Regional Audits - Annual Report 1995-1996

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Annual Report 1995-1996 - An Operational Audit of CSIS Activities

Table of Contents

(a) General

To obtain a field-level perspective on how well the Service's systems are working, we audit the investigative activities in one region of Canada each year. During 1995-96 for example, we reviewed targeting approvals, surveillance, sensitive operations and, for the first time, community relations in a region. The Service's operations took place in fiscal year 1994-95.

The information we collect through these regional audits allows us to see how CSIS operations have evolved since the last audit in a wide range of areas. The impact of new Ministerial Direction and new operational policies, for example, can be ascertained through this regional audit process.

(b) Targeting

During each regional audit, we review the Service's performance of its primary mandate: the investigations authorized pursuant to sections 2 and 12 of the CSIS Act. The Committee randomly selected 11 investigations conducted by the Region: five from the CI Branch and six from the CT Branch.

In each case that we examined, the Committee attempted to answer four questions:

did CSIS have reasonable grounds to suspect a threat to national security?
was the level of investigation proportionate to the seriousness and imminence of the threat?
was the investigation authorized in accordance with the Service's internal rules and the directives in force?
did the Service collect only the information that was strictly necessary in order to advise the Government about threats to national security?

(i) The Counter Intelligence Investigations

The first case concerned a person who CSIS suspected of cooperating with a foreign intelligence service. We found that the targeting proposal was weak in demonstrating reasonable grounds to suspect that the individual posed a threat to national security. The Service told SIRC that the targeting documents did not mention that a foreign intelligence officer was seen using clandestine techniques prior to meeting with the target.

An internal memorandum from CSIS' Legal Services stated that there were no reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that the person posed a threat to the security of Canada. The Service added that the legal opinion was a comment on the “viability of obtaining a warrant” and that the case did not meet the threshold needed to obtain a warrant pursuant to section 21 of the CSIS Act. Moreover, the Service noted that Legal Services would not have recommended that it proceed with other investigative techniques if it believed that the investigation was not justified. The Service terminated the investigation in the Fall of 1995.

We agreed with the initial targeting decision and also supported the decision to terminate the investigation.

In the course of this investigation, the Service collected personal financial information without a warrant from a private institution. The Service stated that provincial legislation allowed the disclosure of such information in the absence of a warrant. In other provinces, a warrant is necessary to obtain the information. Our research confirmed that the legislation in the province does give the Service access to personal financial information without a warrant.

In the same investigation, we noticed that some operational reports did not identify the information source. This procedure makes it difficult, if not impossible from an audit perspective, for both SIRC and CSIS to identify and assess the source of the information. The regional investigators interpreted the new operational practices as preventing the identification of casual contacts, even if these contacts did not object to being identified. The Committee believes that it is essential that both the Service and SIRC be able to identify all information sources.

The second case involved a person suspected of supervising the overseas operations of a foreign intelligence service. According to the targeting authorization, the individual travelled frequently to Canada and other countries, had contacts with known intelligence officers, and seemed to be in a position of authority over the diplomats of his country.

We noted that the Region obtained information about the individual from a private institution in the absence of a warrant. The Committee questioned the Service about the collection effort and we concluded that the information met the test of “strictly necessary.” The Service informed SIRC that it had acquired a legal opinion on the matter to the effect that there was no requirement for a warrant in this situation. Based on the specific facts in this case, we agreed.

The third case also pertained to a foreign intelligence service. Whereas we had no difficulty with the Service's targeting of the long-term adversary, the Committee did find that the 1994 targeting document provided little information about the extent of the foreign intelligence service's activities in Canada.

In the opinion of the Committee, the remaining two cases posed no problems with regard to either the decisions to investigate or the information that the Service collected.

(ii) The Counter Terrorism Investigations

The first CT Branch investigation involved a purported plot to overthrow a foreign government. An emergency targeting authorization was obtained and the decision was later ratified by TARC.

We reviewed the content of the targeting request submitted to TARC and we found that some aspects of the request did not accurately reflect the information collected. For instance, the request stated that the principal conspirators were apparently influential individuals. The Committee learned that a representative from a federal agency told CSIS that the alleged principal conspirators were not influential in their community, and that they did not necessarily have the resources to carry out the threat. The Service informed SIRC that it did not agree with the agency's assessment.

Moreover, on the day that TARC met to approve the request, the Region sent Headquarters a preliminary assessment that cast doubt on the plot theory. The regional assessment was not provided to TARC. The Service said that the Regional report was preliminary and was not consistent with other reports. We informed CSIS that CT Branch should have drawn TARC's attention to the conclusions of the regional assessment.

