the Federal and provincial governments (section 13 of the Act);
• the government of a foreign state (section 13 of the Act); and,
• the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (section 14 of the Act).

22

The number of government security screening investigations for the year under review was 2,424. The majority of field investigations were carried out for the Department of National Defence (659), CSIS (415), Public Works and Government Services (316), Foreign Affairs & International Trade (305), and less than 200 for the Communications Security Establishment.

23

The Service carries out immigration security screening investigations, including any necessary interviews.

24

CSIS investigators assume the primary responsibility for security concerns, listing the names directly with foreign countries, and the application of the security profiles.

25

Both the EII and the Point of Entry Alert System are administered by the Immigration Assessment Unit in the Counter Terrorism Branch. EII is one of many data banks within the Field Operational Support System (FOSS) used by Immigration officers for information, identification, and processing purposes. EII holds information on all persons who have entered any part of the Immigration stream (either for admission purposes or for removal), and identifies the types of documents issued to the applicants and any action taken by CIC.

26

When the Service believes that it is not in a position to render a recommendation to CIC concerning a citizenship application, it must seek approval from the Solicitor General to continue investigating the case and "defer" providing the assessment.

27

We informed ten individuals that their immigration-related complaints had to first be submitted to the Director of CSIS. Twenty other individuals lodged complaints to the Committee after they had been submitted to the Director.

28

A group of fourteen complainants said that they were being asked to inform on their compatriots if they wanted their applications to be treated expeditiously.

29

This is usually determined using information from either the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada or CSIS (under Federal legislation governing Access to Information and Privacy) or from the nature of the screening interviews conducted by the Service. If the delay is within the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada then SIRC does not have jurisdiction.

30

Within such period of time as the Committee considers reasonable (thirty days is the most usual).

31

Concerning a case first heard by our former Chair, the Committee ruled that the subject of the complaint was of such character as to fall within the class of persons described within paragraph 19(1)(g) of the Immigration Act: "persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe...are members of...an organization that is likely to engage in...acts of violence" that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada, and thus are not admissible to Canada.

The Committee's decision was appealed, with the Federal Court of Canada ruling that portions of 19(1)(g) contravened the freedom of association assured by paragraph 2(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in a manner that was not demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. The Court referred the matter back to the Committee for reconsideration.

Another Committee Member (no longer with the Committee) was subsequently asked to rule on whether the subject of the complaint, a permanent resident of Canada, was a person described in paragraphs 19(1)(e), and 27(1)(c) of the Immigration Act as they existed on 29 May 1992, and that portion of paragraph 19(1)(g) of the Immigration Act that remained in force following the Federal Court judgement.

Having found that the subject of the Ministerial Report was a person described in paragraphs 19(1)(e) and 19(1)(g), the Member concluded that a security certificate should be issued. This latest decision is being appealed.

32

Although we noted in our last Annual Report that CSIS saw no difference between threats to "Canadian interests" and threats to "the security of Canada", we were uneasy in that the former could be interpreted as giving the Service a broader mandate than the latter term.

33

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference.

34

The CSIS video explains the Service's role to law enforcement and other agencies.

It was not until 1 July 1998, however, that CSIS assumed the responsibility for the security screening of all Department of National Defence personnel.