Annual Report 1996-1997 - An Operational Audit of CSIS Activities

Appendix C: LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

SECTION 1: A REVIEW OF CSIS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

A. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST FOR 1996-97

CSIS Liaison Program with Foreign Agencies

We recommend, therefore, that the Procedures Manual be brought up to date, and that it cover important post issues that are not addressed elsewhere.

We recommend, however, that when an SLO decides to disclose adverse open information about Canadians to a foreign agency, the SLO be required to first consult with management at CSIS Headquarters.

We recommend that the Service revise, or at least better define, its system of evaluating the reliability of foreign agencies.

Economic Espionage

We recommend that administrative information collected from the Liaison/Awareness Program be retained in a non-section 12 data base.

B. ANNUAL AUDIT OF CSIS ACTIVITIES IN A REGION OF CANADA

We believe that CSIS should obtain the Solicitor General's approval to exchange information with or otherwise cooperate with government departments and agencies with which it does not have formal arrangements.

Consequently, the Committee recommends that unless there are specific operational considerations that preclude it, the Service should in future inform Federal departments concerned about the conclusions it has drawn about Federal employees investigated.

The Committee recommends that source recruitment assessments involving persons who are not targets not be retained as part of the Service's section 12 data base.

The Committee recommends that the definition of community interview programs be clearly set out in CSIS policy.

C. INSIDE CSIS

We recommend, therefore, that the Service review and set out policy which addresses gaps in current policy pertaining to information exchanges with police agencies in relation to advocacy, protest, and dissent.

We recommend, therefore, that the Service take the necessary measures to ensure that section 12 and section 15 investigations are clearly distinguishable, and, where they may of necessity overlap, ensure that all the applicable tests and controls are in place.

We recommend that CSIS clarify its policy in regard to the "strictly necessary" requirement when assessing whether to retain identifying information from foreign intelligence in the Service's computerized data base.