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Annual Report 1997-1998 - An Operational Audit of CSIS Activities
Appendix C: List of Recommendations
CSIS' Role in Immigration Security Screening
While the Committee is aware of the advantages which accrue from having CSIS section 12 investigators from the regions involved in immigration interviews, their presence does increase the possibility that the interview can be used as an investigative tool, rather than for its intended purpose: to provide an opportunity for the prospective immigrant to explain adverse information in relation to his or her security status. The Committee wishes to underscore the need for CSIS to maintain a balance between the need to provide complete and meaningful advice, and the rights of those being interviewed.
We found the Service's Procedures Guidelines on Immigration Screening Interviews to be inadequate in several respects. In the Committee's view, the Guidelines should state clearly that immigration interviews will not be used for recruitment or other unrelated purposes.
The Committee believes that the Service's responsibilities in assisting CIC's ability to detect applicants suspected of war crimes or crimes against humanity should be formalized and set out in policy.
CSIS provides advice to CIC on whether a particular individual wishing to gain entry poses a threat to the security of Canada.
We recommend that in future all advice given to CIC should be recorded, along with the specific details about the individual interviewed.
It is the Committee's view that CIC needs to know as much as possible about would-be refugees as it pertains to threats to Canada's security interests. The Committee believes that CSIS should play a greater role in assisting CIC in refugee matters, and that the role should be carefully defined and transparent.
CSIS Liaison with Foreign Agencies
Existing policy guidelines governing CSIS liaison with foreign agencies are silent when it comes to certain kinds of requests. For example, CSIS can ask foreign intelligence services to monitor Canadian residents who travel to other countries.
We recommend, therefore, that CSIS develop policy regarding requests for assistance to foreign agencies to investigate Canadian residents traveling abroad.
The Committee took note of a case where a foreign arrangement had been dormant for ten or more years, and then was reactivated. During the dormant period, however, the political environment of the country concerned had changed substantially. While an informal, local consultation process occurred, there was no formal procedure in place to review the new circumstances.
We recommend that CSIS policy be revised so as to ensure that the terms and conditions of foreign arrangements that have been dormant for a significant period of time are revisited before reactivation.
Additionally,
The Committee recommends that CSIS systematically reexamine all foreign arrangements after the forthcoming release of the new Ministerial Direction on foreign arrangements.
A Case of Historical Interest
In this case, the Committee concluded that the nature of the interaction CSIS had with a certain foreign intelligence service required the Solicitor General's express written consent which was not obtained.
We strongly recommend, therefore, that in all cases where the Service seeks and receives Ministerial approval, that the written record reflect that fact.
Audit of Sensitive Operations in a Region of Canada
In the cases the Committee reviewed, no unwarranted collection of information involving sensitive institutions was identified. All operations were appropriately authorized by senior management.
One unusual case concerned payments to a source for a humanitarian purpose that were made in a way that did not strictly conform to current Service policies.
The Committee recommends that in future, any significant source payments that the Service makes outside established administrative procedures be authorized at CSIS Headquarters.
CSIS senior management issued instructions in January 1996 on how to deal with sources whose efforts on behalf of CSIS might conflict with their employment responsibilities. The Committee's audit showed, however, that this instruction had not been incorporated into more formal CSIS policy guidelines.
The Committee recommends that CSIS make the senior management instructions referred to above, part of operational policy on the management of human sources.
Collection of Foreign Intelligence
The Committee routinely scrutinizes the Service's requests to the Communications Security Establishment for information to ensure that they are appropriate and comply with existing law and policy. This year the Committee identified an instance where the Service's request was made only verbally, leaving no written record for us to examine.
The Committee recommends that all CSIS requests to CSE for identifying information be fully documented.
Investigation of Complaints about Security Screening
Since the inception in 1987 of the Airport Restricted Area Access Clearance Program, more than 140,000 persons have had to obtain such clearance and 31 individuals have had clearance denied to them. None have access to a Committee review of their cases. The issue of the unequal redress system has been a preoccupation of the Committee since 1987 and we believe that the situation should not be allowed to continue. The Committee understands that the Minister of Transport made representations to the Solicitor General concerning the problem in 1996. We hope the matter will be pursued so that this obvious inequity can be remedied.