Notwithstanding these concerns, the Committee supported the investigation. The volatile political and social situation in the foreign country justified the Service's interest in the possible conspiracy.

The second investigation focused on the activities of a young adult involved in a domestic extremist group. The Region learned that the person was the leader of the group and the Service increased the level of the investigation. We observed that the Region subsequently informed CSIS Headquarters that the target was no longer the leader and, indeed, that the group had disbanded. The Service did not actively investigate the person during the last few months of the specific authorization against him, and then terminated the investigation.

In the course of the investigation, CSIS learned that the target might have been involved in an attempted firebombing. The Service did not find information to show that the target was in fact involved in this criminal matter.

In the remaining four cases, we found that the decisions to investigate were appropriate and that the Region collected only the information that was strictly necessary for the purpose of the investigation. We also noted that the Region was particularly alert to and complied with CSIS policies concerning sensitive institutions in these investigations.

(c) Sensitive Operations

Sensitive operations are subject to the requirements set out in Ministerial Direction and the CSIS Operational Policy Manual, and must be approved by senior CSIS managers or the Solicitor General. These operations might touch on “sensitive institutions” such as churches or universities. We examine the Service's decisions each year to determine if they are “strictly necessary” and whether they comply with policy.

For 1995-96, we noted that a source was directed to attend and collect information at a religious institution without the required approval of a senior manager. We found that no information was collected concerning religious matters. In another operation, we noted that an expenditure which, in the Committee's view, required Headquarters approval had not been appropriately authorized.

CSIS documents revealed that a Federal Government official was asked to provide information to Service officers after, in the course of his duties, he had interviewed an individual. The Service told us that it could not explain the documentary reference. We found that the official did not provide the information to CSIS.

We reviewed a number of other operations approved pursuant to Ministerial Direction and the Service's Operational Policy Manual during the fiscal year. We saw no problems in the approvals, or in the subsequent operations. We found, however, that there was no central file listing all the decisions concerning activities that could touch upon lawful advocacy, protest or dissent. Consequently, these decisions, scattered in numerous operational files, might not be seen during periodic audits.

We recommended to CSIS that records of senior management decisions regarding activities touching upon lawful advocacy, protest or dissent be retained on a central file.

(d) Surveillance

CSIS uses surveillance to provide details on the behaviour patterns, associations, movements, and “trade-craft” of groups or individuals targeted for investigation. Large amounts of personal information can be gathered and stored in the course of surveillance operations.

We examined all of the applications in the Region for the use of surveillance during a six month period. We observed that the majority of requests came from the CT Branch and we found no anomalies or problems with the applications.

Emergency surveillance is used “when an unanticipated threat to the security of Canada is suspected.” In these cases, the TARC authorization for the investigation is sought after the fact. We intended to examine the use of emergency surveillance, but we found that the Region had never used this surveillance provision.

We found few issues in the surveillance operations that we randomly selected for detailed audit. All of the operations were clearly justified, with individual targets linked either to terrorist groups or to hostile intelligence services. We questioned the Service about:

the collection of significant amounts of incidental information on individuals in the vicinity of targets;
the retention by surveillants of working files containing personal information about the targets; and
the use of cameras in the context of a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”

We were satisfied with the Service's responses.

One surveillance report revealed that the Service intended to collect information on a person's movements and contacts. The person in question, however, was not an authorized target and thus, surveillance could only be properly used for identification purposes. CSIS attributed the reference to faulty report writing, and we found no indication that information on the individual's movements and contacts had been collected.

(e) Community Interviews

We have previously reported on the interview programs that CSIS has conducted in ethnic communities. The Committee examined, for example, the first Service-wide community interview program that took place among the Arab community during the Gulf War. Our 1991-92 Annual Report observed that whereas the program was carried out in a lawful manner, it nevertheless elicited fear and controversy in the ethnic community.

We returned to the issue again in our 1993-94 Annual Report. At that time, we found that CSIS had instituted several Community Interview Programs. We concluded that the Service had learned a great deal from its actions during the Gulf War and, in the main, did not repeat the mistakes of the earlier program.

We believe that the potential impact of CSIS on ethnic communities is extremely important. As we noted in 1993-94, “some emigré communities have lived through disagreeable experiences with security services in their homelands. In most of these communities, a knock on the door from a local security service can impact massively and adversely on the individual.”¹³

The Service employs community interview programs to a significant extent, as a consequence of overseas “homelands” conflicts. Consequently, we concluded that we should establish an ongoing review of such programs. We have, therefore, incorporated the review of Community Interview Programs into our regional audits.

