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Annual Report 1998-1999 - An Operational Audit of CSIS Activities
Appendix C: List of Recommendations and Major Issues
Statement from the Review Committee
Recommendation for a Comprehensive Review of Canada's Security Intelligence Systems
In any democratic society security intelligence activities are among the most serious a government can undertake. They warrant the constant and meticulous attention of all who cherish democratic values and civil discourse in a turbulent and dangerous world.
The current security intelligence apparatus was designed twenty years ago, and last examined as a whole in 1990. The Members of SIRC believe that it is time, therefore, for a thorough Government-wide review of all of the nation's intelligence systems and organizations.
The mechanisms of such a comprehensive examination are for Government to choose, however, we would urge that the review be as open as law and prudence permit, and that all interested parties, individuals, and groups, be encouraged to participate.
Review of Transnational Criminal Activity
In the Committee's view, the question of whether CSIS' mandate permits its involvement in the investigation of transnational criminal activity remains open at the present time. There is a larger public policy question to be addressed by Government. Currently, CSIS is following Ministerial instructions to deal with issues of international crime, however, our reviews pointed to a number of problems in regard to the Service taking on the task. Given the importance of the matter, we would urge the Government to consolidate and clarify its intentions on how to address this growing array of threats to Canada.
The threshold for CSIS intervention ought to be clearly articulated: Service participation should be contingent on the criminal activity being of such seriousness and scope as to represent a genuine threat to the strategic, social, economic, and national security interests of Canada. The Service should not become involved in the investigation of criminal activities best left to law enforcement agencies.
Should CSIS continue to remain involved in the area, the Committee recommends that,
it develop a clear operational policy in all its aspects for investigating transnational criminal activity. Such policy should include the requirement to assess each case whenever consideration is given to initiating an investigation under an issue-based targeting authority; and,
it implement a program of specialized training in the key areas of transnational crime in order that the objective of providing strategic intelligence to the government on major international criminal activities can be fully realized.
Review of Intelligence Production
While the Committee acknowledges that as an organizational reality clients in Counter Intelligence and Counter Terrorism will continue to influence much of what RAP does, we remain convinced that the Service should continue active efforts to accommodate its external partners, and that it is possible to seek a better balance without penalty to internal operations.
There is, we believe, a similar lack of balance in the area of strategic analysis. Our discussions with both RAP's internal and external clients evinced the clear need for more and better long-range, strategic analysis.
In order to redress these shortcomings renewed direction from CSIS senior management is required. To this end, the Committee has two recommendations:
The reinvigoration of an apparatus that has become defunct in recent years — the Executive Intelligence Production Committee (EXIPC).
The articulation by CSIS of a specific plan to meet the clear requirement of both internal and external clients for more strategic analysis.
Our review identified a troubling form of professional segregation within the Branch. RAP staff who are not classified as intelligence officers (IOs) are treated differently in the areas of salary, training, and career advancement.
In order to address these issues, the Committee recommends,
that the Service develop quality control guidelines and protocols for its written product, and devise methodologies for checking the veracity of information on which reports are based;
that CSIS implement a comprehensive career plan encompassing all RAP officers, IOs, and non-IOs alike; and,
that a reasonable proportion of supervisory positions within the RAP establishment be designated for officers in the non-IO category.
CSIS Investigations on University Campuses
As a general rule, CSIS officers rely on relevant sections of the CSIS Operational Policy Manual which are derived from Ministerial Direction. Therefore, an examination of the Service's interpretation of Ministerial Directions, as expressed in its policy manual, was an important part of our review. The Committee identified some potential problems:
- in instances where the Minister's approval is still needed, the policy manual excluded the requirement set out in Ministerial Direction that the Service provide an explanation to the Minister of how the proposed operation would affect the rights and freedoms of the subjects of the investigation and others associated with the institution;
- a term for a particular type of investigative activity has been subject to too broad and varied an interpretation;
- the policy contained no references to the seminal 1963 Pearson-Laskin Accord; and,
- the policy permits CSIS officers, without Ministerial approval, to go on campus to collect information for security screening purposes and for other mandated enquiries; such enquiries not being adequately defined.