Community Interview Programs are duly authorized investigations and are used to sensitize ethnic communities to the Service and allow CSIS, in turn, to collect information on the potential for threats to national security. The voluntary cooperation of interviewees is sought by the Service.

When SIRC began the current review, we learned that the Region had also developed a unique and ongoing liaison program with ethnic communities, designed to be completely separate from the section 12 community interviews. We examined both the Community Interview Program and the Ethnic Communities Liaison Program in this study, as they involved the relations between the Service and the ethnic communities in the Region.

For the two types of programs, we sought to ascertain their scope, whether the programs were properly authorized, whether information from the community interview program was collected and retained on a strictly necessary basis, and if the Region collected personal information on those interviewed. We also wanted to see how the Region isolated the information in the Ethnic Community Liaison Program from the operational sector.

Committee Researchers reviewed the Regional and CSIS Headquarters (HQ) correspondence concerning the community interviews and the ethnic community liaison programs. We interviewed the key Regional personnel and we received a community liaison presentation that significantly aided our understanding of the differences between the two programs.

During our review, we saw no Ministerial Direction to address the special concerns dealing with the possible impact on ethnic communities of Service investigations. But we were pleased to see that the Service's operational policies were sensitive to the issues associated with investigating persons from countries where the security and police authorities had brutalized the civilian populations.

Our review of a January 1993 memorandum from the then Director General CT found that it provided guidelines for community interviews, though the definition was ambiguous.

We recommended, therefore, that the memorandum be more precise as to the definition of the program and that it either be included in the Operational Policy Manual or that it be updated and re-issued to all operational branches.

The Service informed us that our recommendation will be given full consideration, as CSIS was “reviewing other operational policies, changes to which may affect the policy governing community interviews.” We will monitor the Service's activities in this regard.

For the period under review, fiscal year 1994-95, we learned that the Region had conducted a small number of community interview programs in the counter terrorism area. The Region had interviewed the leaders and knowledgeable members of the ethnic communities. The CI Branch informed us that it did not conduct any community interviews in the Region during this time.

We observed that even the few interviews in one ethnic community highlighted that group's fear of people in Canada who were associated with overseas enemies. We saw no problems in the Service's community interviews for the period under review. The interviews in another community were also conducted responsibly and we did not see any abuse of the process. We commented, however, on the occasional violations of the requirement to electronically track the information exchanged with other agencies.

The small number of community interviews in a third ethnic population were similarly not of concern. As in the previous interviews, it was evident that people in the ethnic communities were fearful of retribution by their homeland enemies. We noted too, that the Region conducted interviews in a fourth community, but CSIS did not consider these actions to comprise a Community Interview Program per se, and no special authorization was sought, although the general targeting authorization remained in force. The ambiguity associated with whether a special authorization was required, again pointed to a policy vacuum in this area.

In late 1992, Regional staff proposed an innovative Ethnic Communities Liaison Program as a means to approach ethnic communities, to complement the Service's communications strategy, and to demonstrate the Service's openness to multiculturalism. The proposal was inspired by CSIS' first public report in 1991, the Osbaldeston Report, and SIRC's recommendation that ethnic communities be sensitized to the role of CSIS in order to earn their respect and ease the unfounded fears in these communities.

One outcome of the program was the receipt of requests for assistance from the ethnic communities. Although the majority of these requests were not within the Service's mandate, the contacts, said the Region, served to encourage a certain level of confidence in CSIS from the ethnic communities. These results could not completely dispel, however, the general fear in some ethnic communities concerning all intelligence services.

We concluded that the initiative taken by the Region in its Ethnic Community Liaison Program was impressive. The program was well-structured and the objectives were particularly praiseworthy in reaching out to the ethnic communities and focusing on multiculturalism issues for CSIS employees.

We found cases where there were strong links from the liaison to the operational sectors. When liaison officers met with a possible source, we were concerned that the line that separates the liaison program from its operational counterpart was breached. As well, one liaison interview appeared to blur the differences between liaison meetings and community interviews. The Service stated that the liaison staff were present solely to facilitate the meetings.

We noted that the community and liaison programs were duly authorized. As we stated earlier, we believe that clearer policy guidelines are required to better define community interviews.

We also concluded that the Region did not collect personal information on those interviewed for the liaison program. Further, the information from community interviews was amassed on a strictly necessary basis. Finally, we expressed some misgivings about the participation of liaison staff in meetings of an operational nature with members of ethnic communities.

13 1993-94 SIRC Annual Report, p. 14.