Two recommendations emerged from our study of CSIS campus operations:
First, when requesting authorization from the Minister, the Service should be required to explain how a particular investigation will impact on the rights and freedoms of persons who are subjects of the investigation as well as those persons associated with the institution concerned.
Second, the CSIS Operational Policy Manual should include in the authorities section explicit reference to the 1971 Record of Cabinet Decision articulating the general principles of the Pearson-Laskin Accord on campus investigations.
CSIS Cooperation with the RCMP - Part II
While there continues to be some residual friction in two regions between Service officers and their RCMP counterparts over especially difficult cases that arose in the recent past, the Committee believes that these have created no ongoing impairment to operational effectiveness. With the exception of two ongoing concerns—RCMP use of CSIS intelligence in criminal proceedings, and CSIS responsibility in the area of transnational crime—the CSIS-RCMP relationship can be characterized as one of genuine and fruitful cooperation.
CSIS Liaison with Foreign Agencies
Human Rights
The Committee believes that all possible care should be taken to make sure that the Service's exchanges of information are not used to assist in the violation of human rights. In order to ensure that the dissemination of information is tightly controlled, Security Liaison Officers (SLO) must make available to the rest of CSIS timely and accurate information about an agency's human rights record, as well as its propensity to pass information onto third parties without authorization.
Comprehensive Review of All Foreign Arrangements
Fully one-half of the Service's 215 foreign arrangements managed by Service SLOs posted abroad were entered into by the Security Service prior to the establishment of CSIS and, of these, many pre-dated even the 1982 Ministerial Direction. The Review Committee is concerned at the delay in an anticipated release of new Ministerial Direction since our earlier recommendation that CSIS systematically reexamine all foreign arrangements is contingent on new Direction. We strongly urge the Ministry to replace the 1982 Ministerial Direction with one that reflects the Government's experience with the administration of foreign liaison arrangements to date, and that is consistent with the CSIS Act.
A General Finding
The Committee's periodic reviews of the Service's overseas liaison activities encompass all the many difficulties associated with work in foreign posts. SLOs sometimes face environments which are personally and professionally challenging. In general, the SLOs in the two posts reviewed demonstrated initiative, employed good judgement, and the Service exercised commendable restraint in deciding what information would be shared with its foreign partners.
Allegations by a Former CSIS Employee
In July 1998, the then Solicitor General, the Honourable Andy Scott, advised the Committee of certain allegations against CSIS by a former employee of the Service. In accordance with section 54 of the CSIS Act, the Minister asked us to report on the matter, reviewing the allegations and detailing the facts, if any, on which the allegations were based. The Committee concluded that all of the allegations were unfounded and so reported to the Minister.
Overlooked Files
In early 1998, while conducting file reviews at CSIS Headquarters, the Committee came across files that were opened by the RCMP Security Service, and which had been overlooked during the Service's major review in 1990 of all of the files inherited from the RCMP. Our review of the files revealed that the misplaced files were due to “administrative oversight
”: the files had inexplicably not been assigned a Bring Forward (BF) date during the Service's 1990 major review.
In general, although we found CSIS' file review process to be sound, we did find problems in the Service's implementation of that process. With the aim of rectifying these issues, the Committee made three recommendations:
First, that the File Review and Disposition Guidelines be updated to reflect the Service's present policy and operational requirements.
Second, that the operational units be required to comply with National Archives Requirements Unit (NARU) deadlines for disposal decisions, and that NARU establish an effective follow-up process.
Third, that analysts in NARU and the operational desks provide detailed rationales for their decisions to retain files, citing the applicable criteria listed in the Schedules and the Service's interest pursuant to the CSIS Act.